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Abstract
This thesis examines the ideas of the psychoanalyst and social psychiatrist, John 
Bowlby. Drawing on the incipient science of ethology, Bowlby argued that 
psychological development was the product how social instincts, in particular the need 
for maternal affection, were reciprocated. While Bowlby’s ideas have proved 
influential and enduring - his notion of the ‘Environment of Evolutionary 
Adaptedness’ has underpinned the recent emergence of Evolutionary Psychology - 
there remains some confusion as to when he adopted his ethological approach. Popular 
accounts have argued that Bowlby’s theorising was shaped by a conversation with the 
evolutionary biologist and essayist, Julian Huxley, and after reading Konrad Lorenz’s 
King Solomon’s Ring in 1952. However, as early as the 1930s Bowlby had taken up 
the observations of the zoologist, Solly Zuckerman, on the behaviour of monkeys and 
used these to anchor a model of human psychological development in which people 
had the potential to become loving or aggressive. This is evident in his 1939 
publication, Personal Aggressiveness and War, co-authored with the economist and 
socialist political philosopher, Evan Durbin. My thesis, therefore, examines the 
construction and meaning of Bowlby’s model of development in the context of inter­
war Britain. I focus on how altruism, viewed idealistically and as the product of 
individual volition prior to World War I, increasingly came to be seen as part of 
people’s innate psychological make-up. It is argued that Bowlby’s model of 
development was part of the formalisation of the search for the evolved basis of 
altruism. This formalisation can be seen as embedded in debates over the constitution 
of democratic socialism with Bowlby and Durbin prominent members of G.D.H.
Cole’s New Fabian Research Bureau. I go on to examine the role of Bowlby’s
2
psychology in response to the rise of fascism and the prospect of the Second World 
War. This is understood as part a change in the framework for generating social policy, 
from idealistic to technological, that was cemented in the post-war government of 
Clement Attlee.
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Ghosts whom Honour never paid,
In foolish battle made,
Wandering through the stricken grove 
Pluck the bitter herb of Love.
- W.H. Auden, ’Dedication to John Auden’, in Auden and Isherwood, The Ascent o f F6 
(London: Faber and Faber, 1937)
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Introduction
1: John Bowlby and the Evolution of Love
This is a story of love -  psychologised, rationalised, and woven into national and 
international social policy. It focuses on one man, John Bowlby (1907-1990), whose 
formulation of the theory of mother-child attachment has never been satisfactorily 
contextualised. Some of its elements are known, but not the whole. This thesis seeks to 
put the man and the theory back together again.
Attachment theory has achieved considerable popular acceptance, being described 
even as a new paradigm for psychotherapy.1 Bowlby used the science of ethology to 
demonstrate that within every infant there was a need for secure attachment to their 
mother, and the way that this need was reciprocated formed a significant factor in 
determining personality development:
A young child’s experience of an encouraging, supportive and co­
operative mother, and a little later father, gives him a sense of worth, a 
belief in the helpfulness of others, and a favourable model on which to 
build future relationships. Furthermore, by enabling him to explore his 
environment with confidence and to deal with it effectively, such 
experience also promotes his sense of competence. Thenceforward, 
provided family relationships continue favourable, not only do these 
patterns of thought, feeling and behaviour persist, but personality
1 Jeremy Holmes, ‘Attachment theory: A biological basis for psychotherapy’, British Journal o f  
Psychiatry, 163, (1993), 430-438
8
becomes increasingly structured to operate in moderately controlled 
and resilient ways, and increasingly capable of continuing so despite 
adverse circumstances.2
This idea is now so basic to our common sense that it is hard to believe that it had to be 
invented. It is accepted that Bowlby’s orientation owed much to Darwin and, more
' i
specifically, that he adopted a biological interpretation of Freudian thought. However, 
where Freud had placed sexual desire as central to psychological life, Bowlby focused 
upon attachment and the loving relationship between a mother and her child. He 
claimed that this need for secure attachment was innate and ubiquitous and could also 
be observed in the behaviour of other primates. Significantly, the famous experiments 
of Harry Harlow, in which young chimpanzees sought out cloth over wire ‘mothers’, 
was formulated after a conversation with Bowlby.4 Bowlby went on to propose the 
idea of the Environment of Evolutionary Adaptedness (henceforth EEA).5 According 
to this, the mechanisms governing human behaviour patterns -  such as the need for 
secure attachment between mother and child, ensuring that a vulnerable infant was 
protected - had been settled early in the evolutionary process, before the invention of 
agriculture and the rapid change that ensued.
Not only has Bowlby’s notion of the EEA underpinned the recent emergence of the 
discipline of evolutionary psychology, but he was also one of the first modem 
Darwinian thinkers to consider the evolution of altruism. The genetic basis of 
selflessness has been a key concern for evolutionary psychologists. Popular historical
2 J. Bowlby, Attachment and Loss, Vol. 1 Attachment (London: Pimlico, 1999) 2nd edition, p. 378
3 For a controversial account o f  Freud’s debt to Darwin, see F. Sulloway, Freud, Biologist o f  the Mind 
(USA: Burnett Books Limited, 1979)
4 D. Haraway, Primate Visions (London: Routledge, 1989), pp. 235-240
5 First proposed in Bowlby’s, Attachment and Loss in 1969
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accounts of the discipline have traced its origins to the mathematical modelling of G.C. 
Williams who demonstrated how altruistic behaviour could win out in the process of 
selection.6 And the recent and influential work of Robert Trivers has furthered 
Williams’ ideas, employing a kin selection paradigm for examining how altruistic or
*7
aggressive behaviour could have been selected for or against. Indeed, it has been 
argued it is the evolutionary psychologists’ conception of gender differences within the 
family, and the way these differences give rise to altruistic behaviour, that sets their 
work apart from previous controversial sociobiological accounts of evolution.8
We are still awaiting a thorough going historical examination of evolutionary 
psychology, but it is a history in which Bowlby will figure prominently.9 
Writing Bowlby’s history allows for an examination of the formulation of evolutionary 
accounts of altruism and an opportunity to assess their social significance. Such an 
enquiry is particularly pertinent given recent calls for a psychologically informed 
social policy.
In her recent book on debates surrounding evolutionary psychology and sociobiology, 
the anthropologist Ullica Segerstr&le identifies a mind-set common to advocates of 
evolutionary psychology. This mind-set Segerstr&le calls a ‘Hyper-Enlightenment 
Quest’, whereby evolutionary psychologists argue it is necessary to understand the
6 G. C. Williams, Adaptation and Natural Selection (Princeton, NJ.: Princeton University Press, 1966); 
and Natural Selection: Domains, Levels and Challenges (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992)
7 R. L. Trivers, ‘The Evolution o f Reciprocal Altruism’, Quarterly Review o f  Biology, vol. 46, (1971), 
pp. 35-57; ‘Parent-offspring Conflict’, American Zoologist, vol. 14, (1974), pp. 246-264; and Social 
Evolution (Menlo Park, CA: Benjamin Cummings, 1985)
8 see V. Dusek, ‘Sociobiology Sanitised: EP and Gene Selectionism’, Science as Culture, vol. 8 (2), 
(1999), pp. 129-169
9 for discussion o f the issues involved in EP and interviews with many o f its advocates see U. 
Segerstrale, Defenders o f  the Truth: The Battle fo r  Science in the Sociobiology Debate and Beyond 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000); or for critical theoretical discussion see H. Rose and S. Rose 
eds. Alas, Poor Darwin (London: Jonathan Cape, 2000)
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evolutionary basis of altruism in order to realise the Enlightenment ambition of the 
creation of a better society for all.10 This focus on enabling the potential for altruistic 
behaviour may be laudable when compared with prior claims of instinctual and 
unavoidable aggression or, more recently, the evolved basis for rape.11 There are, 
however, social consequences of seeing altruism as an evolved trait which justify a 
historical examination of the basis for this modem understanding.
The identification of altruism within nature does not necessarily encourage people to 
act altruistically. On the contrary, anecdote suggests that the idea of altruism has come 
to be seen as detached from human agency and can be put to serve any number of 
different ends. Surely this view of emotions, especially altruism, as gene-serving and 
somehow separate from how people behave in complex social situations, is to some 
degree culpable for what many see as our ‘post-modem malaise’. By looking at 
Bowlby’s work and contextualising the emergence of his Darwinian interpretation of 
altruism, this study seeks to enhance and enrich present day debates by examining their 
contingent basis and reflecting on the earlier discourse it displaced.
It remains unclear when Bowlby’s evolutionary outlook was constructed. In an 
exposition of attachment theory, written by a practicing psychiatrist and 
psychotherapist Jeremy Holmes, it is argued that Bowlby adopted an ethological 
approach after talking with the famous evolutionary biologist and essayist Julian
10 Segerstrale, ‘Chapter 18: Interpreting the Enlightenment Quest’, in her Defenders o f  the Truth, pp. 
349-371
11 On the innate basis o f  aggression see K. Lorenz, On Aggression (London: Methuen, 1966); and on 
rape see R. Thornhill and C.T. Palmer, A Natural History o f  Rape: Biological Bases fo r  Sexual Coercion 
(Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2000)
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Huxley, in 1952.12 In Holmes’ account Bowlby was lent an advance draft of Konrad 
Lorenz’s King Solomon’s Ring (1952) and the ideas Bowlby encountered were used to 
conceptualise data gathered for the World Health Organisation on post-World War II 
orphans.13
A more recent study by Suzan van Dijken, a researcher in Child and Family Studies, 
revises this account by stressing how a proto-attachment theory can be seen in 
Bowlby’s work prior to World War II.14 She offers a detailed intellectual biography of 
Bowlby; showing the prevalence of bio-psychological ideas in the 1920s and 30s and 
how Bowlby encountered them.15 Following van Dijken, I will offer a contextual 
understanding of Bowlby’s ideas in the interwar period. My object is to prove that 
Bowlby’s evolutionary perspective was clearly in place by 1939 when he co-authored 
Personal Aggressiveness and War with the socialist political philosopher, Evan 
Durbin.16 In this work Bowlby and Durbin found evidence for the innate psychological
12 J. Holmes, John Bowlby and Attachment Theory (London: Routledge, 1993), pp. 13-58. There is a 
large and growing literature on Julian Huxley. For surveys o f his work see C.K. Walters and A. Van 
Helden eds., Julian Huxley: Biologist and Statesman o f  Science (Houston: Rice University Press, 1993) 
and M. Keynes and G. A. Harrison eds., Evolutionary Studies: A Centenary Celebration o f  the Life o f  
Julian Huxley (London: Macmillan, 1989). Huxley will later be discussed at length.
13 As well as Holmes, for similar account o f the genesis o f Bowlby’s ideas see; M. Rutter, ‘Clinical 
Implications o f  Attachment Concepts: Retrospect and Prospect’, Journal o f  Child Psychology and 
Psychiatry, vol. 36, (1995), pp. 549-571; I. Bretherton, ‘The Roots and Growing Points o f Attachment 
Theory’ in C.M. Parkes, J. Stevenson-Hinde, and P. Marris eds. Attachment Across the Life Cycle 
(London: Tavistock/Routledge, 1991), pp. 9-32; and ‘The Origins o f Attachment Theory: John Bowlby 
and Mary Ainsworth’, Developmental Psychology, vol. 28, (1992), pp. 759-775. Conversations relating 
to the W.H.O. report between Bowlby, Lorenz, the cognitive psychologist, Jean Piaget, the famous 
anthropologist, Margaret Mead, and others, can be read in J. M. Tanner and B. Inhelder eds., 
Discussions on Child Development: In One Volume (Edinburgh: Tavistock Publications, 1971)
14 S. van Dijken., van der Veer, R., van Ijzendoom, M. and Kuipers, H-J., ‘Bowlby before Bowlby; the 
sources o f an intellectual doctrine in psychoanalysis and psychology’, Journal o f  the History o f  the 
Behavioural Sciences, vol. 34, no.3 (1998), pp. 247-269; and S. van Dijken, John Bowlby: His Early 
Life: A Biographical Journey into the Roots o f  Attachment Theory (London: Free Association Books, 
1998)
15 see also N. Newcombe and J.C. Lemer, ‘Britain between the wars: The historical context o f Bowlby’s 
theory o f attachment’, Psychiatry, vol. 45, (1982), pp. 1-12;
16 on Durbin see Elizabeth Durbin, New Jerusalems: The Labour Party and Economics o f  Democratic 
Socialism  (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1985); and S. Brooke, ‘Evan Durbin: Reassessing a 
Labour ‘Revisionist” , Twentieth Century British History, vol. 7 (1996), pp. 27-52
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potential of love in humans, citing the work of the zoologist, Solly Zuckerman, and the 
psychoanalytic observations of Susan Isaacs.
Bowlby’s thinking did undergo subsequent shifts. He integrated cognitive theories into 
his work, and no doubt his affinity to Lorenz’s ideas on imprinting persuaded him to 
incorporate the ethological concept of innate releasing mechanisms. However, while 
ethology may have given Bowlby a language and the tools to elaborate his ideas, I 
believe that the fundamentals of attachment theory were in place prior to World War 
II. I will locate and discuss its emergence in the context of interwar Britain.
2: Historiography
The multitude, complexity and incompatibility of the approaches to the history of 
psychology that have arisen in recent years make the need for clarity more pressing 
than a desire for historiographical originality. Primarily I am concerned with the 
meaning and the construction of Bowlby attachment theory, which is where I believe 
van Dijken’s work is lacking. While her study is rigorous and invaluable as a guide to 
research, it is problematic on two counts. First, it has no analytical device for thinking 
about the making of Bowlby’s attachment theory. All she offers is a series of 
influences that, with the benefit of hindsight, we can see as antecedents of Bowlby’s 
later theory. This approach cannot by definition explain how and why Bowlby’s work
1 7differed from what went before. The second problem with van Dijken’s account is 
that it is intemalistic. Rarely does she stray from discussion of psychology and its 
related disciplines. Even if  one adopts the ‘influences’ approach there are many fields
17 For a critique o f the use o f ‘influence’ in history see Q. Skinner, ‘Limits o f  Historical Explanations’, 
Philosophy, vol. 41, (1961)
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other than psychology from which Bowlby could have drawn ideas important to his 
attachment theory. Of course van Dijken’s work could be extended to include extra- 
disciplinary notions that align with Bowlby’s psychological thinking. However, 
without any analytical concepts the number of prospective influences outside of 
psychology appears overwhelming, and it is hard to see how this type of history could 
be written in a meaningful way.
Some of these arguments against ‘internal’ histories of science are evident in early 
critical histories of psychology. Reacting against the positivism and justificationism
that characterised histories by psychologists themselves, historians of science have
1 8long argued that psychology should be seen within its social context. R.M. Young, 
among others, scrutinised the work of E.O. Wilson and saw his sociobiology as the 
naturalisation of the social inequalities that critical historians of psychology wanted to 
highlight and transform.19 While historical accounts of sociobiology have emphasised 
how the discipline embodies a conservative ideology, Bowlby’s ‘psycho-sociobiology’ 
is noticeably different. As we shall see, Bowlby was a close friend of several important 
Labour party reformers and he showed no interest in justifying social inequality in 
biological terms.
Bowlby’s ideas have, to a certain extent, been tackled by a later generation of 
historians of psychology. Nikolas Rose, for example, draws upon the work of Michel 
Foucault to cast psychology in general as part of changing discourses on social
18 R.M. Young, ‘Scholarship and the History o f the Behavioural Sciences’, History o f  Science, vol. 5, 
(1966), pp. 1-51
19 R.M. Young, ‘Darwinism is Social’, in D. Kohn ed., The Darwinian Heritage (Princeton, N.J.: 
Princeton University Press, 1985), pp. 609-38. For discussion o f some o f the issues involved in these 
debates see N. Jumonville, ‘The Cultural Politics o f the Sociobiology Debate’, Journal o f  the History o f  
Biology, vol. 35, (2002), pp. 569-593; and R. Lewontin, It A in ’t Necessarily So: The Dream o f  the 
Human Genome and Other Illusions (London: Granta Books, 2001)
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relations. Rose addresses the way in which psychology changes ideas about the self 
and how psychological theories shape new techniques for organising society. Bowlby 
is identified as an important figure in an emergent discourse on maternal deprivation
9 1after World War II. Aside from taking issue with Rose’s identification of Bowlby 
with a post-Second World War movement, I do not think that his separation of 
language and discursive practices from other aspects of material culture can be 
maintained. As Martin Jay, the cultural historian, has skilfully argued, language is 
intrinsically bound up with other forms of human expression, such as visual culture.22 
Further, Foucauldian histories allow for no agency behind ideas and offer no sense of 
the material necessities that must be in place to hold them together.
An alternative approach is that of the sociologists of knowledge who see ideas as 
situated within society where the conditions for their existence are not determinants 
but contingencies. Within this school by far the best example of the sociology of 
psychological knowledge remains the work of Martin Kusch. He argues that 
psychological knowledge should be seen as a social institution, much as a bank or a 
church, and that, like these other institutions, it is constructed and sustained by
9Tcollectives who believe in it. Thus psychological ideas are not only discursive 
practices but are embedded in wider competing and overlapping social formations that 
require institutionalisation if they are to be propagated. Within this paradigm, however, 
it is difficult to understand the relationships of people holding different ideas and how 
people actually experience their roles in the negotiation of knowledge. This is surely a
20 see N. Rose, ‘Engineering the Human Soul: Analysing Psychological Expertise’, Science in Context, 
vol. 5(2), (1992), pp. 351-369; The Psychological Complex (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1985); 
and Governing the Soul: The Shaping o f  the Private Self (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1990)
21 see Rose, Governing the Soul, pp. 151-177
22 M. Jay, Downcast Eyes: The Denigration o f  Vision in Twentieth Century French Thought (Berkley: 
University o f California Press, 1993)
23 M. Kusch, Psychological Knowledge: A Social History and Philosophy (London: Routledge, 1999)
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prerequisite for writing meaningful history and not simply recording the past. To fill 
this void Kusch makes a dichotomy between psychological ideas and ‘folk’ 
psychologies. He justifies this division by arguing that:
.. ..theories of scientific psychology and bodies of social knowledge are 
rather different. In the network or web of social institutions, theories of 
scientific psychology are phenomena of the short term, and highly 
sensitive to influences of other institutions. Bodies of folk psychology, 
on the other hand, are fundamental and phenomena of the duree 
longue.24
Although this perspective situates psychology in material conditions and, in contrast to 
Foucauldian histories, there is some agency behind psychological ideas, it is still 
difficult so see how psychology connects with people. This latter problem is the 
concern of Denise Riley in War in the Nursery (1983). She focuses on developmental 
psychologies and their place within twentieth century British society and, in a wide- 
ranging introduction, discusses the conceptual difficulties at the heart of theories of
y c
development. This is then used as a platform for an attempt to reconcile social 
constructivism and biologism. Riley dwells upon Marxism, as this takes the 
relationship between the individual and the social as the crucial problem.26 Although 
she acknowledges that there is no secure theory of social relations, she goes on to 
examine the relationship between the popularisation of developmental psychologies, 
such as Bowlby’s, and the labour market. My sympathies are with Riley although my 
interests are slightly different.
24 Kusch, Psychological Knowledge, p. 3
25 D. Riley, War in the Nursery: Theories o f  the Child and Mother (London: Virago, 1983)
26 Riley, War, p. 3
16
Rather than look at the popularisation of Bowlby’s ideas, I am interested in their 
construction and meaning. I do not wish to offer a justification for Bowlby but rather, 
set up a dialogue between his biologism and his social context. Although it is 
impossible to historically investigate Bowlby’s claims on childhood development, I 
believe that engaging with Bowlby and the issues that preoccupied him will suggest 
alternative ways of looking at the relationship between the individual and the social.27 
In writing Bowlby’s history we are afforded the opportunity to reassess the 
appropriateness of his ideas of development for our present day society. Rather than 
attempting to offer a grand theory of the relationship between society and developing 
minds and bodies, I will argue that Bowlby’s theory of attachment was part of a 
process in which the idea of altruistic love became rationalised.
3: Between Love and Aggression
A popular or common-sense understanding of the relationship between scientific 
knowledge and its perceived social value would hold that the former precedes the 
latter. However, Bowlby’s history shows how a belief in an evolved understanding of 
altruism for the betterment of society was not conceived on the basis of scientific ideas
27 This is basically the same orientation as H. Stuart Hughes in his Consciousness and Society (Brighton: 
Harvester Press, 1979). Conclusive cross-cultural studies for assessing Bowlby’s psychology have not 
been forthcoming. For an example o f how cross-cultural studies have been carried out to investigate and 
refute the claims o f  evolutionary psychologists, in this case gender differences in sexual jealousy, see 
D.M. Buss, R.J. Larsen, D. Westen, and J. Semelroth, ‘Sex Differences in Jealousy: Evolution, 
Physiology and Psychology’, Psychological Science, vol. 3, (1992), pp. 251-255; D.M. Buss, A. 
Angleitner, B.P. Buunk, and V. Oubaid, ‘Sex Differences in Jealousy in Evolutionary and Cultural 
Perspective. Tests From the Netherlands, Germany and the United States’ Psychological Science, vol. 
7(6), (1996), pp. 359-363; C.R. Harris and N. Christenfold, ‘Gender, Jealousy and Reason’ 
Psychological Science, vol. 7(6), pp. 364-366; D.A. Desteno and P. Salovey, ‘Evolutionary Origins of  
Sex Differences in Jealousy? Questioning the ‘Fitness’ o f the M odel’ Psychological Science, vol. 7(6), 
(1996), pp. 367-372; D.M. Buss, R.J. Larsen and D. Westen, ‘Sex Differences in Jealousy: Not Gone, 
not Forgotten and not Explained by Alternative Hypotheses’, Psychological Science, 7(6), (1996) pp. 
373-375; and C.R. Harris and N. Christenfold, ‘Jealousy and Rational Response to Infidelity Across 
Gender and Culture’, Psychological Science, 7(6), (1996), pp. 378-379.
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of altruism. Rather, I contend, new evolutionary accounts of altruism were the product 
of wider social changes in which love ceased to be seen as a volitional, conscious 
human activity, and came to be viewed as a potentiality, something that could be 
engendered for the creation of a more harmonious society. To use the sociologist, Max 
Weber’s, term love became rationalised.
Rationalisation is the most general concept of Weber’s sociology. It refers to the 
process by which knowledge is increasingly systematised with the rise of secular
9 oideology and bureaucratisation. Although I do not wish to align myself with Weber’s 
thoughts on love, I will argue that, with the advent of World War I, ideas of altruistic
90love became modernised. Beginning with the work of Wilfred Trotter and his 
advocacy of the use of psychology to boost the morale of soldiers, altruism began to be 
seen as the product of the evolved unconscious, replacing the dominant late nineteenth 
and early twentieth century view of altruism as a conscious and volitional action.30
It has been persuasively argued that in the latter half of the nineteenth century, the idea 
of altruism was seen as an uncontested ideal that structured contemporary social and
28 H.H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills, From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology (London: Routledge and 
Kegan Paul, 1970), p. 51
29 on Weber’s view on love see Gerth and Wright Mills, From Max Weber, p. 3 4 7 .1 am using altruism 
as a generic term for psychological and proto-psychological conceptions o f non-sexual, selfless love. I 
have tried to avoid being anachronistic and appreciate that the meaning o f  the term alters. These often 
subtle changes are noted throughout the thesis, reinforcing the overall argument. I admit that one 
interesting element not dealt with in this thesis is the frequency o f its use. Altruism was in common 
usage in late nineteenth and early twentieth century thought. With World War I, however, it was less 
frequently employed and often used interchangeably with co-operation or as an example o f a more 
general conception o f love. Tracking these changes and the emergence o f altruism within later 
evolutionary thought could provide an interesting avenue for future investigation, hopefully 
complemented by this thesis.
30 W. Trotter, Instincts o f  the Herd in Peace and War (London: T. Fisher Unwin, Ltd, 1916). On the 
rationalisation o f medicine and war see R. Cooter, M. Harrison, and S. Sturdy eds. War, Medicine and 
Modernity (Stroud: Sutton, 1998)
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moral thought.31 Psychological ideas of altruism reflected and contributed towards this 
framework. For instance, when altruism was cast in Darwinian terms in the work of 
Henry Drummond, it was represented as the pinnacle of the evolutionary process.32 
And in the early theorising on personality or character formation it was argued that 
altruism was attained through the inhibition of the more primitive selfish faculties.
This conception of altruism began to change with World War I, as I will discuss in 
Chapter 1, with many of the nineteenth century debates becoming transposed into new 
ideas on the make up of the human unconscious. After the war, and in the context of a 
crisis in national identity, many thinkers sought to understand the evolutionary basis of 
altruism within history and within the unconscious in order to reinstate the certainties 
of the pre-war world.
The identification of altruism within human nature created a space in which it could be 
contested on scientific grounds. In the works of Ian Suttie and Susan Isaacs, 
acknowledged as important precursors to Bowlby’s idea of attachment, it can be seen 
how altruism was constituted psychoanalytically. Altruism was no longer viewed as an 
a priori ideal but was seen by Suttie as a biologically grounded myth, and by Isaacs as 
an unconscious genetic trait that had to be understood and enabled by the analyst.
Chapter 2 of this study positions Bowlby in these debates. His changing views of love 
can be seen as analogous to the shifts that had occurred over the previous half-century. 
There are many points of contact between Bowlby’s changing views of love and the
31 S. Collini, T h e Culture o f  Altruism, Selflessness and the Decay o f Motive’, in his Public Moralists: 
Political Thought and Intellectual Life in Britain 1850-1930 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993), pp. 60- 
90. Also see J. Harris, ‘Political Thought and the Welfare State 1870-1940: An Intellectual Framework 
for British Social Policy’, Past and Present, vol. 135, (1992), pp. 116-141
32 H. Drummond, The Lowell Lectures on the Ascent o f  Man (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1894)
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people and institutions who sought to promote its rationalisation. For example, an 
important contributory factor in shaping Bowlby’s notion of altruism was his 
befriending Hugh Gaitskell, the future Labour Party leader, and Evan Durbin, with 
whom Bowlby would later write Personal Aggressiveness and War. Gaitskell and 
Durbin both studied at Oxford University where, to a large extent, Socialist politics 
were underpinned by the new ideas of altruism that had emerged after the war. This 
forms the subject of chapter 3 where particular attention is paid to the group 
surrounding the socialist and economic historian G.D.H. Cole. This group and the New 
Fabian Research Bureau formed the perfect political platform from which Bowlby and 
Durbin could argue for the integration of rationalised love into mainstream politics. 
Based on the belief that people had the psychological potential for love, Durbin 
elaborated his vision of democratic socialism and this proved important in shaping the 
Labour Party’s acceptance of Keynesian economics.
Durbin’s ideological package informed his and Bowlby’s response to the rise of 
fascism, and Chapter 4 of this study addresses the place of psychological ideas of love 
in socio-political debates leading up to World War II. Through an interrogation of 
changing ideas of security it can be seen how Bowlby and Durbin reconfigured ideas 
of international co-operation into a psychological defence for fighting the war. The 
idea of the altruistic unconscious provided the conceptual space for debating the moral 
questions raised by the prospect of conflict. For Bowlby and Durbin the social group 
or government that promoted altruistic relationships and enabled international 
prosperity, was justified in using military action against a German government that 
was based upon and fostered aggressive tendencies.
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This justification for British foreign policy was reflected in Bowlby and Durbin’s 
domestic social policy (Chapter 5). Whereas, prior to 1940, British social policy had 
been formulated in idealistic terms, we can see in Bowlby’s evacuation work, and in 
Durbin’s contributions to the post-war Attlee government, a move towards a 
technological social policy rooted in a theory of social behaviour that would dominate 
British politics for the next twenty years. Altruism was no longer to be seen as the 
driving force for social progress but was instead a potentiality for responsible social 
behaviour. Historical discussion of these issues raises questions about the appropriate 
role for psychology in a progressive society, in particular the compatibility, or not, of 
psychologies o f love and commerce.
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Chapter 1: Changing Conceptions of Altruistic Love
The idea of selflessness has, of course, a long history and this chapter makes no claims
to be comprehensive. Rather, it traces out some of the early British ideas of altruism
and draws on recent historical research showing the place o f selflessness in late
nineteenth and early twentieth century debates. The examples used give the historical
background and ancestry of Bowlby’s ideas and, in turn, permit an analysis of the
changes that occurred in the interwar years, 
o
1: The Evolution of Love in Late Nineteenth- Early Twentieth Century Britain
The place o f ideas of altruistic love in the late nineteenth century is a complex one. 
Debates surrounding it were mediated by competing ideological concerns and, more 
broadly, by the variety of responses to the Victorian ‘crisis of faith’. However, a 
pattern can be discerned in these debates. The historian Jose Harris has identified an 
idealistic intellectual framework for generating social policy in the period. Harris 
writes of how, with the previously localised provision of social welfare coming within 
the national sphere, social policy came to be based upon ‘corporate identity, individual
• . . .  T ' l  .altruism, ethical imperatives and active citizen-participation’. Sociological and 
psychological theories, including evolutionary ideas, were rooted in this framework. 
More profoundly, Stefan Collini has argues that the notion of altruism was 
fundamental to ‘the primacy of morality’ that characterised Victorian culture.34 
Although we might look back to the work of Jean-Jacques Rousseau to discern a 
theory of altruistic love, Collini notes how the term was first coined by Auguste Comte
33 J. Harris, ‘Political Thought and the Welfare State’, p. 137
34 S. Collini, ‘The Culture o f Altruism’, pp. 60-64. Also see T. Wright, The Religion o f  Humanity: The 
Impact o f  Comtean Positivism on Victorian Britain (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986)
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and did not enter the English language until 1853. It quickly became common usage 
and, Collini argues, became an uncontested basis for Victorian thought. Opposed to 
selfishness and giving in to one’s temptations, altruism was central to the Victorian
• temphasis on duty and obligation. Collini uses various examples to make his case, 
giving extended discussion to the work of John Stuart Mill. My examples given below 
-  early socio-medical and pedagogical reformers, and early personality theorists -  bear 
out Collini’s thesis and provide the backdrop to discussions of changing conceptions of 
altruism and the later psychoanalytic formulation evident in the work of Bowlby.
In her intellectual biography of Margaret McMillan, the historian Carolyn Steedman 
traces out the ideas that contributed to McMillan’s founding of the first public clinic 
for children at Deptford in 1910, her presidency of the Nursery School Association,
T *7
and of her theories on childhood development. McMillan had argued for social 
reform through the introduction of culture in the lives of the working class and the 
cultivation of childhood imagination. Steedman points to McMillan’s debt to Rousseau 
and the romantic ideas of William Wordsworth, as well as the evolutionary theology of 
Henry Drummond, the Scottish naturalist and Free Churchman.38
35 ibid., p. 60. On Rousseau and how he conceived o f the relationship between virtue and nature see J-J. 
Rousseau, The First and Second Discourses, R.D. Masters ed. (New York: St. Martins Press, 1964); for 
discussion see, F. Moran III, ‘Between Primates and Primitives: Natural man and the Missing Link in 
Rousseau’s Second Discourse', Journal o f  the History o f  Ideas, vol. 54, (1993), pp. 37-58; and M.F. 
Plattner, Rousseau’s State o f  Nature: An Interpretation o f  the Discourse on Inequality (Dekalb: 
Northern Illinois University Press, 1979)
36 Collini, ‘The Culture o f  Altruism’, pp. 63-4
37 C. Steedman, Childhood, Culture and Class in Britain: Margaret McMillan, 1860-1931 (London: 
Virago Press, 1990)
38 On the establishment o f  romantic, post-Wordsworthian child literature see P. Coveney, The Image o f  
Childhood, The Individual and Society: A Study o f  the Theme in English Literature (Harmondsworth: 
Penguin, 1967), pp. 37-51, 68-90. Robert Pattison looks at the differences between Rousseau and 
Wordsworth’s visions o f  childhood in The Child Figure in English Literature (Athens: University o f  
Georgia Press, 1978), p. 58
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In his Ascent o f  Man (1894) Drummond conceived of evolution as not only the 
progress of matter, as had famously been advocated by Herbert Spencer, but also as the 
progression of spirit:39
Evolution is Advolution; better, it is Revelation -  the phenomenal 
expression of the Divine, the progressive realisation of the Ideal, the 
Ascent of Love.... The aspiration in the human mind and heart is but 
the evolutionary tendency of the universe becoming self-conscious.40
This romantic interpretation of Darwinian thought held altruism to be the pinnacle of 
evolution. Although altruism may have been naturalised, it remained an uncontested 
ideal. It was not something contained within nature, as later theories would hold, but 
part of a progressive process through which people had recognised it as their duty to 
attend to the helplessness of childhood. Katharine Bruce Glasier, a close ally of 
McMillan, wrote of how this formed the basis for civilisation:
Those who are familiar with the biographical writing of the brothers 
Reclus and Kropotkin, gathered into a wonderfully suggestive form by 
Drummond in his ‘Ascent of Man’, will recognise the form of the 
argument that it was the helplessness of little children more than any
39 On the wider relationship between ideas of childhood development and Darwinian thinking see C. 
Steedman, Strange Dislocations: Childhood and the Idea o f  Human Interiority, 1780-1930 (London: 
Virago Press, 1995) and C. Castaneda, ‘Developmentalism and the Child in Nineteenth-Century 
Science’, Science as Culture, vol. 10(3), (2001), pp. 375-409. On Herbert Spencer see J.D.Y. Peel, 
Herbert Spencer: The Evolution o f  a Sociologist (London: Heinemann, 1971)
40 H. Drummond, quoted and discussed in J. Moore, The Post-Darwinian Controversies: A Study o f  the 
Protestant Struggle to come to Terms with Darwin in Great Britain and America, 1870-1900 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), p. 224
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other influence that has led us as a human race to the possibilities of the 
Socialist State.41
The recognition of childhood innocence and helplessness allowed for the expression of 
altruism in ‘the infinite self-sacrifices of Maternity’.42
These ideas also featured in the work of James Sully, the psychologist and pedagogue. 
Sully’s recapitulatory psychology saw the study of childhood as the study of the 
genesis of the human mind.43 Unlike present day genetic psychologies, based on a 
material conception of genes that can supposedly pass on psychological structures, 
Sully’s genetics referred to a temporal state of innocence corresponding to the 
Romanticism discussed above.44 Sully became an important figure in the establishment 
of scientific psychology in Britain and served as vice-president of the London Child 
Study Society, founded in 1894, and his work found wide recognition.45
The ideas of Drummond and Sully are also evidence of a wider movement based on 
Tmmanentisf theology. An examination of immanentist beliefs further supports 
Collini’s thesis that altruism was an a priori ideal underlying the values of the period.
41 Katharine Bruce Glasier, quoted and discussed in Steedman, Childhood, pp. 73-4;
42 Drummond, quoted ibid., p. 74; Peter Kropotkin was an influential anarchist and had employed 
Lamarckian theory to argue that co-operation could aid survival and that this trait was passed on directly 
to future generations; P. Kropotkin, Mutual Aid: A Factor in Evolution (London: Heinemann, 1902)
43 J. Sully, ‘Introduction’, in B. Pererz, Child Psychology (London: Sonnenschein, 1885), p. v; on Sully 
see L.G. Gurjeva, ‘James Sully and Scientific Psychology, 1870-1910’, G.C. Bunn, A.D. Lovie and 
G.D. Richards eds. Psychology in Britain: Historical Essays and Personal Reflections (Leicester: BPS 
Books, 2001), pp. 72-94
44 J. Sully, Studies o f  Childhood (London: Longmans Green, 1895); for a comparison with Freud’s 
model o f recapitulation see G. Richards, ‘Britain on the Couch: The Popularization o f Psychoanalysis in 
Britain 1918-1940’, Science in Context, vol. 13(2), (2000), p. 188. Humphrey Carpenter writes o f the 
connection between the Wordsworthian understanding o f childhood and the genesis story in Secret 
Gardens: The Golden Age o f  Children’s Literature (London: Allen and Unwin, 1985), p. 9
45 Gurjeva, ‘James Sully’, p. 74
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In a recent article, Mark Bevir highlights the importance of religious belief in the early 
years of the Labour movement.46 Rather than see ethical socialism as rooted in a 
secular class movement, Bevir examines the role that religious ideas played in shaping 
socialist beliefs.47 He argues that a common solution to the Victorian crisis of faith, 
precipitated by the rise of Darwinian theory, was to adopt an immanentist view of God. 
Replacing atonement theology, immanentism was a belief that God dwells in the world 
rather than being transcendent of it, and Bevir stresses how this view could promote a 
socialist outlook 48 Immanentism blurred the distinction between sacred and secular; it 
suggested that everybody contained the divine within them and could support the 
notion of a universal brotherhood; and it led to a new consideration of Christ the man 
as an example to follow 49
To take one example, the Congregationalist, the Rev. R. J. Campbell, instigated the 
‘New Theology’ social movement and created the Progressive League in 1907.50 
Campbell had been a charismatic preacher and came to socialism after meeting and 
being ‘converted’ by the evangelical Christian and Labour Party Leader, Kier Hardie.51 
Campbell’s ‘New Theology’, which was delivered to Labour churches, trade unions, 
Independent Labour Party meetings and Fabian debates, was drawn from the doctrine 
of Divine Immanence. Campbell stressed the impossibility of knowing a
46 M. Bevir, ‘The Labour Church Movement, 1891-1902’, The Journal o f  British Studies, vol. 38(2), 
(1999), pp. 217-245
47 In this respect Bevir is building on the work o f Chris Waters, British Socialists and the Politics o f  
Popular Culture (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1990) and S. Yeo, ‘A New Life: The 
Religion o f Socialism in Britain, 1883-1896’, History Workshop, vol. 4, (1977), pp. 5-56
48 Bevir, ‘The Labour Church’, pp. 221-2. On atonement theology, see B. Hilton, The Age o f  Atonement: 
The Influence o f  Evangelicalism on Social and Economic Thought, 1795-1865 (Oxford: Clarendon, 
1988). The differences between Evangelicalism and T.H. Green’s views are also discussed in M.
Richter, The Politics o f  Conscience: T.H. Green and His Age (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson,
1964), pp. 13-32
49 Bevir, ‘The Labour Church’, p. 223
50 P.d’A. Jones, The Christian Socialist Revival, 1877-1914: Religion, Class and Social Conscience in 
Late-Victorian England (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1968), pp. 421-430
51 on Keir Hardie K. Morgan, Keir Hardie: Radical and Socialist (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 
1975)
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transcendental God and how this belief led to a dangerous dualism: ‘It is the immanent 
God with whom we have to do’, every man was ‘a potential Christ’. To this end 
Campbell founded the League of Progressive Thought and Social Service, attracting
STthe support of George Bernard Shaw, among others.
Immanentist beliefs were exemplified in, but by no means confined to, the work of the 
Oxford philosopher T.H. Green. Since the publication of Melvin Richter’s The Politics 
o f Conscience: T.H. Green and His Age (1964), the importance of T.H. Green’s 
idealistic philosophy in shaping British social policy has been well documented. 
Green’s theology was written as a defence of Christianity from the doubts raised by 
science and scholarship. It stressed activism rather than contemplation and taught the 
duties of applied altruism rather than piety. Christianity became a social religion based 
upon active citizenship, and these ideas found a large audience in Mrs Humphry 
Ward’s nineteenth century best seller, Robert Elsmere.54 Ward wrote of the link 
between Green’s theology and his politics that:
Mr Green was not only a leading Balliol tutor, but an energetic Liberal, 
a member both of the Oxford Town Council and of various University 
bodies; a helper in all the great steps taken for the higher education of 
women at Oxford, and keenly attracted by the project of a High School 
for the town boys of Oxford - a m an.. .preoccupied.. .with the need of 
leading a ‘useful life’.55
52 R. J. Campbell, The New Theology, Popular Edition (London: Mills and Boon, 1909), pp. v-vi, ix-x;
quoted in Jones, The Christian, p. 423 
5 Jones, The Christian, p. 426
54 Richter, The Politics, pp. 25-29
55 Mrs Humphry Ward, A W riter’s Recollections (London: Collins, 1918), pp. 133-4
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Although Green was undoubtedly an important figure, Jose Harris stresses how his 
work was just the tip of an idealistic iceberg.56
Immanentism, as well as providing the basis for progressive politics, has been seen as 
laying the groundwork for later psychological ideas of personality. According to the 
historian Rhodri Hayward, some nineteenth century idealists developed a conception
cn
of an altruistic personality through the idea of ‘kenosis’. Kenosis referred to a set of 
theological beliefs that were based, not on an eternal Godhead, but on the incarnation
<ro
of Christ and his embracing his mortality. This allowed for a conception of Christ the 
person that provided a template for future discussions of personality. An altruistic 
personality was the product of the individual human conscience following the example 
of Christ - accepting mortality and finding transcendence through engaging with the 
social world. Thus, Hayward concludes, in this new theological conception of 
personality the transcendent aspects of man became the inner life of people living in 
the social world. This coalesced with an older legal understanding and, as William 
Wallace, Whyte’s Professor of Moral Philosophy at Oxford and a follower of T.H. 
Green, wrote in an article entitled ‘Person and Personality’: ‘It is tolerably evident that 
such personality is a quality inhering in the individual through his place in the 
system.’59
This new conception of personality can be seen in the British response to the work of 
Arthur Schopenhauer. I dwell on Schopenhauer because the British reception of his
56 Harris, ‘Political Thought’, p. 123
57 R. Hayward, ‘Popular Mysticism and the Origins o f the New Psychology, 1880-1910’, PhD Thesis, 
Lancaster University, (1995), pp. 8-78
58 Hayward, ‘Popular Mysticism’, p. 17
59 W. Wallace, ‘Person and Personality’, in his Lectures and Essays on Natural Theology and Ethics 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1898), p. 268
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work shows how immanentism was resistant to any metaphysical or scientific analysis 
of altruism. Schopenhauer’s ideas are now seen as precursors to Freud’s and they were 
characterised by his opposition to Hegelian idealism. Schopenhauer built upon and 
extended the work of Immanuel Kant to construct a philosophy of the will. In his 
principal work, The World as Will and Idea (1819), he proposed, in line with Kant, 
that phenomena exist as we perceive them but, (unlike in Kantian philosophy) believed 
that it was possible to grasp ultimate reality. Schopenhauer identified reality with will. 
The will contained not only reason but also unconscious physiological functioning.
The parallels with the work of Freud, who admired Schopenhauer, are easy to draw, 
and the ‘unconscious’ aspect of Schopenhauer’s thinking was developed by Edward 
Von Hartmann in nineteenth century Germany.60 However, for Schopenhauer altruistic 
love was not to be found in the rational or unconscious parts of the will. On the 
contrary, Schopenhauer thought the nature of the will would continually lead people to 
be unhappy as their urges could never be satisfied. Drawing on Eastern and Western 
religions, Schopenhauer argued that it was only by the abandonment o f the experience 
of the will that people would be able to act ethically and altruistically. Altruistic love 
was a metaphysical state, radically different from the sentimental love of couples 
which was driven by the will and could result only in the conflict of passion and 
reason. However, such a metaphysical analysis of altruism and the difficulty of its 
attainment was radically inconsistent with British philosophy.
Schopenhauer’s work was not readily assimilated in Britain and did not come to have 
any significant impact until after his death. In the first English biography and overview 
of his work Helen Zimmem noted the steady growth of curiosity in it. But she took
60 see R.K. Gupta, ‘Freud and Schopenhauer’, Journal o f  the History o f  Ideas, vol. 36(4), (1975), pp. 
721-728
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issue with what she saw as his one-sided idealistic tendency and did not believe that 
Schopenhauer successfully reconciled metaphysics with the natural world.61 This point 
was drawn out by a reviewer in the pages of the journal Mind who wrote how 
Schopenhauer had taken metaphysical and philosophical concerns and placed them 
within the will (the realm of the physical scientist) while Schopenhauer’s own 
metaphysics were inadequate.62 This view was again repeated by the aforementioned 
William Wallace who commented at length on the confusing relationship of the will 
and the intellect in Schopenhauer’s thought. The Victorian conception of the 
relationship between the will and the intellect can be examined through the idea of 
character.
Character was used to refer the possession of highly valued moral qualities which 
generally equated to the ability to inhibit or restrain one’s self from the lower forms of 
behaviour.64 There was much discussion about how such a character could be 
produced* for example, in the economics of Alfred Marshall and in the Fellowship of 
the New Life, out of which the Fabian Society had grown in 18 83.65 For the purposes 
of this study it is important to note that altruism was not being directly cultivated. How 
could it be if it resided outside of human nature as an a priori ideal? What could be 
cultivated were habits that would allow for the expression of altruism.
61 H. Zimmern, Arthur Schopenhauer: His Life and His Philosophy (London: Longmans, Green and Co., 
1876)
62 R. Anderson, ‘Schopenhauer’s Philosophy’, Mind, vol. 1(4), (1876), pp. 491-509
63 W. Wallace, Life o f  Arthur Schopenhauer (London: Walter Scott, 1890)
64 S. Collini, ‘The Idea o f Character, Private Habits and Public Virtues’, in his Public Moralists, pp. 96- 
7
65 ibid., pp. 91-3; the changing objective o f economics as regards character will be drawn out later in this 
study.
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Prior to the advent of psychoanalysis, there is little evidence o f psychological 
theorising being employed for the betterment of character. Rather, early personality 
theories where distinguished by taxonomies of instincts and elitist judgements of what 
constituted better characters, i.e. how those of a certain disposition could inhibit the 
baser instincts.
The most widely read psychologist of the early twentieth century was William 
McDougall, whose An Introduction to Social Psychology (1908) went through 21 
editions in twenty years and it was structured around his ‘hormic’ psychology.66 The 
term ‘hormic’ referred to his belief that all behaviour was purposeful. For McDougall, 
instincts were the sources of ‘hormic energy’, but human character was explained by 
the ability to inhibit instincts and be ‘self-regarding’.67 Following on from McDougall, 
Alexander Shand’s The Foundations o f Character (1914) cast altruistic love within 
this hormic model. Shand employed a distinction between the sentiment of love based 
upon the sex instinct and love based upon devotion.68 The devotional form could be 
seen in matemalism and the commitment of men to science and art. While it might 
take many forms, it was always characterised as the pursuit o f some ‘Ideal’.69 Pursuing
66 L. Heamshaw, A Short History o f  British Psychology, J840-1940 (London: Methuen and Co. Ltd., 
1964), p. 188; W. McDougall, An Introduction to Social Psychology (London: Methuen, 1908); for 
limited historical discussion o f  McDougall see L. Krantz and D. Allen, ‘The Rise and Fall o f McDougall 
and Instinct’, Journal o f  the History o f  the Behavioural Sciences, vol. 3, (1967), pp. 326-38, and H.G. 
McCurdy, ‘William M cDougall’, in B.B, Wolman ed., Historical Roots o f  Contemporary Psychology 
(New York: Harper and Row, 1968), pp. 111-130
67 Even when McDougall was introduced to and borrowed from the work o f Freud, he maintained that it 
was inhibition and not the unconscious that explained human behaviour; Heamshaw, A Short History, p. 
193
68 A. Shand, The Foundations o f  Character (London: Macmillan and Company, 1920), p. 112, first 
published 1914. Many o f Shand’s ideas had actually preceded McDougall’s and can be seen in A.
Shand, ‘Character and the Emotions’, Mind, vol. 5, (1896), pp. 203-226. For discussion o f Shand’s debt 
to the utilitarian John Stuart M ill’s version o f ethology and French ideas o f  character formation see,
D.E. Leary, ‘The Fate and Influence o f John Stuart M ill’s Proposed Science o f Ethology’, Journal o f  the 
History o f  Ideas, vol. 43 (1), (1982), pp. 153-162
69 Shand, The Foundations, p. 113
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an ‘Ideal’ was not driven by a natural instinct. Rather the pursuit itself constituted an 
altruistic character and was, therefore, the product of individual choice.
This model of altruism was not a simple reflection of immanentist beliefs, but was
70underpinned by an elitist idea of the inferiority of the masses. As Reba Soffer has 
argued, this British social psychology constituted a new form of elitism based on the
71fear that mass democracy would destroy moral institutions. McDougall’s hierarchical 
psychology supported his belief in the irrationality of the masses and his authoritarian 
politics.72 And the views of Alexander Shand, an aristocrat with royal connections, can 
be seen to embody an elitist model of altruism. Shand’s psychology equated to a scale 
for measuring altruism and contained no genuine insight into the quality of 
selflessness. It is tempting to place his ideas within a larger tradition of institutions that 
sought to collapse altruism into a few simple moral imperatives; the ‘muscular 
Christianity’ of British public schools and Boy Scout movement are ready examples.73 
I do, however, grant that this would take a much longer analysis.
70 For a wide ranging discussion o f tum-of-the-century psychologies and how they embodied the idea of  
the inferiority o f  the masses see P. Crook, Darwinism, War and History: The Debate Over the Biology 
o f  War from  ‘Origin o f  the Species ’ to the First World War (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1994), especially pp. 146-152
71 R.N. Soffer, Ethics and Society in Modern Britain: The Revolution o f  the Social Sciences, 1870-1914 
(Berkeley: University o f  California Press, 1978), pp. 217-233 and 234-251; and R.N. Soffer, ‘The New  
Elitism: Social Psychology in Pre-War England’, The Journal o f  British Studies, vol. 8(2), (1969), pp. 
111-140
72 see W. McDougall, The Group Mind (Cambridge: The University Press, 1927), and Ethics and Some 
Modern World Problems (New York: G.P. Putnam’s Sons, 1924)
73 On the idea o f character and public schools see J.A. Mangan, Athleticism in the Victorian and 
Edwardian Public School: The Emergence and Consolidation o f  an Educational Ideology (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1981); on the failure o f public school sporting ‘comradeship’ to make an 
impact on the working class see S. Barlow, ‘The Diffusion o f  “Rugby” Football in the Industrialised 
Context o f Rochdale, 1868-90: A Conflict o f Ethical Values’, International Journal fo r  the History o f  
Sport, vol. 10(1), (1993), pp. 46-67; on boys’ movements see M.D. Blanch, ‘Imperialism, Nationalism 
and Organised Youth’, in J. Clarke, C. Critcher and R. Johnson eds., Working-Class Culture -  Studies in 
History and Theory (London: Hutchinson, 1979), pp. 103-120.
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The social psychology of McDougall and Shand had its own contemporary critic in the 
Fabian, Graham Wallas.74 In Human Nature in Politics (1908) Wallas addressed the 
relationship between psychological states and the rise of rationalistic, individualistic 
and large scale societies.75 However, rather than turn to social psychology as the 
means to solve these modem problems, Wallas’ political science advocated the 
creation of a system of government that supported cultural and individual variety. In 
his next book, The Great Society (1914), Wallas addressed the anti-intellectualism he 
thought characterised the early years of the twentieth century.76 For us, this work is 
notable for discussing the limits of psychological theories of love:
Is love of our fellows natural to us? Mother-love is certainly natural; 
and so are the weaker forms of love arising from fatherhood, sex and 
Fellow-membership of the human species. Philanthropy, however, in 
order to become the Public Spirit required in the Great Society, must be 
strengthened by Imagination, Knowledge, Habit, the aesthetic emotion, 
and other dispositions.77
But Wallas was in a minority and the elitism of McDougall was strengthened by the 
arrival of psychoanalysis. As we shall see, many of the earliest British psychoanalysts 
were drawn from the London medical elite - a group that has been described as
74 On Wallas see R.N. Soffer, Ethics and Society, pp. 190-208; and M.J. Wiener, Between Two Worlds: 
The Political Thought o f  Graham Wallas (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1971). Wiener argues that Wallas 
struggled to reconcile the revival o f Evangelicalism that underpinned the thought o f  T.H. Green, and 
utilitarian beliefs.
75 G. Wallas, Human Nature in Politics (London: Archibald Constable and Co. Ltd., 1908)
76 G. Wallas, The Great Society: A Psychological Analysis (London: Macmillan and Co., 1914)
77 Wallas, The Great Society, pp. x-xi
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advocating a holistic approach to doctoring in support of patrician values - and took up
78the hormic social psychological model to discuss love.
With the first incursions of psychoanalysis in the 1910s it can be seen how some of the
• 7 0debates over love were interiorised and cast as part of an unconscious struggle. 
However, prior to the First World War, there is no evidence that a desire for altruistic 
love was seen as a combatant in an internal psychological battle. Rather, it was the 
goal towards which psychoanalytic investigation should strive. Some early British 
psychoanalytic ideas are outlined below before turning to the impact of World War I 
where psychological ideas of altruism were transformed.
2. The Reception of Psychoanalysis in Britain
Unlike in America -  where the Clark University Conference of 1909 marks a clear 
point of entry for psychoanalytic thought -  Freud’s ideas crept into Britain just prior to 
World War I. With the hormic model of social psychology dominant in Britain, 
psychologists had a catalogue of instincts with which to debate the makeup of Freud’s 
notion of the unconscious. Leslie Heamshaw, in his classic A Short History o f British 
Psychology (1964), argues that with the advent of psychoanalysis the multiplicity of 
instinct theories in nineteenth and early twentieth century psychology engendered the
78 on the relationship between medicine and ideology in early twentieth century Britain see C. Lawrence, 
‘Incommunicable Knowledge: Science, Technology and the Clinical Art in Britain: 1850-1914,’ Journal 
o f  Contemporary History, vol. 20 (1985), pp. 503-520; and ‘Still Incommunicable: Clinical Holists and 
Medical Knowledge in Interwar Britain’ in C. Lawrence and G. Weisz eds. Greater than the Parts: 
Holism and Biomedicine 1920-1950 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), pp. 94-111. On the 
importance o f hormic psychology in the take up o f psychoanalysis see, Heamshaw, A Short History, p. 
189.
79 ‘Interiorised’ is used here rather than ‘internalised’, which has psychoanalytic connotations. I am 
studying changing ideas o f altruism and am making no claims as to how they have restructured the 
human mind.
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formation of various ‘depth’ psychologies. Although the group advocating depth 
psychologies is traditionally seen as eclectic, there was a broad consensus that Freud 
had over-emphasised the role of the sex instinct in psychological functioning. For 
example, in one of the first systematic expositions of psychoanalytic thought to appear 
in Britain, The Psychology o f  Insanity (1912), by Bernard Hart, a psychiatrist at 
University College Hospital, it was stated that:
Freud considers that the origin of all cases belonging to varieties of 
mental disease can be traced back to factors connected with a single 
one of the great instincts, that of sex.. ..Freud’s generalisation is 
considered by most authorities to be too wide, and has not been 
universally accepted. The evidence produced in its favour is, indeed, 
not altogether convincing, and, even allowing for the fact that Freud’s 
conception of sex is far wider than is covered by the ordinary use of the 
term, his theory cannot be said to have been satisfactorily established.81
Likewise, William Brown, then Head of the Psychological Department, King’s 
College, London, thought that the sexual instinct was only one part of the psyche. 
Brown went further in a letter to the journal The Strand, entitled ‘Is Love a Disease?’82 
As the title suggests, the letter, written in 1912, addressed Brown’s concerns that 
altruistic or devotional love would come to be seen as a pathological condition.
Brown, a Christian as well as a psychologist, went to great lengths to make a
80 Heamshaw, A Short History, pp. 238-9
81 B. Hart, The Psychology o f  Insanity (London: Cambridge University Press, 1930), p. 166, first 
published 1912
2 W. Brown, ‘Is Love a Disease?’, The Strand, (January, 1912), pp. 96-103
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distinction between sexual and spiritual love. It was sexual love that Brown thought in 
need of a cure, and psychoanalysis was the means by which it could be affected.
To illustrate his argument Brown used a photograph of an embracing couple under 
which the caption read, ‘John Tanner and Ann Whitefield in ‘Man and Superman’, A 
Play based on Schopenhauer’s theory of love’. The depicted couple represented the 
form of spiritual love advocated by Brown and their association with Schopenhauer 
and George Bernard Shaw’s play were used to justify his assertion. Schopenhauer had 
shown to Brown that, ‘the offspring of a love-match are likely to be finer children than 
those of a marriage without affection’.83 For Brown, true love was the source of 
evolutionary progress.
Sandra Ellesley points out in her thesis on the popularisation of psychoanalysis, that 
Brown transposed the idea of a perfect couple into individual unconscious. This is 
borne out by Ellesley’s discussion of Brown and his use of Shaw’s play. She writes of 
how the character of Tanner personifies intelligence and Ann great instinctual power. 
Progress lies in the coming together of these two attributes. Brown reasoned that love 
based purely upon instinct was emasculating and that no good could come of it. This 
type of love, seen by Brown as the dominance of irrationality and femininity within the 
psyche, was thus appropriate for treatment by psychoanalysis. Psychological health, 
equating to altruistic or spiritual love, could be restored by directing reason against 
‘the irrational emotional tendencies that have gained a footing in his subconscious, so
83 Brown, ‘Is Love’, p. 96
84 S. Ellesley, ‘Psychoanalysis in Early Twentieth-Century England: A Study in the Popularisation of  
Ideas’, Ph.D. thesis, University o f Essex, (1995), p. 146; see also B. Shaw, Man and Super Man: A 
Comedy and a Philosophy (London: Constable, 1903); F. Whitman, Shaw and the Play o f  Ideas 
(London: Cornell University Press, 1977); and J.L. Wisenthal, The Marriage o f  Contraries (Cam.
Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1974), pp. 22-57
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that they are seen in their true light and combated accordingly.’85 Rationality had to 
triumph over bestiality in order to direct evolution to the higher end of spiritual love.
Thus in Brown’s letter we can see how the mixture of metaphysical and instinctual 
ideas that had characterised many of the nineteenth and early twentieth century debates 
on altruistic love were transposed into psychoanalytic notion of the unconscious. The 
inhibition of selfish, baser instincts was transformed into a gendered unconscious 
struggle. For the analyst, it was then a question of understanding unconscious conflicts 
so that spiritual love could win out.
It is possible to see the psychoanalytic casting of debates on love as the first step on a 
road to rationalisation whereby love becomes the problem of the psychoanalyst not the 
individual conscience. However, prior to World War I the ideal of altruistic love was 
not being contested or justified on psychoanalytic grounds.
Less conventional than Brown, although equally idealistic, was the work of Montague 
David Eder. Bom into a wealthy Jewish family, Eder inherited a large amount of 
money after his father’s death. With this money Eder began studying medicine in 
London and, while training, was greatly influenced by the ideas of the anarchist, Peter 
Kropotkin. Kropotkin had argued that doctors should attend to social problems and, 
allied to this, that co-operation and altruism evolved in a Lamarckian fashion.86 After 
travelling the world Eder returned to Britain to fight an unorthodox socialist cause.
Eder thought that socialism should strive to allow for individual freedom. In 1907 he 
devised ‘The Endowment of Motherhood Scheme’ based on the politics of The New
85 Brown, ‘Is Love’, p. 103
86 M. Thomson, ‘Mind in Socialism: Montague David Eder, Socialist, Psycho-analyst, and Zionist’, 
Unpublished MS, p. 3
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Age; a periodical of the anarchist A.R. Orage that advocated ‘Collectivism of the 
Nation, Communism for the Home, and Anarchism for the Individual’.87 Believing that 
women had an instinctual desire for motherhood that needed to be satisfied, Eder 
argued that they should be provided with a weekly wage so that they could look after 
their children for the first two years of their lives. Thereafter children should be moved 
to communal homes where they might be able to find their individuality. Finding 
sympathy with the socio-medical reformers, Eder worked with Margaret McMillan at 
her Deptford Clinic and founded the journal School Hygiene in 1910. The first issue of 
School Hygiene contained an article by McMillan reiterating Kropotkin’s ‘Appeal’ to
oo
doctors to consider social problems.
Eder used School Hygiene as a way of popularising his burgeoning interest in 
psychoanalysis. He had befriended Ernest Jones who later claimed that he introduced
QQ
Eder to analysis around 1908. Eder was unusual in his openness in speaking and 
writing about Freud’s ideas on childhood sexuality.90 He used these ideas to challenge 
conventional morality and as a justification for his own socialist/anarchist ideology; 
‘We are surely on the threshold of discoveries in the psychic region comparable with 
the gift of the new world’.91 A subsequent paper, delivered with his wife at the North 
England Education Conference in 1914 was entitled ‘The Unconscious Mind in the 
Child’ and caused such uproar when published in the journal, Child Study, that every 
copy was withdrawn.92
87 M.D. Eder, The Endowment o f  Motherhood (London: New Age Press, 1908), p .l; on Orage see W. 
Martin, The New Age Under Orage (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1967)
88 Thomson, ‘Mind in Socialism’, p. 9 and M. McMillan, ‘On the Threshold’, School Hygiene, vol. 1, 
(1910), pp. 28-31
89 E. Jones, ‘Obituary to M.D. Eder’, International Journal o f  Psychoanalysis, vol. 17, (1936), pp. 143-6
90 Thomson, ‘Mind in Socialism’, p. 10
91 ibid., p. 10
92 M.D. and Mrs. Eder, ‘The Conflicts o f  the Unconscious Child’, Child Study, vol. 9(6), (Oct. 1916), 
pp. 79-83; and vol. 9(7-8), (Nov.-Dee. 1916), pp. 105-8
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Whereas William Brown had turned to psychoanalysis to support a conventional 
morality, controversy surrounded Eder attempted grounding of morality in psycho- 
sexual ideas. He befriended D.H. Lawrence who, whilst writing Sons and Lovers, was 
keen to think about the psychoanalytic implications of his work. Lawrence thought of 
Eder’s lifestyle as a model for a new society without the repression and corrosion of 
Victorian and Edwardian values.93
While Eder may have blurred the Victorian dichotomy of altruism and individual 
desire, he retained a faith in social obligation or duty. His radicalism lay in his attempt 
to ground altruism in psycho-sexual theory, as opposed to the older model of character 
building through inhibition. He did not challenge the a priori assumption that altruism 
was the goal to be worked towards. This can, however, be seen to change with World 
War I as altruism came to be seen as a potentiality within human nature that could 
serve the national interest.
3. The Great War and the Rationalisation of Love
‘The war has been a vast crucible in which all our preconceived views concerning 
human nature have been tested.’94 This was the verdict of the psychologist and 
sometime anthropologist W.H.R. Rivers on war’s effect on psychological thinking. 
Recent historical accounts share Rivers’ emphasis on the importance of the war in 
shaping psychological thought. The focus of historical scrutiny has, in the main, been
93 B. Maddox, ‘ The married man ’ - A Life o f  D.H. Lawrence (London: Sinclair-Stevenson, 1994), pp. 
196-7
94 W.H. R. Rivers, Instinct and the Unconscious: A Contribution to a Biological Theory o f  Psycho- 
Neuroses (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1920), p. 252
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upon shellshock and its socio-economic and political context.95 The war added a new 
dimension to psychology as psychiatrists were charged, not simply with curing 
soldiers, but with returning them back to the war. The historian Martin Stone writes of 
psychoanalysis and psychiatry in wartime that:
.. ..this reformulation of psychiatry did not revolve around a set of 
scientific judgements of an ‘abstract’ ideological kind but around a set 
of practical problems. These were related to the undermining of army 
discipline, the existence of a large number of servicemen unfit for any 
kind of work -  military or otherwise -  and the accumulation of a 
substantial pensions bill.96
Stone concludes that the war ‘set psychiatry’s field of practice squarely within the
Q7social fabric of industrial society’.
But historical attention to shellshock has obscured other aspects of the relationship 
between psychology and war, not the least of which were the changing psychological 
ideas of love in this period. I wish to argue that psychological ideas of altruism in 
wartime should also be seen in the way Stone historicises psychoanalysis and 
shellshock, i.e. that the war saw military and industrial technologies applied to 
psychological ideas. While Rivers, with his interest in psychoanalysis, drew upon 
William McDougall’s taxonomy to address shellshock and thought that World War I 
had shown ‘self-preservation’ or ‘danger’ instincts central to unconscious conflicts, the
95 M. Stone, ‘Shellshock and the Psychologists’, in R. Porter, W.F. Bynum and M. Shepherd eds., The 
Anatomy o f  Madness, Essays in the History o f  Psychiatry, Vol. II Institutions and Society (London: 
Tavistock Publications, 1985)
96 Stone, ‘Shellshock and Psychiatry’, p. 265
97 ibid., p. 266
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war led Wilfred Trotter to see psychological functioning as a conflict between 
individuality and altruism.98
Wilfred Trotter, the London surgeon and brother-in-law of Freud’s British apostle 
Ernest Jones, began propounding his social psychological notion of a ‘herd’ instinct in 
1908." Prior to World War I, Trotter did not equate altruism with his notion of a herd 
instinct. He believed that true altruistic behaviour in man was not part of nature. Rather 
he saw it as the product of human volition -  ‘.. .conscience is an indirect result of the 
gregarious instinct, and is in no sense derived from a special instinct forcing men to 
consider the good of the race rather than individual desires.’100
Trotter’s Instinct o f  the Herd in Peace and War (1914) further developed these notions
of a ‘herd’ instinct. However, with his increasing use of the psychoanalytic model of
the mind, altruism became interiorised: without altruism ‘egotistic reason
would.. .have rapidly carried the race to destruction in its mad pursuit of pleasure for
its own sake.’101 Now couched in psychoanalytic language, Trotter’s conception of
altruism was transformed from an act of individual volition into an unconscious
potentiality.
Trotter’s depiction of the gregarious instinct as an internal struggle was given 
additional emphasis by the perceived necessities of wartime and he came to believe 
that his theory could serve the national interest:
98 on Rivers’ new taxonomy, Instinct and the Unconscious, appendix 7, pp. 248-259; and see Stone, 
‘Shellshock and the Psychologists’, pp. 255-6
99 W. Trotter, ‘Herd Instinct and its Bearing on the Psychology o f  Civilised Man’, Sociological Review, 
vol. 1(1), (1908), pp. 227-248
100 Trotter, ‘Herd Instinct’, p. 248
101 quoted in H.C. Greisman, ‘Herd Instinct and the Foundations o f Biopsychology’, Journal o f  the 
History o f  the Behavioural Sciences, vol. 15, (1979), p. 360
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.. ..it [psychology] is capable of becoming a guide in the actual affairs 
of life and of giving an understanding of the human mind such as may 
enable us in a practical and useful way to foretell some of the course of 
human behaviour. The present state of public affairs gives an excellent 
chance for testing the truth of this suggestion, and adds to the interest of
1 A A
the experiment the strong incentive of an urgent national peril.
He concluded with a slightly opaque paragraph suggesting that his theory could be 
used to reinforce the morale of soldiers:
... .the needs and capacities that were at work in the primeval amoeba 
are at work in him [the soldier]. In his very flesh and bones is the 
impulse towards closer and closer union in larger and larger 
fellowships. To-day he is fighting his way towards that goal, fighting 
for the perfect unit which Nature has so long foreshadowed, in which 
there shall be a complete communion of its members, unobstructed by 
egoism or hatred, by harshness or arrogance or the wolfish lust for 
blood. That perfect unit will be a new creative, recognisable as a single 
entity; to its million-minded power and knowledge no barrier will be 
insurmountable, no gulf inseparable, no task too great.103
Here Trotter clearly employed a distinction between the psychological ‘fact’ of 
altruism and its value in fighting the war. The phylogeny o f altruistic love was played
102 W. Trotter, Instincts o f  the Herd in Peace and War (London: T. Fisher Unwin, Ltd, 1916), p. 6
103 Trotter, Instincts o f  the Herd, pp. 212-213
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out internally or unconsciously in wartime and it was through the triumph of love over 
egoism, ontologically, that would assure the future of civilisation. This contrasts 
sharply with the elitism of pre-war social psychology. Altruism was not wrought 
through the inhibition of baser instincts, but was itself a natural capacity that could 
only be obscured by egoism and hatred; and the altruism of the common solider was 
the basis for the advance of civilisation. The parallels between Trotter’s beliefs and the 
use of male bonding employed by military authorities in World War I, are striking.
Joanna Bourke, in her history of the British male body during the war, writes that it is 
axiomatic for histories of World War I that servicemen ‘bonded’ together.104 This was 
not, however, an inevitable consequence of the war but something actively encouraged 
by those in power. As Bourke notes, part of disciplining a regiment involved 
‘ritualized humiliations and rites of powerlessness’, but this was not only an exercise 
in degradation. The other side to army discipline involved love - binding men together 
through inspiring pride in men as a group.105 For example, the creation of Pals’ 
Battalions was hugely important to British recruiters. Instigated by Lord Derby at a 
crowed meeting in St. Georges Hall, Liverpool, the idea was that those who ‘joined 
together should serve together’. This idea proved very successful and was soon 
sanctioned by Lord Kitchener.106 Between August 1914 and June 1916 close to forty 
per cent of service and reserve battalions were raised by bodies other that the War 
Office.107
104 J. Bourke, Dismembering the Male: M en’s Bodies, Britain and the Great War (London: Reaktion 
Books, 1996), p. 126
105 Bourke, Dismembering, p. 128
106 J. Stevenson, British Society, 1914-1945 (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1984), pp. 50-51
107 Bourke, Dismembering, p. 131
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I grant that there is a lack o f evidence showing the interpenetration of psychological 
and military ideas of altruism. This would require a complex social analysis detailing 
the relationship between Trotter’s ideas, military planning and soldiers’ 
understandings. Nonetheless, the link is intriguing. In contrast to the assertion of the 
historian John Keegan that the ‘Pals’ Battalions’ were a spontaneous and popular 
movement, Bourke makes a strong case for the idea of male bonding working 
downwards from hierarchically organised institutions, grounded in ‘muscular
1 ORChristianity’, and becoming a part of the values of working class soldiers. In other 
words, the idea o f male bonding was no longer just the preserve of public schools 
where it had served as a way of differentiating ‘characters’. It was now seen as part of 
the psychological nature of the common soldier and rationalised for the war effort.
Despite the lack of evidence implicating psychological theories in this process, post­
war debates do support the thesis that World War I witnessed a fundamental change in 
conceiving of altruism. After the war, and in the context o f a crisis of national identity, 
the idea of altruism was reconfigured with the primitive aspects of man accorded 
greater value than the previously esteemed moral codes of the pre-war period.
4. The Primitive Basis of Love
Jay Winter, the cultural historian, argues that with the Great War people turned back to 
the past and employed a complex traditional vocabulary of mourning - symbols of
108 J. Keegan, The Face o f  Battle (London: Cape, 1976) and Bourke, Dismembering, pp. 138-144
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meaning were ‘resurrected’ during and after the war.109 War memorials are testament 
to this process and Winter notes how British authorities were unique in using the 
ordinary ‘Tommy’ as a figure for war memorials, rather than mythical or iconic figure 
of the French or the German classical male nude. The reputation of the essential 
goodness of the British soldier was further enhanced by the predominately upper- 
middle class war poets who stressed the universal suffering of soldiers.110 This, Winter 
argues, was important for the refashioning of notional identity that occurred after the 
war. Such an analysis can be elaborated by considering the post-war crisis of national 
identity as a shift from the primacy of morality to the primacy of primitivism.
It has been commonplace to note that, after World War I, British culture evidenced a 
crisis of national identity. Precisely what this crisis entailed has been a matter of some 
consternation. For example, the historian Alison Light contends that the period saw a 
move away from masculine and imperialist values towards a more domestic, feminine 
and inward-looking national identity.111 This has recently been challenged by Matthew
119Thomson, in a study of race and psychology in early twentieth century Britain. 
Thomson argues that imperialism was not replaced by the domestic vision described
by Light, but that the two were intertwined in a focus on the primitive and instinctual
1 11
aspects of identity. Thomson writes of how, from around the beginning of the
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twentieth century, racist psychology -  psychology that stressed innate inequalities and 
cast races on a hierarchical scale from civilised to primitive -  gradually came to be 
replaced with a more pluralistic understanding that emphasised cultural differences and 
that found evidence of a primitive mentality within civilised society. This new 
theoretical position was particularly suited to addressing questions of national identity 
after World War I.114 He points to the emergence of the Mass Observation movement 
at the end of the 30s -  a movement that sought to identify the ‘savage’ elements of 
British society -  as the culmination of this process.115
While Thomson’s thesis is convincing, I think the post-war change in British culture is 
more profound than he acknowledges. The diversity of interwar identities that could be 
formed on alternative understandings of primitivism is well beyond the scope of this 
study; ranging as they do through hedonistic jazz and the music and dancing of 
Josephine Baker, to the populist Oriental and African influences in art deco, and even 
Baldwinite Conservatism.116 However, detailing changing ideas of altruism in this 
period is revealing on several counts.
In his novel, The Secret Places o f the Heart (1922), H.G. Wells explored the link 
between primitivism and identity and showed how it could have a regenerative
114 ibid., p. 236
115 ibid., pp. 250-251. On Mass Observation see the accounts by its founders, C. Madge and T. Harrison, 
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Victor Gollancz, 1937)
116 Thomson gives several pages to the subject, Thomson, “ Savage Civilisation” , pp. 246-250. Some o f  
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effect.117 The character Sir Richard Hardy is cured of his depression by the 
psychologist Dr Martineau (fictive author of The Psychology o f the New Age) through 
the recognition of primitive culture and a loss of his modem selfhood after a tour of 
ancient sites in the south of England.118 While Wells points to the pivotal role of 
psychology in the use of primitivism for the reconstruction of national identity, the 
psychological theorising of the period was rather more complicated than the tour 
conducted by Dr. Martineau.
In 1923, discussing of the effect of war on ideas of love, F.R. Barry, a Christian 
minister with an interest in psychology, wrote that:
.. ..the terrific strain to which all were subjected, and from which we 
have none of us yet fully recovered, forced the mind back, as it were, 
upon itself, and created an unprecedented interest in the specifically 
mental sciences, as well as in spiritualism and similar cults. We are all 
psychologists today.119
The mental implosion described by Barry can be explored by discussion of the 
psychologies of religion that arose after World War I. In particular it can be seen how 
altruism had lost its exalted place within British culture and that Christian 
psychologists and pro-psychology Christians sort to reinstate its incontestable status.
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For some church ministers, knowledge of psychology could help then carry out their 
pastoral duties, or at least arm them against materialist views of the mind.120 Others 
found a higher purpose for psychology and it became the means to reinstate their
spiritual beliefs and transform society through understanding and enhancing the
• 121historical and evolutionary basis of altruism.
In sharp contrast to the prior belief in an unquestioned altruistic ideal, some post- 
World War I religious thinkers argued that altruism was an aspect of human nature that 
had to be released. This involved identifying the historical and psychological aspects 
of religious experience to enable love. As Barry wrote in his advocacy of a psychology 
of religion, ‘We can become free only when our whole selves are caught up into a
harmonious controlling purpose to which every element of our nature is loyal: and that,
• • 122 in the fullest Christian sense, is Love.’
Barry was not alone. W.B. Selbie, Wilde Lecturer in Natural and Comparative 
Religion at Oxford, argued in his The Psychology o f  Religion (1924) that:
A sound philosophy of religion will find its materials in history and 
psychology...the psychology of religion has some severe limitations, 
and can only carry us a certain way in the direction of a true science of
120 For a general overview o f the relationship between psychology and the church in the interwar period 
see G. Richards, ‘Psychology and the Churches in Britain 1919-1939: Symptoms o f  Conversion’, 
History o f  the Human Sciences, vol. 13(2), pp. 57-84. Richards notes that The Lambeth Conference o f  
1920 stated that ordinals ‘should be equipped by training in psychology, and be given some 
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religion. It provides us with our material and indicates the use that may 
be made of then.123
Although American psychologists such as G.S. Hall and William James had offered 
psychological accounts of religion, Selbie thought that they cast it in Darwinian terms 
as a struggle for existence, ‘judging religion by the way in which it helps or hinders 
that struggle’.124 Selbie looked to the history and psychology of religion for the source 
of the unifying and joyous capacity of the religious sentiment, believing this could 
serve as a guide for determining the conditions for physical and psychological 
development.125 The views of Selbie and Barry can be found echoed in many pro­
religious psychological works throughout the 1920s. For instance, in An Introduction 
to the Psychology o f  Religion (1923) Robert Thouless, a psychology lecturer at the 
University of Manchester, argued for a presumption of the truth of religion. He thought 
that the truth or falsity of religion could not be proved or disproved empirically for, 
‘even if we find that the mind obeys psychological law this cannot disprove the 
existence of the supernatural in the mind.’ Indeed, Thouless found evidence for the 
supernatural in Alexander Shand’s conception of the altruistic character and the
123 W.B. Selbie, The Psychology o f  Religion (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1924), p. 3
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sentiment of love: ‘The emotions organised in the religious sentiment are, on the
127whole, the same as those of the sentiment of love’.
Tellingly, where Shand’s notion of the altruistic character was essentially an evaluative 
judgement, Thouless took it as evidence for the actual existence of a divine 
selflessness. The movement from using psychology as an evaluative judgment on 
altruism to a psychological understanding of altruism can also be seen in J.A. 
Hadfield’s Psychology and Morals (1923). This book was not explicitly religious but 
took up McDougall’s hormic psychological to examine the basis of moral
1 98sentiments. Hadfield included a section on ‘The Function of Love’ in which he 
argued that love was not necessarily a civilised trait but could be found in even the 
most basic societies, and that the understanding and enhancement of love was the only 
resolution to the problems that faced the post-World War I world:
We find love in all communities in the world, even the most primitive.
It is not specifically Christian virtue, for we find the golden rule, ‘Love 
thy neighbour as ty self, in at least a dozen religions of the world. The 
commandment ‘Thou shall love the Lord thy God with all thy heart and 
with thy soul and with all thy mind, and thy neighbour as thyself 
existed before Christianity. But the Christian religion adopted it as the 
basic principle in life.
It is obviously the solution to the world’s problems, for only by good 
can the peace of the world be achieved. All Conferences in the world
127 Thouless, An Introduction, p. 100
128 J. Hadfield, Psychology and Morals: An Analysis o f  Character (London: Methuen, 1964), first 
published 1923
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will fail, as indeed at the present time they are failing time and again, if
129they meet an atmosphere of suspicion, threats and fear.
Love, these authors felt, had been lost in history and a psychological understanding of
it was being used to reaffirm morality. As Selbie put it, ‘there is nothing derogatory to
110religion in the fact that it has had a lowly origin.’ This new psychological 
conception of altruism also found expression in the idea of the group. At Oxford, for 
example, an associate of Selbie, Frank Buchman, founded what later became know as 
the Oxford Group movement.
Frank Buchman underwent a spiritual experience while visiting the Keswick 
Convention in Cumbria, in 1908:
I began to see myself as God saw me, which was a very different 
picture than the one I had myself.... I sat there and realised how my sin, 
my pride, my selfishness, and my ill-will had eclipsed me from God....
I was the centre of my own life. That big T  had to be crossed out.131
Returning to his native America he became responsible for Christian work at 
Pennsylvania State University and, in 1921, he was invited to attend a Disarmament 
Conference in Washington. On the way he decided the plans for world peace were 
inadequate and that what was required was a spiritual revolution starting with
129 Hadfield, Psychology and Morals, p. 101
130 Selbie, The Psychology, p. 13
131 G. Lean, Frank Buchman: A Life (London: Constable, 1985), pp. 30-1; on the Keswick Convention 
see J. Kent, Holding the Fort (London: Epworth Press, 1978)
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individual salvation.132 He set off for England and ended up in Oxford where he 
founded what became known as the ‘Oxford Group’, building up a number through 
what he called the practice of ‘soul surgery’.133 He would meet with students 
undergoing personal crises, identify their sins, and persuade them that these sins were 
the choice of the self. The self had to be renounced through Buchman’s ‘soul 
surgery’.134 Every Buchman success was encouraged to continue his practice and love 
was the ultimate goal towards which individuals should work: ‘The greatest of all 
human words, because it denotes the greatest of human powers, is the word love -  a 
word which signifies desire at its highest intensity’, as one convert expressed it.135 In 
1928 Buchman took some of his followers to South Africa and The Times referred to 
the travellers as the ‘Oxford Group’.136 After some dispute with the university the 
name stuck.
In her recent thesis, Alison Falby has argued that Buchman and Gerald Heard, a writer 
on the evolution of consciousness, laid the basis for early secular group therapy.137 
This, Falby believes, was a continuation of the immanentist theology of the nineteenth 
century, and she notes how both Buchman and Heard drew on the ideas o f Henry 
Drummond.138 While I agree with Falby that the work of Heard and Buchman was 
important in the formation of new psychological ideas, there were, however,
132 P. Howard, The World Re-Built: The True Story o f Frank Buchman and the Men and Women o f  
Moral Re-Armament (London: Blandford Press, 1951), pp. 124-5
133 for discussion o f  Buchman’s impact on Oxford see R. Crossman ed. Oxford and the Groups: The 
Influence o f  the Groups Considered by Rev. G.F. Allen, John Maud and others (Oxford: Basil 
Blackwell, 1934)
134 H. Begbie, Life Changers (London: Mills and Boon , 1924)
135 Begbie, Life, p. 17
136 Howard, The World, p. 125
137 A. Falby, ‘Gerald Heard (1889-1971) And British Intellectual Culture Between the Wars’, D. Phil 
Thesis, Oxford University, (2000), p. vi. For Heard’s views on religious groups see his, Social 
Substance o f  Religion: An Essay on the Evolution o f Religion (London: G. Allen and Unwin, 1931). 
Heard would go on to put his ideas into practice, eventually setting up communities in California with 
the author Aldous Huxley.
138 Falby, ‘Gerald Heard’, p, 162, 164 & 179; and Lean, Frank Buchman, p. 78
52
differences between the religious groups of Heard and Buchman and pre-World War I 
theology. In contrast to the idealistic theology of the late nineteenth century, Buchman 
advocated the use of the social group as the vehicle for the eradication of the self 
Groups were not merely the appropriate means for spreading Buchman’s message, nor 
were they a way of promoting good character, as had been the goal of some nineteenth 
century institutions, such as the Fellowship of the New Life. For Buchman, the group 
was a way of re-creating a natural selfless personality. Not all of the attempts to 
recover love in the interwar period were conducted by explicitly religious thinkers, nor 
was the search for the psychological contingencies of love only directed to specifically 
religious ends. Luisa Passerini has shown in her study of contemporary psychological
ideas, Europe in Love, Love In Europe (1999), that secular attempts to forge a new
1morality based upon the reconstruction of love were also apparent in this period.
Passerini takes as her starting point the myth that Europeans invented courtly love in 
12th century Provence, a myth that was carried through the Enlightenment. During the 
interwar period, she argues, the theme of the Europeanness of love was central to those 
wishing to bridge the gap between political extremes. As the ‘new’ Europe offered by 
these extremes (Communism, Fascism, and American individualism) came to be seen 
as a Europe of decline and decadence so love came to be seen as the means of 
reinstating civilisation. As evidence she notes the preoccupation with love in the art 
and literature o f the period, for example C.S. Lewis’ The Allegory o f  Love (1936), and 
the proliferation of psychologies of love.
139 L. Passerini, Europe in Love, Love in Europe: Imagination and Politics in Britain Between the Wars 
(London: I.B. Tauris Publishers, 1999)
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Passerini’s arguments are very speculative and she never really addresses exactly who 
wished to use love to reinstate civilisation. Nor does she interrogate and differentiate 
the various psychological theories involved. There are, therefore, large gaps in how 
she explains this turn to love. Also, she often resorts to Jungian psychoanalysis and the 
notion of a collective unconscious as causal, rather than offering a socio-cultural 
analysis. What her work does reinforce is that the idea of love was being discussed and 
contested in the interwar period, and this can clearly be seen in some of the 
psychological theories that took altruism as their central concern.
Institutionally, secular psychological discussion of altruism was served in part by the 
Tavistock Clinic. Founded by Hugh Crichton Miller in 1920, and staffed by eclectic 
depth psychologists, it became known as the ‘Parson’s clinic’ for its emphasis on 
moral as well as psychological treatment.140 Although the Tavistock Clinic had many 
religious affiliations it also acted as a centre for the discussion and dissemination of 
various new interpretations of psychoanalysis. This was in stark contrast to the British 
Psycho-Analytic Society, presided over by the dogmatic Freudian, Ernst Jones. In 
debates at the Tavistock and in the pages of the British Journal o f Medical Psychology 
(the Tavistock was closely linked to the Medical Section of the British Psychological 
Society) the search for the psychological roots of idealistic love was reformulated into 
a formal developmental theory of altruism.141
Writing in the British Journal o f  Medical Psychology in 1932, David Eder took up 
some of Freud’s ideas in Civilisation and Its Discontents (published in England in
140 on the Tavistock clinic see H.V. Dicks, 50 Years o f  the Tavistock Clinic (London: Routledge and 
KeganPaul, 1985)
141 Between 1921 and 1934, three quarters o f the articles published by the British Journal o f  Medical 
Psychology were concerned with psychodynamics, see Hearnshaw, A Short, p. 285
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1930) and dismantled his own prior beliefs in individual freedom and improvement.142 
No longer was a new life of love something to be worked towards, Eder claimed it was 
simply a ‘myth of progress’ to make life more bearable:
We are bom mad, acquire morality and become stupid and unhappy.
Then we die. This, the natural history of man under domestication, is so 
rigid a sequence under a variety of forms and changes in the patterns of 
civilisation, that mankind has invariably found it helpful to find a refuge 
in myths to relieve its perplexity and it mitigate its unhappiness.143
As Mathew Thomson notes, the faith in progress required for Eder’s new humanism 
was fast disappearing in the interwar period and this was reflected in his 
psychoanalytic theorising. It has been argued that this introspective form of 
psychoanalysis was somehow indicative of the destructive tendencies of the period and 
also characterised much of the literature 1930s.144 In Psychoanalysis and the 
Unconscious (1921), D.H. Lawrence blamed psychoanalysis itself for the post-war 
erosion of morality. However, rather than advocate the abandonment of analysis, 
Lawrence argued that notions of the unconscious and repression needed rethinking: 
‘Psychoanalysis is wont, under a therapeutic disguise, to do away entirely with the 
moral faculty of man. It is time the white garb of the therapeutic coat was stripped off 
the psychoanalyst.... It is obvious that we cannot recover our moral footing until we 
can in some way determine that true nature of the unconscious’.145 Although this study
142 M.D. Eder, ‘The Myth o f Progress’, British Journal o f  Medical Psychology, vol. 12, (1932), pp. 1-14
143 Eder, ‘The Myth’, p. 1
144 L. Stonebridge, The Destructive Element: British Psychoanalysis and Modernism (London: 
Macmillan, 1998)
145 D.H. Lawrence, Psychoanalysis and the Unconscious (New York: Thomas Seltzer, 1921), pp. 12-13 
& 26
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has found wider reasons for the interwar debates on the basis of altruism, Lawrence 
shows how psychoanalysis and the idea of the unconscious offered a new space for 
discussing morality. And it is to other contributors to the British Journal o f Medical 
Psychology and their analysis of love that I now turn.
Associates of the Tavistock and contributors to the British Journal o f Medical 
Psychology, the psychoanalysts Ian Suttie and Susan Isaacs elaborated psychoanalytic 
theories of altruism and they are acknowledged as key figures in the formation of 
Bowlby’s thought. Bowlby recognised Suttie’s ideas as precursors to his own, and he 
was to utilise Susan Isaacs’ observations and theorising about child development in his 
Personal Aggressiveness and War (1939). In the work of Suttie and Isaacs Freudian 
theory was used to rationalise the post-World War I concerns. The reinstatement of 
altruism through a psychological or evolutionary understanding came to be viewed as 
an unconscious psychological process. They offered genetic and developmental 
theories of altruism that afforded a practical and secular means to unlock the 
psychological potential for love. In doing so, altruism and morality became constituted 
in scientific terms, requiring the skills of the psychoanalyst to be understood and 
enabled.
5. Ian Suttie and Susan Isaacs’ Genetic Psychologies
Ian Suttie was bom in Glasgow in 1889. He qualified in medicine and specialised in 
psychiatry at Glasgow University. In 1928 he moved to London to become a clinical 
assistant at the Tavistock Clinic. His theorising involved overhauling psychoanalysis 
and basing it around love rather than sex. The outcome was his The Origins o f Love
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and Hate (1935) published a few days after his death.146 When the book was reissued 
in 1989 Bowlby supplied a foreword where he wrote that, ‘as an early contribution to 
an evolving discipline of personality development and psychopathology with an 
application in psychotherapy, Suttie’s The Origins o f Love and Hate stands out as a 
milestone.’147
Suttie’s ideas can be bracketed under two headings: first, his emphasis on love as the 
key to successful psychotherapy; and, second, his identification of love within 
ontogeny and phylogeny as rooted in the child’s need for their mother. Suttie’s view 
that successful psychotherapy required a bond of love between analyst and patient was 
probably taken from the controversial psychoanalytic ideas of Sandor Ferenczi whose 
work Jane Suttie, Ian’s wife, translated into English. However, Suttie did not share 
Ferenczi’s concept of love and his theorising was very much in the British tradition.
Suttie’s debts to the psychology of religion debates are obvious from his introduction, 
particularly his equating the emotion of tenderness with Christian love. This position 
was common to psychologies of religion. For example, Robert Thouless employed 
Shand’s notion of the sentiment of love to describe the origins of the religious 
experience. However, rather than see psychology as descriptive of or equivalent to the 
selflessness of a religious consciousness, Suttie looked for its unconscious 
underpinnings in both individual and social development. To this end he went onto 
propose an elaborate ‘dimorphic’ conception of nature and culture.
146 see D. Heard, ‘Introduction: Historical Perspectives’, in I. Suttie, The Origins o f  Love and Hate 
(London: Free Association Books, 1988), pp. xvi-xl; Dorothy Heard is a psychoanalyst and is the niece 
of Suttie.
147 J. Bowlby, ‘Foreword’, in I. Suttie, The Origins, pp. xvi-xvii
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While David Eder had been dismissive of the importance of myth making in human 
history, Suttie saw myths as valuable in themselves and connected to human biology. 
He shared with Freud a belief in organic repression, but where Freud saw myth and 
morality as moderators of sexual behaviour, Suttie thought that (both ontologically and 
phylogenetically) we had undergone a repression of tenderness. We were, thought
1 48  •Suttie, suffering from a ‘tenderness taboo’. Suttie’s theory was not an alternative to 
Freud. Freud’s theory was recapitulatory because he believed that in individual 
development people recapitulate the whole of human history. In contrast, Suttie’s 
theory was dimorphic because he believed that in individual development people 
recapitulate only part of phylogenetic evolution. Suttie thought that Freud had 
described the winning out of aggressive patriarchal mythology based upon selfish 
desires and had ignored matriarchal mythology. It was the tender, matriarchal 
mythology based upon the devotional idealistic love between mother and child that 
Suttie wished to resurrect. In this view the Christian belief in love was now part of 
unconscious human psychological nature. Altruism was the domain of the analyst and 
had to be negotiated in psychoanalytic terms.
Suttie believed his theory was compatible with contemporary approaches to biology
and he was one o f several thinkers who constructed a new genetic psychology,
comparable to some present day understandings. As has been shown, nineteenth
century genetic psychology, practised by James Sully amongst others, referred to the
romantic identification of a state if innocence. In Suttie’s formulation, although he
looked back through history for the roots of tenderness, there was also his belief that
this was being played out within the unconscious development of individuals. He did
148 Suttie, The Origins, p. pp. 80-96; see also I. Suttie and J. Suttie, ‘The Mother: Agent or Object?’, 
British Journal o f  M edical Psychology, vol. 12(2), (1932), pp. 91-108
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not refer to the principles of genetic inheritance of psychological states, but his ideas 
did contain the conceptual foundations of present day evolutionary psychology. This 
can also be seen in the work of Susan Isaacs, the contemporary of Suttie and colleague 
of John Bowlby.
Susan Isaacs is recognised as a prominent figure in the professionalisation of the child 
study movement of the 1930s. Indeed, following on from Margaret McMillan, she 
became an important figure in the Nursery School Association. Less has been written 
on how her conceptual model of development differed from other educationalists of 
the time.149 She was not simply part of a movement stressing environmental over 
hereditary explanations of personality formation.150 Rather, she offered a dimorphic 
model of development (almost identical to that of Suttie) which aimed to identify the 
root cause of sociability in childhood development.151 It was this model, and Isaacs’ 
observations of developing children, recorded in her Social Development in Young 
Children (1933), that Bowlby employed in Personal Aggressiveness and War. Isaacs’ 
work offers an excellent contrast to nineteenth century genetic psychology and with 
other important psychological theories of the 1920s and 30s, such as Kleinian 
psychoanalysis, North American behaviourism and Piaget’s cognitive psychology.
Isaacs’ Social Development in Young Children (1933) was based upon observations of 
children’s behaviour that she made while running The Makings school in
149 For biographies o f Isaacs see J. Sayers, ‘Psychology and Psychoanalysis: the Case o f Susan Isaacs’, 
in G.C. Bunn, A.D. Lovie and G.D. Richards eds. Psychology in Britain: Historical Essays and 
Personal Reflections (Leicester: BPS Books, 2001), pp. 205-222; D.E.M. Gardner, Susan Isaacs 
(London: Methuen Educational Ltd, 1969); and L.A.H. Smith, To Understand and to Help (London: 
Associated Press, 1985)
150 this is the explanation o f R. Smith, The Norton History o f  the Human Sciences (New York: W.W. 
Norton and Company, 1997), p. 625
151 on Isaacs and Suttie’s collaboration see I. Suttie, M. Ginsberg, S. Isaacs, and T.H. Marshall, ‘A 
Symposium on Property and Possessiveness’, British Journal o f  Medical Psychology, vol. 15, (1935), 
pp. 51-83
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Cambridge.152 ‘Running’ is perhaps a misnomer as Isaacs’ style was to allow the 
children to express themselves as freely as possible. Indeed this ‘authenticity’ is one of 
the reasons Bowlby would later find Isaacs’ work so useful.153 Isaacs’ book was not 
primarily about education in the traditional sense. She responded to Bertrand Russell’s 
characterisation of her approach as the ‘application of psychoanalytic theory to 
education’ by stressing how her interest was psychological and not educational. In 
looking at the psychological she was responding to the children’s need to be 
understood}5A This understanding Isaacs expressed in terms of Kleinian psychology.
Melanie Klein had visited England in 1925 to deliver a series of lectures and had paid 
a visit to Isaacs’ school.155 The lectures later formed the basis of Klein’s The 
Psychoanalysis o f  Children (1932), in which she gave examples of childhood 
phantasies or instincts that form a child’s personality.156 Isaacs, too, depicted her 
children as driven by phantasies, but her characterisation of them was markedly 
different from Klein, a difference that was shared by Bowlby. The main difference in 
Isaacs’ work was her emphasis on the importance of the ‘real’ social world in a child’s 
psychological development. While Klein saw phantasy as the child’s imposition of 
meaning upon the world, irrespective of the actual social world inhabited, Isaacs was 
concerned with how real phenomena, particularly sex/gender differences, became 
internalised. Prior to writing Social Development she had engaged in debates with the
152 S. Isaacs, Social Development in Young Children (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1933). The 
Maltings School was established by the entrepreneur and inventor Geoffrey Pyke. Pyke would go on to 
become one o f Lord Mountbatten’s chief scientific advisors during World War II; D. Lampe, Pyke: The 
Unknown Genius (London: Evans Brothers Ltd., 1959), pp. 36-58 & 95
153 J. Bowlby and E.F.M. Durbin, Personal Aggressiveness and War (London: Routledge, Kegan Paul,
1939), p. 62. Others saw less reason to value Isaacs’ efforts (or lack o f efforts). The psychoanalyst 
James Strachey mocked it and others referred to her school as a pre-genital brothel, see Sayers, ‘Susan 
Isaacs’, pp. 210-211
154 Sayers, ‘Susan Isaacs’, p. 212
155 ibid., p. 212
156 M. Klein, The Psychoanalysis o f  Children (London: Hogarth, 1932)
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psychologists Jean Piaget and Karen Bridges. In doing so she employed an interactive 
model of development, stressing the need for a genetic understanding of psychology 
that did not detract from the value of emotions.
Isaacs’ model of development can be seen initially as a contrast to the work of Jean 
Piaget and then in opposition to the North American interpretation of genetic 
psychology. In her first book about her school, Intellectual Growth in Young Children 
(1930), Isaacs took issue with the theories of a young Piaget, who was concerned with
i c 'y
the developmental stages in a child’s understanding of the world. He pointed to 
distinct stages in cognitive development that determined how children organised their 
world. Because Piaget’s model was not purely intra-psychic, but relied on the child’s 
continual interaction with the world, Isaacs believed he paid insufficient attention to 
social instincts. On his theory she wrote:
.. .The social factor is thus the key to intellectual growth; but we are 
given no key to social development in its form. This has no explanation 
-  it would seem to be itself the principle of explanation.. ..No 
psychological genesis of the social instincts appearing at 7-8 years is 
offered. They are, presumably, the result of some biological process of 
maturation of the nervous system, and their roots are not to be sought in 
previous psychological happenings.158
157 S. Isaacs, Intellectual Growth in Young Children (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1930). See 
also S. Isaacs, ‘Review o f A C hild’s Conception o f  the World by J Piaget’, Mind, 38, (1929), pp. 506- 
513; ‘Critical Review o f Three Works by J. Piaget’, Journal o f  Genetic Psychology, 36, (1929), pp. 597- 
609; ‘Review o f  The Child’s Conception o f  Causality by J. Piaget’, Mind, 40, (1931), pp. 89-93;
‘Review o f  The M oral Judgement o f  the Child by J. Piaget’, Mind, 40, (1934), pp. 85-90, and Sayers, 
‘Susan Isaacs’, pp. 211-2. On Piaget see F. Vidal, Piaget Before Piaget (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard 
University Press, 1994)
158 Isaacs, Intellectual Growth, p. 78
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Isaacs thought the process of socialisation gradual and continuous and that it should be 
placed at the heart of any theory of intellectual development. Her subsequent book, 
Social Development in Young Children, aimed to tackle this issue head on. In doing so 
she set her work against that of a Canadian behaviourist, Katherine Bridges.
From 1925-8 Bridges was a Rockefeller funded psychologist of McGill University 
Nursery School. Her work was reported in The Social and Emotional Development o f  
the Pre-School Child (1931) as part of the research programme of the Canadian 
National Committee for Mental Hygiene.159 In it she looked to devise behaviour scales 
rather than the then fashionable mental scales. Her scales operated on two axes: social 
development and emotional development. The former being what children do, the 
latter what they express when they do it. While her social scale reflected contingent 
behaviour, her emotional scale she sought to explain in genetic terms.160
Emotions, for Bridges, were hard to disentangle from one another. She could think of 
no distinct visceral patterns corresponding to any single emotion, for example, 
perspiration linked to fear and anxiety. Rather, she thought emotions should be seen as 
changes in the behaviour of the total personality.161 So she argued that it was difficult 
to determine from general observations what exactly constituted separate emotions.162 
Following the behaviourist Watson, she believed that controlled experiments from a 
child’s birth could establish how visceral, glandular and motor changes came to be
159 K.M. Banham Bridges, The Social and Emotional Development o f  the Pre-School Child (London: 
Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner and Co., 1931). See also K.M. Bridges, ‘A Genetic Study o f the Emotions, 
1930’, Journal o f  Genetic Psychology, vol. 152 (4), (1991), pp. 487-99
160 Bridges, The Social, ‘Chapter XV -  A Genetic Theory o f the Emotions’, pp. 198-211
161 ibid., p. 198
162 ibid., p. 203
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associated to form what are commonly thought of as emotions: ‘The genetic theory of 
the emotions is thus that excitement, the undifferentiated emotion present at birth, 
becomes differentiated and associated with certain situations and motor responses to 
form the separate emotions of later life’.163 This was not a genetic theory as it might be 
understood today, where genes are thought to give rise to specific behaviour patterns.
It was an attempt to disentangle the multitude of ontogenetic processes that go into 
making up a behaving personality.164
Isaacs thought Bridges’ material valuable and agreed that a genetic theory was 
necessary to make sense of her descriptions of children’s behaviour.165 However,
Isaacs disagreed with Bridges’ quantitative approach and her behaviourist 
interpretation. She denied the usefulness of scales, thinking quantitative perception a 
poor second to the ‘systematic scrutinising of the actual events from the psychological 
point o f view \ (her italics).166 For Isaacs, psychology was not about achieving a 
disinterested subjective understanding, but about connecting with children. This 
perspective made it impossible for Isaacs to accept Bridges’ mechanistic interpretation 
of emotion:
Moreover, the poverty of her interpretive theories actually makes it 
possible for her to suggest (apparently) that the specific emotions of 
fear and anger are not to be seen until two years of age. This seems
163 ibid., p. 201
164 This conception o f  genetics goes back at least as far as the work o f  the American J.M. Baldwin. See 
R. Wozniak, ‘Metaphysics and Science, Reason and Reality: The Intellectual Origins o f Genetic 
Epistemology’, in J.M. Broughton and D.J. Freeman-Moir eds., The Cognitive-Developmental Theories 
o f  James Mark Baldwin: Current Theory and Research in Genetic Epistemology (Norwood, New Jersey: 
Alex Publishing, 1982), pp. 13-45
165 Isaacs, Social Development, p. 207
166 ibid., p. 6
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again to be a case of eyes blinded by inadequate psychological 
theory.167
Isaacs’ interpretive genetic theory made use of Freud’s notion of the unconscious 
mental life of children and adults. She admitted that her theory was ultimately 
derivative with adult relationships being understood as the result of earlier social 
interaction. But Isaacs thought relationships at home were irreducible to basic 
physiological processes, describing a child’s relationship with their parents as special 
and placing an emphasis on early conflicts about a child’s possible rivals at home.168
Thus Isaacs’ idea of genetic psychology was much more closely aligned to present 
evolutionary understandings. Children were vital, innately endowed organisms with 
social instincts at a temporal disjuncture to their environment. Her genetic psychology 
was not about appreciating childhood innocence, as had been Drummond and Sully’s 
concern, but about actively seeking out the contingencies for loving and sociable 
childhood development. Furthermore, as Isaacs and Suttie elaborated their genetic 
theories within a Freudian framework we can see a reconfiguration of the idealism that 
had underlain prior theorising.
In Suttie’s dimorphism and Isaacs’ commitment to understand the children she taught, 
altruism ceased to be an a priori category and was, instead, conceived of as an 
unconscious process that had to be related and enabled by the analyst. Altruism had 
thus shifted from being an incontestable ideal within Victorian culture, to a desirable 
psychological state constructed by psychologists of religion in their attempts to
167 ibid., p. 10
168 ibid., p. 207
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reaffirm the basis of morality, to being an unconscious process requiring the expertise 
of the psychoanalyst. We must now turn to how Bowlby came to and employed these 
psychoanalytic ideas of love in his own early personality theorising, before we can 
examine the social implications of this rationalised view of love.
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Chapter 2; Bowlbv in Search of Love
In 1925 John Bowlby entered Trinity College, Cambridge, and enrolled for the Natural 
Science Tripos.169 This was intended to lead Bowlby to following in his father’s 
footsteps, to become a distinguished surgeon.170 The choice of career served a dual 
purpose: Bowlby thought it acceptable to his father and that he would be able to better 
people lives. Prior to entering Cambridge Bowlby wrote to his mother that he would, 
‘improve the community as a whole’.171 This cannot be regarded simply as the 
beginning of Bowlby’s interest in medicine and psychiatry and the first step to 
constructing his attachment theory. In 1927 Bowlby gave up his plans to become a 
medical doctor and, after a year spent studying for the Moral Science Tripos, turned 
his back on his university education altogether. He never offered an explanation for 
this shift, and subsequent biographers have been no more forthcoming.172 It seems 
clear, however, that Bowlby went through a fundamental change in his social outlook, 
for the abandonment of his medical studies coincided with a change in his political 
views. During the General Strike of 1926 he had volunteered to help the Tory
169 The Natural Science Tripos granted exemption from Parts I and II o f the Bachelor o f Medicine 
(M.B.); S. van Dijken., van der Veer, R., van Ijzendoom, M. and Kuipers, H-J., ‘Bowlby before 
Bowlby: the sources o f an intellectual doctrine in psychoanalysis and psychology’, Journal o f  the 
History o f  the Behavioural Sciences, vol. 34, no.3 (summer 1998) p. 248
170 Bowlby’s father, Sir Anthony Alfred, was a surgeon at St. Bartholomew’s Hospital. Here he 
excelled, obtaining membership o f the Royal College of Surgeons in 1879 and winning the Brackenbury 
scholarship in surgery in 1880. After holding a succession o f offices he was appointed consulting 
surgeon in 1919. In 1920 he succeeded Sir George Makins as president o f the RCS. His rise in the 
medical establishment was complemented by distinguished service to the monarchy and the army. He 
was awarded a knighthood in 1911 for his services to Edward VII and George V. By this time he was 
already a Major in the Army having served in the South Africa war in 1899. During World War I he was 
made Major-General and was largely responsible for the medical services o f the British forces in 
France: Dictionary o f  National Biography: the Concise Dictionary, Part 2 1901-1970 (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1982), p. 97
171 S. van Dijken, John Bowlby: His Early Life: A Biographical Journey into the Roots o f  Attachment 
Theory (London: Free Association Books, 1998), p. 46
172 For Bowlby’s lack o f an explanation see M.J.E. Senn, ‘Interview With Dr John Bowlby in London, 
England, 19th October, 1977’, p. 1 Unpublished, National Library o f Medicine, quoted in van Dijken, 
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government, and was set manning an electricity generating system.173 By 1927 he was 
a passionate Labour Party supporter. Thus, it was in the same year that he turned his 
back on the Tory Party and also turned his back on a conservative medical 
establishment.174
After leaving Cambridge, Bowlby rejected a position as teacher at St. Paul’s, a 
prestigious London boy’s school, thinking the job too ordinary. Instead, he sought out 
teaching work in less conventional schools and, held his first appointment at Dunhurst, 
the Junior School of Bedales.175 Here, Bowlby resolved to understand the work of 
educationalists: ‘It is impossible to estimate the scope and value of work in education, 
work which has been touched on by most geniuses and has been taken for granted by 
all fools’.176
Dunhurst could not afford to make him a full member of staff and Bowlby resigned 
after only 6 months.177 The next post Bowlby found was at Priory Gate, Norfolk, a 
school for maladjusted children. Here Bowlby formed a lasting friendship with John 
Alford, a war veteran who had received some therapy from Homer Lane, an important 
figure for the institutionalisation and popularisation of psychoanalysis in Britain (see
van Dijken, John Bowlby, pp. 44-5
174 on the relationship between medicine and ideology in early twentieth century Britain see C. 
Lawrence, ‘Incommunicable Knowledge: Science, Technology and the Clinical Art in Britain: 1850- 
1914,’ Journal o f  Contemporary History, vol. 20 (1985), pp. 503-520; and ‘Still Incommunicable: 
Clinical Holists and Medical Knowledge in Interwar Britain’ in C. Lawrence and G. Weisz eds. Greater 
than the Parts: Holism and Biomedicine J920-1950 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), pp. 94- 
111. Bowlby’s father is an archetype o f the patrician London doctors described by Lawrence.
175 van Dijken, John Bowlby, p. 48
176 Bowlby writing to his mother in 1928; quoted in van Dijken et al., ‘Bowlby before Bowlby’, p. 251
177 van Dijken, John Bowlby, p. 51
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below).178 It was Alford who encouraged Bowlby to complete his medical training and
179to become a psychiatrist and psychotherapist.
It was only after Bowlby resolved the crisis of his youthful idealism that he returned to 
medicine and began formulating the attachment theory for which he would later 
become famous. Bowlby’s changing views on altruism are analogous to the changing 
conceptions of love that occurred in the preceding half century. In his life we see in 
microcosm the process by which ideas of love in Britain became rationalised. His 
abandonment of his Tory political beliefs and his Whiggish views o f medicine came to 
be replaced by a search for the natural potential of love in the children he taught. After 
returning to medicine, Bowlby formalised this concern, constructing his theory of 
attachment; a theory that he would apply to the problems of juvenile delinquency and 
then to the socio-economic and political problems that faced Britain with the rise of 
fascism in the lead up to World War II.
1: Oxford, Progressive Schools and Medical Specialisation
There are many points of contact between Bowlby’s changing views of love and the 
various people and institutions discussed in the previous chapter. An important 
contributory factor in Bowlby’s abandonment of his medical studies was his encounter 
with friends of his elder brother, Tony, at Oxford University. Among these were the 
future Labour leader, Hugh Gaitskell, and Evan Durbin, with whom Bowlby would 
later write Personal Aggressiveness and War (1939). Discussion of Gaitskell and 
Durbin’s socialist politics will be taken up in the next chapter. Here I want to
178 on Lane see D. Wills, Homer Lane: A Biography (London: Allen and Unwin, 1964)
179 van Dijken et al., ‘Bowlby before Bowlby’, p. 253
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concentrate on how their views were related to the discussion of love and of groups 
that were prevalent at Oxford in the late 1920s. It was after meeting Durbin and 
Gaitskell that Bowlby’s conception of altruism changed -  signified by his giving up 
his medical studies and his Victorian sense of duty.
Evan Durbin (1906-1948) was an important figure in the Labour party until his 
untimely death, saving his daughter and a friend from drowning.180 Because of this he 
has received scant historical attention; the exception being an exposition of his 
democratic socialist economics, written by his daughter Elisabeth, and a recent article 
by Stephen Brooke.181 Durbin’s youth needs to be understood against his changing 
religious beliefs. His father had been a Baptist minister and a staunch Liberal 
supporter, and his mother the daughter of a Congregationalist divine. ‘God and Mr 
Gladstone’, he was to write of his childhood, ‘I was uncertain which one was more 
important’.182 Although he abandoned his father’s liberalism for socialism early in his 
life, Durbin maintained that in his youth orthodox religion was ‘the kernel of my 
philosophy’. Writing in 1924, the year he entered New College, Oxford as a zoology 
student, Durbin thought there only two things of which he could be certain: ‘this life is 
dark, we move in the gloom of unknowable, almost unthinkable mysteries, but shining 
clear through them all there are two great facts on which I stake my all, Christ’s life 
and Christ’s death’.183 With this background it is not unreasonable to suppose that 
Durbin formed an opinion on the ideas of W.B. Selbie and the Oxford Group
180 Durbin was one Labour MP’s tip to be future Prime Minister, see S. Taylor, A Natural History o f  
Everyday Life: A Biographical Guide fo r  Would-be Doctors o f  Society (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1988), p. 45
181 E. Durbin, New Jerusalems: The Labour Party and Economics o f  Democratic Socialism (London: 
Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1985); S. Brooke, ‘Evan Durbin: Reassessing a Labour ‘Revisionist” , 
Twentieth Century British History, vol. 7 (1996), pp. 27-52
182 quoted in P. Clarke, Liberals and Social Democrats (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1978), 
p. 279
183 Evan Durbin, ‘Notebook, 1924’, Durbin Papers, British Library o f  Political and Economic Science, 
(hereafter BLPES), 10/1
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movement headed by Frank Buchman. Buchmanism did attract comment from other 
Oxford notables of the period such as the left-wing intellectual and future member of 
the Labour cabinet Richard Crossman, and the poet W.H. Auden.184 Indeed, the 
influence of Buchmanism within the Labour movement has been a matter of some 
controversy.185
Although it is not possible to know exactly what Durbin was thinking during this 
period, he did gradually abandon his orthodox religious beliefs in favour an almost 
evangelical socialism. Along with Gaitskell, he is remembered for his devotion to 
character development and, as an Oxford contemporary put it, ‘a passion for improving
1 QA •the human race, beginning with me’. Such sentiments are, of course, compatible 
with a number of social and political philosophies. It is, however, telling that both 
Durbin and Gaitskell set their views against the hedonism of the 1920s. Gaitskell 
would later recall how, with the General Strike, he turned his back on the frivolities of
i 0*7
the period and became a serious minded student. And Durbin, in a defence of 
utilitarianism, believed that it had, *.. .degenerated into the personal hedonism of the 
1920s’.188 Within this context Durbin and Gaitskell reaffirmed altruistic action and this 
was reflected in their politics.
184 R. Crossman ed. Oxford and the Groups: The Influence o f  the Groups Considered by Rev. G.F. Allen, 
John Maud and others (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1934)
185 For conflicting accounts see P. Howard, The World Re-Built: The True Story o f  Frank Buchman and 
the Men and Women o f  M oral Re-Armament (London: Blandford Press, 1951), especially p. 42 and 
132; and, playing down the importance o f the MRA, the former Labour MP, Tom Driberg, Mystery o f  
Moral Re-armament (London: Seeker and Warburg, 1964)
186 J. Omik, quoted in E. Durbin, New Jerusalems, p. 4
187 H. Gaitskell, ‘At Oxford in the Twenties’, in A. Briggs and J. Saville eds. Essays in Labour History 
(London: Macmillan, 1967), pp. 6-19. For biographies o f Gaitskell see P. Williams, Hugh Gaitskell: A 
Political Biography (London: Cape, 1979); and B. Brivati, Hugh Gaitskell (London: Richard Cohen 
Press, 1996)
188 E.F.M. Durbin, The Politics o f  Democratic Socialism  (London: George Routledge and Sons Ltd.,
1940), p. 329
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Durbin and Gaitskell’s socialism found expression in their membership of a circle 
surrounding the economic historian G.D.H. Cole.189 I will discuss the Cole group in 
the next chapter. It is only important here to note that at the key stage in Bowlby’s 
career, in which he turned his back on medicine and conservatism, he was exposed to 
debates over the basis of altruism and aligned himself with Durbin and Gaitskell’s 
political commitment.
After abandoning his medical studies Bowlby sought out work in progressive or 
experimental education and this was yet another point where he encountered debates 
on the psychology of love. This form of education had become established in Britain in 
the 1890s, coinciding with the change in child labour laws. It addressed itself to moral 
development or the formation of the person. Originally built on a diverse range of 
theories from a variety of educationalists - Froebel, Pestalozzi, Montessori and Dewey 
-  it can be seen how, as with academic psychology, the impact of psychoanalysis 
resulted in the interiorisation of some of these debates.
The Bedales school, where Bowlby was first employed, was founded by J.H. Badley in 
1893 and had been set up in reaction to ‘muscular’ Christianity, with its bias towards 
the classics, and its obsession with public school team games. The emphasis was rather 
on learning by doing and enabling children to fulfil their individual potential.190 In 
contrast, Bowlby’s next appointment was at the more recently formed Priory Gate.
189 The ‘Cole Group’, o f which Durbin and Gaitskell were a part, was named such at a much later date. 
Margaret Cole writes that it was not unprecedented for tutors to meet with their students to discuss 
politics and this practice had been carried out by the historian and social critic, R.H. Tawney, for years 
before Cole began collecting students around him; M. Cole, The Story o f  Fabian Socialism (London: 
Heineman, 1961), pp. 208-9
190 J.H. Badley, Bedales: A Pioneer School (London: Methuen and Co., 1923); A. Clarke, ‘Dunhurst’, in
G. Brandreth and S. Henry eds. John Haden Badley 1865-1967: Bedales School and its Founder (The 
Bedales Society, 1967); and van Dijken, John Bowlby, p. 49
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This school had been founded by Theodore James Faithfull and was run along the lines 
of the Order of Woodcraft Chivalry (a non-religious organisation founded by a Quaker 
who thought that World War I had destroyed the idealism of the scouts) mixed with 
some Freudian theory.191 It was closely linked to the psychoanalytical ideas of A.S. 
Neill who, after being treated by the anthropologist and psychoanalyst W.H.R. Rivers 
in World War I, used psychoanalysis to support his belief in non-repressive libertarian 
education.192 Neill’s psychoanalytic ideas meshed with the Darwinian psychology of 
the American G. Stanley Hall and bio-psychology of Ernest Haeckel. Haeckel’s 
‘Biogenetic Law’ -  a law that equated pre-adolescent development with phylogeny, 
and all subsequent individual development with the modem struggle to find new ways 
of evolving -  underpinned the emergence of various naturalistic youth movements 
such as the Order of Woodcraft Chivalry.193 Neill did not actually psychoanalyse 
students; this was, however, practiced by Homer Lane who saw analysis as a 
corrective in childhood development.
Homer Lane was an unconventional American who was invited to England by the Earl 
of Sandwich in 1913 to organise a reformatory school for delinquent children.194 This 
was named the Little Commonwealth, and a book was published on the experiment by 
Elsie T. Bazely: Homer Lane and the Little Commonwealth (1928). Lane’s ideas were 
introduced to Bowlby while he was teaching at Priory Gate, and we know that he read
191 van Dijken et al., ‘Bowlby before Bowlby’, p. 251; on post-imperialist youth movements and the 
Order o f Woodcraft Chivalry see J. Webb, The Occult Establishment (La Salle, Illinois: Open Court 
Publishing, 1975)
192 R.D. Hinshelwood, ‘Psychoanalysis in Britain: Points o f Cultural Access, 1893-1918’, The 
International Journal o f  Psycho-analysis, vol. 76, (1995), p. 145
193 Webb, The Occult, pp. 81-88. On Haeckel see Stephen Jay Gould’s Ontogeny and Phylogeny 
(Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1977), pp. 76-85
194 Hinshelwood, ‘Psychoanalysis in Britain’, p. 144
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Bazely’s book along with Lane’s Talks to Parents and Teachers (1928).195 Although 
the experience may have led Bowlby to conceptualise educational issues in 
psychoanalytic terms, there is no indication that Bowlby chose to follow Lane’s 
psychotherapy. Lane had been forced to disband the Little Commonwealth in 1918 
following a scandal.196 He then set up his own psychotherapeutic practice and became 
something of an iconic figure for intellectuals advocating, and practicing, a more 
liberal sexuality. Auden and Christopher Isherwood were among his followers.197 
There is no evidence that Bowlby subscribed to Lane’s views on sexuality. In contrast, 
he took to the theme of the psychoanalysis of love as the panacea for society’s ills, and 
returned to his medical studies.
Bowlby’s state of mind when he returned to medicine at University College London in 
1929 can be inferred from a letter he sent to the journal The Nation and Anthenceum. In 
this, he addressed the issue of maternal mortality and argued for a radical
• • 1Q8reorganisation of medical teaching along specialist lines. This is an indication of his 
belief in the rationalisation of medical and psychiatric practice. It did not mark his 
return to the conservative values that had characterised his initial medical studies. 
Rather, Bowlby’s medical ideology aligned him with the left-wing socio-medical 
reformers such as Sir Arthur Newsholme and Bowlby’s library contained a copy of his 
Medicine and the State (1932).199 Newsholme, the Chief Medical Officer, had argued
195 van Dijken, ‘Bowlby before Bowlby’, p. 53; H. Lane, Talks to Parents and Teachers (London: 
George Allen and Unwin, 1928); and E. T. Bazely, Homer Lane and the Little Commonwealth (London: 
New Education Book Club, 1928)
196 Hinshelwood, ‘Psychoanalysis in Britain’, p. 145
197 see C. Isherwood, Christopher and his Kind, 1929-1939 (London: Minerva, 1993), pp. 9-13
198 J. Bowlby, ‘Maternal Mortality’, The Nation and Anthenceum, vol. 48, (4th October, 1930), p. 12
199 A. Newsholme, Medicine and the State: The Relation Between the Private and Official Practice o f  
Medicine with Special Reference to Public Health (London: George Allen and Unwin Ltd, 1932), 
Bowlby’s copy is available from the Wellcome Library, London. On Newsholme see J.M. Eyler, Sir 
Arthur Newsholme and State Medicine 1885-1935 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997)
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that the specialisation of medical science had only worked because of an 
accompanying increase in human empathy.200
Bowlby’s maintenance of his socialist beliefs after returning to medicine is further 
illustrated by his managing ‘Bogey’s Bar’, a cafe in the basement of the Royal Hotel 
just off London’s Russell Square (Bogey was Bowlby’s nickname). The bar was the 
investment of Durbin and Gaitskell and was frequented by London’s socialist 
intellectuals.201 Thus, it appears Bowlby was committed to a state-led process of 
rationalisation for socialist ends. But the transposition of these ideas into 
psychoanalysis had begun with Bowlby starting his training at the Institute of Psycho- 
Analysis in 1929.
2: Psychoanalysis and Juvenile Delinquency
At the Institute of Psycho-Analysis Bowlby entered into personal analysis with Joan 
Riviere, a friend and associate of Melanie Klein. He disagreed with Riviere and Klein, 
thinking their teaching dogmatic, but when he qualified as a doctor in 1933 he was 
accepted for further psychoanalytic training. Without access to Bowlby’s training 
records it is difficult to know what transpired between himself, Riviere and Klein. In 
retrospect it is easy to understand how Bowlby’s commitment to the 
professionalisation of medicine would conflict with Klein’s use of her powers of
200 Newsholme, Medicine and the State, p. 31
201 Brivati, Hugh Gaitskell, p. 30. Both Durbin and Gaitskell had moved to London around 1930 as 
economists at University College London.
202 van Dijken et al., ‘Bowlby before Bowlby’, p. 255
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persuasion as justification for her analytical insights.203 Bowlby’s differences with 
Klein would later come to a head as he developed his views throughout the 1930s.
From 1933 Bowlby held several positions. As well as continuing his psychoanalytic 
training he joined the Maudsley Hospital, London, to specialise in psychiatry. Here he 
worked under the influential psychiatrist Aubrey Lewis and conducted research on 
personality types.204 This probably led him to begin a PhD under Cyril Burt,
• 205examining emotional classification of personalities. Little is known of this 
experience, except that he abandoned his research after two years.206 What is known, 
however, is that during this time Bowlby worked closely with Susan Isaacs who was a 
colleague of Burt’s at the London County Council, and that he formed with her a 
lifelong friendship. We also know that Bowlby shared Burt’s concern with juvenile 
delinquency. Later he held an honorary membership in the Institute for the Scientific 
Treatment of Delinquency, for whom he treated referrals to its Psychopath Clinic. 
During this time Bowlby also secured a half-time fellowship to work as a child
00 7psychiatrist at the London Child Guidance Clinic in Islington. It was on his work at 
the London Child Guidance Clinic that Bowlby first began to publish his ideas of 
childhood development.
203 for Klein and Riviere’s individualistic interpretation o f instincts o f love see their Love, Hate and 
Reparation (London: Hogarth Press, 1937). On Riviere see A. Hughes ed., The Inner World and Joan 
Riviere (London: Kamac, 1991); on Klein, P. Grosskurth, Melanie Klein: Her World and Work 
(London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1986)
204 van Dijken et al., ‘Bowlby before Bowlby’, p. 255; on Lewis see M. Shepherd, A Representative 
Psychiatrist: The Career, Contributions and Legacies o f  Sir Aubrey Lewis, [Psychological Medicine 
Monograph no. 10] (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986)
205 Bowlby and Burt’s correspondence can be found in, ‘PhD’, Bowlby Papers, (CMAC), Wellcome 
Library (hereafter WL), PP/BOW/D. 1. On Burt see L. Heamshaw, Cyril Burt: Psychologist (London: 
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206 van Dijken, John Bowlby, p. 71
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Child guidance clinics first began to appear in England in the 1920s.208 There were 
multiple reasons for the creation of these clinics, but the primary motive was money 
from the American Commonwealth Fund. The fund believed in the prevention of 
delinquency through early psychological intervention.209 Thus was the London Child 
Guidance Clinic created in 1928.210 Bowlby’s work on delinquency was substantial 
and the context within which it was created shaped his ideas in at least two important 
ways.211 First, the clinics’ brief to prevent juvenile delinquency through early 
intervention created a space for a psychological investigation of childhood behaviour. 
This, however, is not enough to explain the constitution of Bowlby’s theorising since
alternative formulations were wide ranging. The genesis of his ideas is better explained
212by the socio-cultural developments referred to in Chapter 1. Bowlby argued that 
delinquency stemmed from early childhood experiences, in particular separation from 
the mother through death or a broken home. Unlike in the Victorian psychological 
model, where morality was a product of the will inhibiting undesirable traits, Bowlby 
viewed moral and altruistic behaviour as rooted in the unconscious and developing 
through ‘natural’ family relations.
208 see N. Rose, The Psychological Complex (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1985), pp. 176-219; 
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210 Thom, ‘Wishes, Anxieties’, p. 207
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Second, and more significantly, Bowlby’s work on delinquency set his theories in a 
politico-legal framework. Explicitly, this linked his ideas to the needs of the state, a 
connection I will explore in Chapter 5, with regard to the evacuation of children during 
wartime.
Bowlby’s work for the London Child Guidance Clinic culminated in the publication of 
two articles in the International Journal o f Psychoanalysis. The first of these, ‘The 
Influence of the Early Environment in the Development of Neurosis and Neurotic 
Character’, he read to the British Psycho-Analytic Society in 1939 in order to qualify 
for voting rights. This brought him into direct confrontation with Melanie Klein and 
her followers. He caricatured Kleinian psychology for paying insufficient attention to 
the environment. Childhood development, he argued, was not purely intra-psychic, but 
was characterised by social interaction with the world, particularly through parents. 
Isaacs’ defence of Bowlby cemented their personal and professional alliance. Later he 
would draw upon her work when, with Evan Durbin, he started to extend his 
psychoanalytical theorising to international relations.
3: Personal Aggressiveness and War
When the storm clouds of war gathered over Europe for the second time in the
twentieth century, Bowlby turned his attention away from domestic issues of juvenile
delinquency and applied his growing understanding of social interaction to the
international arena. Together with Durbin, he brought psychoanalytic, anthropological
and zoological findings to bear upon the recently witnessed violence in Spain and
213 see van Dijken et al., ‘Bowlby before Bowlby’, pp. 261-263. Bowlby’s opinion o f the members of 
the British Psycho-analytic Society can be seen in ‘Notes on Members o f the British Psychoanalytic 
Society 1935-1945’, Bowlby Papers, (CMAC), WL, PP/BOW/G.1/8
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Germany.214 In their book, Personal Aggressiveness and War (1939), Bowlby and 
Durbin found the evidence for the innate psychological potential of love in humans in 
the work of the zoologist, Solly Zuckerman, and in the psychoanalytic observations of
215Susan Isaacs.
Zuckerman had begun the research for The Social Life o f Monkeys and Apes (1932) in 
his native South Africa, looking at baboon colonies in the wild. Upon moving to 
England he had been encouraged by members of the scientific community, such as 
Julian Huxley, to continue his work. His book was one of the first attempts to 
systematically study the behaviour of primates, a necessary preliminary stage in order 
to achieve a scientific understanding of man, Zuckerman maintained. Too often, he 
noted, theories on the origin of human nature were based on nothing more than 
anecdotal accounts of the lives of other primates.216
Zuckerman distanced himself from previous anthropomorphic attempts to understand 
animals. Instead, he sided with the philosopher and biologist Jacques Loeb, and his
917psychologist disciple Edward Thorndike. Loeb had attacked the psychological 
method of introspection and believed the way to establish a science of animals and 
man was through controlled experiments of their overt behaviour.218 In common with
214 Bowlby’s notes for this project can be found in, ‘Personal Aggressiveness and War’, Bowlby Papers, 
(CMAC), WL, PP/BOW/K. 1
215 J. Bowlby and E.F.M. Durbin, Personal Aggressiveness and War (London: Kegan Paul, Trench and 
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Zuckerman, From Apes to Warlords: The Autobiography (1904-1946) o f  Solly Zuckerman (London: 
Hamish Hamilton, 1978)
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Loeb and his psychologist followers, Zuckerman thought overt behaviour could be
219explained in terms of physiological processes which go to make up a reflex. The 
development of complex behaviour was the result of the interaction of the form of the 
organism, a few innate reflexes that aided reproduction and survival, plus the 
environment.220At this time Zuckerman did not believe his findings could contribute to 
human sociology as man’s capacity for language, and the cultural phenomena this 
enabled, were beyond the scope of biology. It was not until 1962 that the primatologist 
Robert Altmann built upon Zuckerman’s work by integrating semiotics into the study 
of animal behaviour, laying the basis for the controversial discipline of 
sociobiology.221 However, in the context of interwar Britain, moves were already being 
made for biology to play a prominent role in consolidating human values. This can 
clearly be seen in the work of Julian Huxley.
In his autobiography Julian Huxley recalled how his philosophy of science came to 
him in America while recovering from a breakdown:
My nervous breakdown in 1912, due to my unresolved conflicts about 
sex, had inflicted on me ‘the dark night of the soul’, in which all sense 
of fruitful communion, in human love, or with natural and man-made- 
beauty, and even in fruitful moral and intelligent co-operation, went
Dunlape, 1924) and for discussion o f this see I. Lowy, ‘Immunology and Literature in the Early 
Twentieth Century: Arrowsmith and The D octor’s Dilemma’, M edical History, 32, (1988), pp. 314-332. 
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overboard. The essential religious feeling of oneness with nature, with 
art and fellow human beings, was lost. Even the consolation of work 
denied me.
I gradually recovered my normality in Texas.. ..I read the essays of 
Lord Morley, where he affirmed.. ..that ‘the next great task of science 
will be to create a religion for humanity’. He stressed that writers and 
artists as well as scientists could play their part in this transformation.
Earlier my aunt Mary Ward’s book, Robert Elsmere, had made a 
deep impression on me, and help convert me to what I must call a 
religious humanism, but without a belief in a personal God.222
Huxley’s debt to the nineteenth century idealists for his conception of progress has 
been acknowledged by historians.223 However, his work in the interwar years 
contrasted starkly with earlier attempts to reconcile Darwinian thought to Christianity. 
This can partly be explained by his writings during World War I. After Huxley 
recovered from his breakdown he became head of the Department of Biology at Rice 
University in America. Here, in the midst of the Great War he set about constructing 
an evolutionary theory that could unite humanity, replacing all the conflicting ‘creeds’
222 J. Huxley, Memories, vol. 1 (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1978),p. 153
223 See for instance P. Bowler, Reconciling Science and Religion: The Debate in Early Twentieth 
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and World View (Berkley: University o f California Press, 1981); J.C. Greene, ‘The Interaction of 
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and Evolutionary Biology’, Journal o f  the History o f  Biology, vol. 25, (1992), pp. 40-43; and C. Divall, 
‘From a Victorian to a Modem: Julian Huxley and the English Intellectual Climate’, in C.K. Walters and 
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-  religions, capitalism, socialism, imperialism, nationalism, scientism -  that had 
created such international disharmony.224 He advocated state planning through ‘a 
common theory of life’, greater political power for scientists and engineers, and 
eugenic measures for the control of the future of human hereditary.225
Unlike in the work of Henry Drummond, where evolution was a continuous process 
towards a spiritual end, Huxley’s evolutionary idealism was set in a belief that human 
beings’ had an evolved capacity for consciousness and this allowed them to direct the 
future course of evolution. During the interwar years Huxley developed a belief that 
large scale evolution had come to an end and that a point had been reached where man 
was the ‘trustee’ for future evolutionary progress.226
This belief led Huxley to advocate eugenics as the conscious and scientific 
understanding of heredity to control the direction of human evolution.227 He also 
looked to understand and control the biological basis of behaviour.228 Along with 
Zuckerman, Huxley was instrumental in the establishment of the Institute for the Study
224 M. Swetlitz, ‘Julian Huxley and the End o f Evolution’, Journal o f  the History o f  Biology, vol. 28, 
(1995), p. 184
225 Huxley’s early views on evolutionary progress are discussed in Swetlitz, ‘Julian Huxley’, pp. 184- 
185. Huxley justified his arguments by citing the H.G. W ells’ edited, Socialism and the Great State 
(New York: Harper, 1911). However, the war formed the principle basis o f his views; Swetlitz cites the 
following papers from the Julian Huxley archive as evidence: Julian Huxley, ‘Biology, the Individual 
and the State’ (1916), box 57, folder 6, Julian Sorrell Huxley Papers, Foundren Library Rice University 
Houston, Texas (Hereafter JSHP); ‘Biology and War’ (1916), box 57, folder 6, JSHP; ‘Notebook on 
Religion’ (1916-17), box 56, folder 8, JSHP; ‘Letters to Beloved’ (1917), box 58, folder 1, JSHP; and 
‘Wanted -  Unity o f Political Command’ (1918), box 58, folder 6, JSHP
226 see M. Swetlitz, ‘Julian Huxley’, pp. 181-217
227 On Huxley and eugenics see J. Huxley, ‘Marriage and Eugenics’, in A. Forbath ed., Love, Marriage, 
Jealousy (London: Pallas Publishing, 1938), pp. 289-323
228 Simon Frankel, a historian o f science, argues that Huxley early ornithological investigations, 
focussing mainly on monogamous birds, were structured by his conservative and patriarchal attitudes. 
These studies, supposedly disproving the notion o f female ‘choice’ in mating, were used to undermine 
claims for the sexual selection model o f evolution, supporting instead Huxley’s favoured natural 
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Eclipse of Sexual Selection’, in R. Porter and M. Teich eds. Sexual Knowledge, Sexual Science: The 
History o f  Attitudes to Sexuality (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), pp. 158-183. On 
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of Animal Behaviour (ISAB) in 193 6.229 Although it reflected the many different 
aspirations and theoretical inclinations of its members, the ISAB did lay the foundation
230for the British school of ethology that Bowlby would draw upon in his theonsmg.
Huxley’s notion of control differed from the American ideas employed by Zuckerman. 
Huxley equated control with consciousness and when he applied his philosophy of 
science to human psychology he could employ the notion of the unconscious to give 
him his subject matter. Thus, Huxley could draw on Freud when considering the 
violence of the 30s, believing aggression to be the product of unconscious primitive 
forces, and remain true to his ‘trustee’ model of evolution.231 This perspective is also 
evident in Bowlby’s theorising.
Bowlby saw Zuckerman’s observations of the behaviour of monkeys and apes as the 
means to grasp what was essential to all primates, humans included. Along with 
Huxley, but unlike Zuckerman, Bowlby saw no sharp divide between human culture 
and primate nature. Instead, he saw human culture as distinct from, but interacting 
with, primitive instincts active in the human unconscious. This was similar to the 
dimorphism proposed by Ian Suttie and the model of evolution which was to underlie 
the later notion of the Environment of Evolutionary Adaptedness which is discussed in 
the introduction of this thesis. Bowlby’s emphasis on understanding purposeful, 
innately endowed organisms was thus clearly in place before his reading of Konrad
229 The importance o f Gerald Heard, the writer on the evolution o f consciousness (discussed in Chapter 
1), in mediating between Huxley and Zuckerman has yet to be systematically explored. On Zuckerman’s 
opinion o f Heard see Zuckerman, From Apes to Warlords, pp. 49-51. For Huxley on Heard see Huxley, 
Memories, p. 207
230 On the establishment o f the ISAB see J.R. Durant, ‘The Making o f Ethology: The Association for the 
Study o f Animal Behaviour, 1936-1986’, Animal Behaviour, vol. 34, (1986), pp. 1601-1616
231 J. Huxley, ‘Peace through Science’, in S. Jameson ed. Challenge to Death (London: Constable and 
Co. ltd., 1934); p. 297
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Lorenz’s King Solomon’s Ring (1952), the point at which most biographers see 
Bowlby’s adoption of an ethological perspective.
Bowlby justified the suitability of using Zuckerman’s study to prove the inherent 
qualities of man by noting that humans shared with other primates basic physiological 
processes and related social structures. These social structures were organised around 
the biological potential of both males and females for mating at any time. Unlike other 
mammals who have a mating season, or who only mate when the female of the species 
is on heat, primates, humans included, were held together by a permanent heterosexual 
interest which formed the basis of family life: ‘The male retains possession of his 
female or females, has frequent intercourse with them all the year round, and 
consequently is a father socially as well as biologically’.232 It followed from this that 
primates, humans included, had basic sexual and parental instincts that enabled these 
social structures to function.
As a corollary to basic sexual and parental instincts Bowlby found evidence in 
Zuckerman’s work for other elemental instincts, notably male aggression and 
dominance.233 Aggression enabled the males to secure wives and food, while dominant 
behaviour enabled a stable social organisation that was not constantly threatened by 
violent extinction. To strengthen the case that studies of primates were suitable for 
understanding human behaviour, Bowlby noted that the same instincts and social 
structures could be seen among ‘simpler peoples’. Pointing to a study by the 
anthropologists L. T. Hobhouse, G.C. Wheeler and Morris Ginsberg, The Material 
Culture and Social Institutions o f Simpler Peoples (1915), Bowlby described how in
232 Bowlby, Personal Aggressiveness, p. 53
233 ibid., pp. 55-8
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societies without government the basic social structure is that of enlarged families in 
which the most frequent source of fighting is over the possession of women.234 He also 
saw this state of nature in the behaviour of children who, he felt, were more direct and 
honest in their expression of feelings than adults. Although children did not exhibit 
aggression over the possession of sexual partners, Bowlby argued that one of the 
principal causes of childhood violence were situations that threatened the loss of 
affection.236 In order to prove this he drew upon the work of Isaacs, in particular her 
study Social Development in Young Children (1933). In doing so Bowlby recast 
people’s evolutionary past as part of the human unconscious. For example, he cited 
Isaacs’ work to support his claim that children fight when they are in situations which 
threaten the loss of possessions or affection, and when they experience anxiety or 
frustration over the accomplishment of a task.237 After giving various examples from 
Isaacs’ book Bowlby concluded that, like apes, the most intense aggressive behaviour 
in children resulted from a rivalry for possession of a female:
.. ..perhaps the most important objects of which a child wants 
possession are the people who afford him pleasure and whom he loves.
In this respect children are very much like apes who, as Zuckerman 
says, treat females fundamentally as material objects. Isaacs notes that 
aggressive behaviour from the motive of rivalry for the possession of a
234 ibid., pp. 59-61. L.T. Hobhouse, G.C. Wheeler, and M. Ginsberg, The Material Culture and Social 
Institutions o f  Simpler People (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1965), first published 1915. On 
Hobhouse’s liberal sociology see S. Collini, L.T. Hobhouse and Political Argument in England 1880- 
1914 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979)
235 Bowlby, Personal Aggressiveness, p. 62
236 ibid., p. 64
237 ibid., pp. 62-72
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person was both more frequent and gave rise to more acute tension of
238feeling than did rivalry over material possessions.
Although children did not fight over the possession of wives they seemed to be 
endowed with the same instinct to defend the attentions of females. Bowlby, honouring 
a statement in Personal Aggressiveness that future research should focus upon this 
link, would later elaborate this theme and help promote work that aimed to show how 
people and other primates shared the same instinct for maternal affection.239
Bowlby’s discussion of childhood development reveals how Isaacs’ model of social 
development was compatible with his own instinctive model. In both cases the crucial 
factor in development was the interaction of social dispositions -  unconscious 
primitive desires - with a real environment. Isaac’s model of development fitted with 
Bowlby’s claims that our evolutionary past, evident in Zuckerman’s studies of 
primates, was a key factor in ontological childhood development.
Although Personal Aggressiveness and War dwelt only on the causes of violence, 
Bowlby’s early conceptual model was also the basis of his more refined work on 
attachment. In 1939 he had already identified the significance of the mother-child 
bond, and he employed a conception of nature and culture whereby human instincts, 
understood as unconscious reworkings of our evolutionary past, were separate from
238 ibid., p. 65
239 Harry Harlow’s famous experiments with the wire and cloth chimpanzee ‘mothers’ was conceived 
after a conversation with Bowlby, see H. Harlow, Love in Infant Monkeys (San Francisco, 1959), 
reprinted from Scientific American, (1959), and D. Haraway, Primate Visions, pp. 235-240. For 
discussion o f  Harlow see D. Blum, Love at Goon Park: Harry Harlow and the Science o f  Affection 
(Chichester: Wiley, 2002). Bowlby would play and instrumental role in helping the ethologist Robert 
Hinde set up a Medical Research Council Unit to study these issues, see Bowlby Papers, ‘Application’, 
Autumn 1958, (CMAC), WL, PP/BOW/B.3/18, ‘Letter from Hinde to Sir Harold Himsworth’, 23rd 
Oct., 1963, (CMAC), WL, PP/BOW/B.3/18
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but interacted with social institutions. This incomplete division of nature and culture 
underlay his later notion of the EEA.
As well as marking an important conceptual milestone, Bowlby’s work also points to 
the fact that, in the context of interwar Britain, altruism was increasingly being 
contested as a psychological phenomenon. The moral faculty of human beings was in 
the domain of psychoanalyst and this had important social implications. These can be 
explored by looking at how Bowlby used his rationalised conception of love to ground 
his and Durbin’s wider political and socio-economic claims.
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Chapter 3: Love’s Labour’s Found
In the previous chapters it has been argued that, with World War I, ideas of altruistic 
love became rationalised. Increasingly altruism came to be seen as lost in mankind’s 
evolutionary past, and a psychological understanding of its roots sought to reinstate the 
previously unquestioned commitment to altruism. The rationalisation of love 
culminated in the psychological theorising of Ian Suttie, Susan Isaacs and then John 
Bowlby. In their model of individual development it was the early interaction of basic 
social instincts, understood as unconscious urges from our evolutionary past, which 
formed the basis of personality development. The mother-child bond was already 
being considered as an important factor in the development of an altruistic personality; 
as evident in Suttie’s dimorphism and in Bowlby and Isaacs’s view of the mother as an 
object to be possessed. This view of altruism was not confined to clinical 
psychological settings. Indeed, the context within which it was conceived - as a 
solution to the crisis of national identity - and the fact that the theory emphasised the 
ubiquity of these social instincts, provided compelling reasons for its extension to 
wider social problems. It was not only Bowlby’s psychology that was thus 
underpinned; a great deal of political and socio-economic thought in interwar Britain 
was similarly informed and it supported a tightly packaged democratic socialist 
ideology.
It has already been stressed how Bowlby’s encounter with his elder brother’s friends 
from Oxford University was pivotal in shaping his social and psychological outlook. It 
was noted how both Evan Durbin and Hugh Gaitskell committed themselves to a 
socialist cause in opposition to the hedonism of the period. It can be speculatively
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argued that this framed their view of altruism such that they viewed it as a natural 
potentiality. Oxford also provided a context for the establishment of a political 
platform in which ideas of rationalised love could figure. This chapter elaborates on 
the political thinking of Bowlby’s sometime collaborator Evan Durbin and examines 
how Oxford provided him with an institutional base for the propagation of political 
and socio-economic ideas based on rationalised love. Durbin held a prominent place in 
a group surrounding the socialist and economic historian, G.D.H. Cole. This group 
concerned itself with rethinking socialist ideology and, to this end, founded the New 
Fabian Research Bureau (NFRB) and the Socialist Society for Inquiry and Propaganda 
(SSIP) in 1931. The function of the NFRB was to examine long-term socialist policy 
and Bowlby and Durbin both became members. The culmination o f this work can be 
seen in Personal Aggressiveness and War and in Evan Durbin’s The Politics o f  
Democratic Socialism (1940). Durbin’s centre-left treatise employed his and Bowlby’s 
work on aggressiveness to support his vision of the future of socialism. This chapter 
examines the place of psychologies of love within this political orientation.
1: G.D. H. Cole’s Group
While at Oxford Durbin made many friends who shared a similar political outlook. 
Among them were G.D.H. and Margaret Cole who, at this time, were concerned with 
reformulating collectivist socialist ideology. The period between 1929 and 1933 has 
recently been described as ‘The Age of Cole’ because of the impact he had upon the 
British Labour movement in this period.240 Understanding Cole’s work, the context in
240 N. Riddell, ‘’The Age o f Cole’? G.D.H. Cole and the British Labour Movement 1929-1933’, The 
Historical Journal, 38(4), (1995), pp. 933-957
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which he operated, and Durbin’s place in the ensuing debates reveals how space was 
created for rationalised ideas of love to find a place in mainstream politics.
G.D.H. Cole had spent much of the 1920s in an intellectual wilderness. His pluralistic 
notion of guild socialism, developed from 1910 to 1922, had been conceived in 
opposition to Fabian collectivism and stressed the need to establish a direct democracy 
based upon the ideas of Rousseau. Although a number of guild committees were 
created in 1919, several factors contrived to rob the movement of the trade union 
support it required to maintain its impetus. The Russian Revolution led to serious splits 
within the National Guilds League and the formation of the Communist party in 
Britain divided the loyalties of former supporters. The recession of the early 20s, 
moreover, meant that long-term goals gave way to more immediate priorities.241
The historian N. Riddell argues that by 1923 Cole was ‘ideologically stranded’ and 
that he retreated into academia. This is confirmed by a diary entry of Beatrice Webb:
Cole...has lost all touch with other people and has no spiritual home in, 
or outside of the Labour movement. Politically, he is a lost soul - the 
older men have ceased to fear him; the younger men no longer look up 
to him.... He still trots out his ‘worker’s control’ - but in a disheartened 
fashion, without conviction that anybody cares about it.242
With the failure of the General Strike of 1926 demonstrating the limits of the direct 
trade union action he had previously advocated, Cole gradually moved back towards
241 Riddell, ‘The A ge’, p. 936-7
242 Beatrice Webb’s diary, 17th May 1924, Passfield Papers, BLPES. Quoted in Riddell, ‘The A ge’, p. 
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the Labour party and its Fabian collectivist philosophy. He rejoined the Fabian Society 
in 1928, and by 1929 was arguing the Labour Party should seek independence from the 
unions. However, the precise nature of Cole’s beliefs at this time is a matter of some 
contention.
A.W. Wright has argued that Cole’s views did not change fundamentally. He notes that 
his principle work in this period, The Next Ten Years in Social and Economic Policy 
(1929), reflected only an acceptance of state intervention as a necessity to counter 
economic problems and the threat of fascism.243 In contrast, Riddell points out that 
Cole now conceived the psychology of the working class to be less dominated by their 
workplace and less political than he had once thought and hoped.244 Furthermore, and 
following on from his first shift in emphasis, Cole now saw it as the job of government 
experts to run industry, rather than the workers and the unions. Because of this Cole 
was to argue that the socialisation of banking and finance were more important for the 
Labour government than the nationalisation of industry. This, he thought, would 
enable the government to aid suffering industries and create new ones.245
While establishing his new ideological package, Cole set about recruiting support for 
his opposition to the government of Ramsay MacDonald. This government, Cole felt, 
was unable to effectively tackle the problem of unemployment. He founded the New 
Fabian Group, to ‘rally the young men, among whom there is some excellent
243 A.W. Wright, G.D.H. Cole and Socialist Democracy (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1979), pp. 119-122; 
G.D.H. Cole, The Next Ten Years o f  Social and Economic Policy (London: Macmillan, 1929)
244 Riddell, ‘The A ge’, pp. 939-940. For discussion of the meshing o f  liberalism and socialism in the 
interwar years see M. Freeden, Liberalism Divided: A Study in British Political Thought, 1914-1939 
(Oxford: Clarendon, 1986), especially pp. 294-328. Freeden notes how some debates on political 
psychology were structured around the belief that liberal notions o f individuality and the self were so 
strong in British culture that an introduction o f radical socialism was impossible.
245 Riddell, ‘The A ge’, p. 941
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stuff...and get some decent Socialist literature instead of ILP (Independent Labour 
Party) or Mosley amateur claptrap’.246 Durbin attended the group’s initial meetings, 
held at Easton Lodge in Essex, and it appears that he was part of the ‘excellent stuff to 
which Cole referred.247
The meetings of the New Fabian Group quickly led to the establishment of the New 
Fabian Research Bureau (NFRB) to examine long term policy and the Socialist Society 
for Inquiry and Propaganda (SSIP) to spread the findings of the NFRB and promote 
discussion of them within the Labour movement.248 Having received the approval of 
the Webbs, the two bodies were formally established in 1931. Cole wrote of the NFRB 
that:
The Bureau does not promise immediate results. It is setting out on a 
programme of research meant to be spread over a considerable period 
of time, and it is setting out to do this work patiently...conscious that 
what the Labour movement needs above all is the constant expansion 
and adaptation of policy in the light of changing conditions, on a basis 
of accurate research and collection of available experience.249
246 Cole to Beatrice Webb, 9th Dec. 1930, BLPES, Passfield Papers, II/4. Quoted in Riddell, ‘The A ge’,
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248 Riddell, ‘The A ge’, p. 947-948
249 Cole, quoted ibid., p. 948
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The creation of the NFRB was the perfect platform from which Bowlby and Durbin 
could argue for the integration of a rationalised love into mainstream politics and both 
became early members. First, the bureau was based on the Fabian model of state 
collectivism. Second, as the above quotation illustrates, it was technocratic with a 
commitment to experts running industry and, following on from this, the application of 
social science. And last but not least, it was based on the premise that the psychology 
of the working classes was not dominated by the workplace. There was thus room for 
the psychologisation of domestic arrangements such as the relationship between 
mother and child and the application of these psychological ideas by a collectivised, 
centralised government. This can clearly be seen in the economic ideas advocated by 
Durbin. His main contribution to the NFRB was to formulate an argument for the 
Labour party adopting consumer economics. Although there were similarities in 
Durbin’s thinking and that of John Maynard Keynes, Durbin’s position was more 
complicated. Confusingly, his economics have been described as a mix of 
Keynesianism, Fabian socialist concerns and Hayekian liberal economics. However, a 
close reading Durbin and Keynes’ economic ideas shows how their differences were 
rooted in the adoption of contrasting psychological models - Durbin’s rationalised love 
and Keynes’ ‘animal spirits’.
2: Economics and Man’s Place in Nature in Interwar Britain
Through his work with the NFRB, Durbin confronted the major problems of socialist 
economics. As part of G.D.H. Cole’s Bureau and its ideology of the socialisation of 
banking and finance, Durbin argued for the necessity of a managed economy. Cole had
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supported the findings of the enquiry on industry and finance, set up by the 
government in 1929 and chaired by Lord Macmillan. These findings, published in 
1931 and mainly the result of the contributions from Keynes and Ernest Bevin, stated 
that wage cutting would only be to the detriment of consumer power, and that what 
was required was state driven economic expansion. This inquiry anticipated but 
failed to impact upon the economic crisis encountered by Ramsay MacDonald’s 
Labour government, a government that, for various reasons, was resistant to 
imaginative economic solutions.251 On 23 August 1931 Macdonald resigned as Prime 
Minister and precipitated the replacement of the Labour government with a coalition.
During the economic turmoil of the 30s Durbin elaborated ideas of state-driven 
economic expansion in his Purchasing Power and Trade Depression (1933), Socialist 
Credit Policy (1934) and The Problem o f Credit Policy (193 5).252 It was these ideas 
that Durbin and Hugh Gaitskell developed in the NFRB and worked to introduce to the 
Labour party. It earned them the reputation of ‘identical twins’ in the Labour
253movement.
An historian of the Labour Party Stephen Brooke has recently tried to understand 
Durbin’s economic ideas as part of his Labour ‘revisionism’. Brooke argues that, as 
well as working closely with Cole, Durbin also sympathised with the Liberal 
economists of the London School of Economics. He suggests that Durbin’s thinking
250 ibid., p. 951, on Keynes role in the Macmillan committee see R. Skidelsky, John Maynard Keynes: 
The Economist as Saviour, 1920-1937 (London: Macmillan, 1992), pp. 343-362
251 see R. McKibbin, ‘The Economic Policy o f the Second Labour Government’, Past and Present, vol. 
68, (1975), pp. 95-123
252 E. Durbin, Purchasing Power and Trade Depression: A Critique o f  Under-Consumption Theories 
(London: Jonathan Cape, 1933); Socialist Credit Policy (London: Victor Gollancz, 1934); The Problem 
o f  Credit Policy (London: Chapman and Hall, 1935)
253 E. Durbin, New Jerusalems: The Labour Party and the Economics o f  Democratic Socialism (London: 
Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1985), p. 4
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reflected the schizophrenic position in which he found himself between economists at 
opposite ends of the political spectrum.254 For example, Durbin believed that pricing in 
a planned economy was not about efficiency, but primarily about enhancing individual 
consumer power.255 The balancing of individual or consumer rights and the perceived 
necessity of a managed economy would form the basis of Durbin’s muted response to 
Keynes’ ‘General Theory’ when it was published in 1936. Rather than seeing Durbin’s 
economics as a middle-way between contrasting ideologies, they are better understood 
as grounded in a commitment to a rationalised love. This becomes clear if you 
compare Durbin’s ideas with the London School of Economics’ ‘Austrian school’ 
(under Hayek) and their belief in the ‘natural corrective’, and with Keynes’ notion of 
the ‘animal spirits of capitalism’.
After moving to London in 1929, and a short stint at University College London, 
Durbin secured a Senior Lectureship in Economics at LSE, which was dominated by 
the future Nobel Prize winner Friedrich Hayek and the liberal Lionel Robbins. This 
became known as the Austrian school after the birthplace of Hayek. It was 
characterised by a belief in free trade and, allied to this, the notion that within nature 
there was a corrective for unsustainable economic activity. This was not Durbin’s 
position; he argued for state driven economic expansion. However, Brooke argues that 
Durbin did share Hayek’s concerns, famously laid out in The Road to Serfdom (1944), 
that a planned economy could be oppressive.256 For example, Durbin wrote that:
What we have in mind is a principle of policy - that in any standard of 
living it is desirable to retain the power of consumers to influence the
254 Brooke, ‘Evan Durbin’, p. 34
255 ibid., p. 34; see E. Durbin, Purchasing Power.
256 F.A. Hayek, The Road to Serfdom (London: G. Routledge and Sons, 1944)
94
production of commodities as part of personal liberty. To do so a 
system of prices and costs, whose character has been investigated in the 
Theory of Value, must be maintained. Whether or not it will prove 
efficient to administer certain industries in a larger number of 
comparatively small units or not is another matter -  determined by 
technical consideration. There is, therefore, no conflict between unified 
planning and the maintenance of some degree of consumer
257sovereignty.
Brooke argues that this emphasis on individual liberty formed Durbin’s response to 
Keynesian economics later in the decade.258 It is true that in a review of Keynes’ The 
General Theory o f  Employment, Interest and Money (1936), Durbin argued that:
.. ..private enterprise involves the domination of man over man in one 
of the most objectionable and uncontrollable forms. The necessary 
relation of employee to private employer may be, and too often is,
9 SOoppressive to the one and degrading to the other.
However, understanding this as an ethical objection and part of Durbin’s battle 
between his liberalism and socialism, as Brooke does, is too simplistic. Durbin’s 
political and socio-economic arguments contained a consistent ideology that was not 
simply the dilution of capitalist and socialist extremism. Indeed, Durbin’s ideological 
consistency is evident in his call for economists to work more closely with other social
257 Durbin to Maurice Dobbs, 21st December, 1942, Durbin Papers, BLPES, 6/1
258 Brooke, ‘Evan Durbin’, p. 34
259 ‘Professor Durbin Quarrels with Professor Keynes’, Labour, (1936), p. 188
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scientists.260 This ideology is evident in his The Politics o f Democratic Socialism 
(1940) in which he synthesised his and Bowlby’s work in Personal Aggressiveness 
and War with his economic beliefs. The Politics o f  Democratic Socialism will be 
discussed later. For now I wish to concentrate on Durbin’s reaction to Keynes’ 
economic theory and dwell on the psychological aspect of Keynes and Durbin’s work. 
Through this analysis it can be demonstrated that Durbin’s views economic views, in 
sharp contrast in Keynes’, were based upon a belief in the cultural enabling of a natural 
potential to act altruistically.
In his monumental biography of Keynes, Robert Skidelsky does draw attention to the 
differences of Keynes and Durbin.261 He identifies but does not elaborate upon the fact 
that these differences were first and foremost psychological: ‘It is difficult for me to 
understand,’ Durbin wrote to Keynes on 29 April, 1936, ‘how the author of the 
Economic Consequences o f Peace...cm  argue that one advantage of a laissez-faire 
system lies in the freedom it gives to certain privileged persons to exercise their 
sadistic impulses in the control of industrial workers’.
The centrality of the sadism, identified by Durbin, to Keynes’ theory has been 
discussed by Ted Winslow. Winslow argues convincingly that it was Keynes’ 
abandonment of a belief in the rational economic motives of man, and the replacement 
of this with a notion of ‘animal spirits of capitalism’, that underpinned his economic
260 E. Durbin, ‘Methods o f Research -  A Plea for Co-operation in the Social Sciences’, Economic 
Journal, vol. 48, (1938), pp. 183-195. It is clear from this article that Durbin regarded the psychological 
work on character formation o f  primary importance for the economist.
261 Skidelsky, John M aynard Keynes, p. 575
262 D. Moggridge ed., The Collected Writings o f  John Maynard Keynes, vol. 29  (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1989), p. 234
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ideas.263 Keynes’ ‘General Theory’ supposed that, to enable economic growth, the 
conditions had to be in place to encourage investment from entrepreneurs:
A large proportion of our positive activities depend on spontaneous 
optimism rather than on a mathematical expectation, whether moral or 
hedonistic or economic. Most, probably, of our decisions to do 
something positive, the full consequences of which will be drawn out 
over many days to come, can only be taken as a result of animal spirits 
-  of a spontaneous urge to action rather than inaction, and not as the 
outcome of weighted averages of quantitative benefits multiplied by 
quantitative probabilities. Enterprise only pretends to itself to be mainly 
actuated by the statements in its own prospectus, however candid and 
sincere. Only a little more than an expedition to the South Pole, is it 
based on an exact calculation of benefits to come. Thus if the animal 
spirits are dimmed and the spontaneous optimism falters, leaving us to 
depend on nothing but a mathematical expectation, enterprise will fade 
and die -  though fears of loss may have a basis no more reasonable than 
hopes of profit had before.
It is safe to say that enterprise which depends on hopes stretching 
into the future benefits the community as a whole. But individual 
initiative will only be adequate when reasonable calculation is 
supplemented and supported by animal spirits, so that the thought of 
ultimate loss which often overtakes pioneers, as experience
263 E.G. Winslow, ‘Keynes and Freud: Psychoanalysis and Keynes’s Account o f the ‘Animal Spirits of 
Capitalism” , Social Research, vol. 53, (Winter 1986), pp. 549-578. Less convincingly Winslow argues 
that Keynes did not directly acknowledge the importance o f  psychoanalysis in his work because o f his 
own psychological make-up and his own anal-sadistic complex.
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undoubtedly tells us and them, is put aside as a healthy man puts aside 
the expectation of death.
This means, unfortunately, not only that slumps and depressions are 
exaggerated in degree, but that economic prosperity is excessively 
dependent on a political and social atmosphere which is congenial to 
the average businessman. If the fear of a Labour Government or a New 
Deal depresses enterprise, this need not be the result either of a 
reasonable calculation or of a plot with political intent; - it is the mere 
consequence of upsetting the delicate balance of spontaneous optimism.
In estimating the prospects of investment, we must have regard, 
therefore, to the nerves and hysteria and even the digestions and 
reactions to the weather of those upon whose spontaneous activity it 
largely depends.264
To understand the conditions that would encourage investment and release these 
‘animal spirits’, Keynes drew upon the psychoanalytic ideas of Ernest Jones, whom he 
footnoted in his ‘General Theory’. Keynes was presumably introduced to Freud 
through his Bloomsbury connections. In 1925, James Strachey reported that Keynes 
was ‘engrossed in the case histories of Freud’.265 In the same year, in a letter to the 
Nation, Keynes wrote that:
Professor Freud seems to me to be endowed, to the degree of genius, 
with a scientific imagination which can body forth an abundance of
264 John Maynard Keynes, The General Theory o f Employment, Interest and Money (1936) in D. 
Moggridge ed., The Collected Writings o f  John Maynard Keynes, vol. 7 (London: Macmillan, 1973), pp. 
161-2
265 Skidelsky, John M aynard Keynes, p. 234; on Keynes and Bloomsbury see Ted Winslow, 
‘Bloomsbury, Freud and the Vulgar Passions’, Social Research, vol. 57(4), (1990), pp. 785-819
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innovative ideas, shattering possibilities, working hypotheses, which 
have sufficient foundation in intuition and common experience to 
deserve the most patient and unprejudiced examination.... But when it 
comes to the empirical or inductive proof of his theories, it is obvious 
that what we are offered in print is hopelessly inadequate to the case....
I venture to say that at the present stage the argument in favour of 
Freudian theories would be very little weakened if it were to be 
admitted that every case published hitherto had been wholly invented 
by Professor Freud in order to illustrate his ideas and to make them 
more vivid to the minds of his readers. That is to say, the case for 
considering them seriously depends at present on the appeal which they 
make to our own intuitions as containing something new or true about 
the way in which psychology works, and very little indeed upon the so- 
called inductive verification...266
Ted Winslow argues that Keynes’ intuitive acceptance of Freud is evident in his 
various references to ‘money loving’ and ‘money-making instincts’. He goes on to 
propose that Keynes’ psychological portrait of capitalist entrepreneurialism, a 
characteristic that he saw as so essential for economic recovery, is comparable to 
Freud and Jones’ notion of the anal-sadistic character. In Freudian theory the anal- 
sadistic character is someone who becomes fixated at the anal point of psychological 
development. From around the age of 18 months the pleasures of retaining or expelling 
faeces may be so great that toilet training is achieved only with the greatest reluctance 
on the part of the child and he or she may become fixated on these pleasures. In
266 John Maynard Keynes, Letter to the Nation, 1925; quoted from D. Moggridge ed., The Collected 
Writings o f  John Maynard Keynes, vol. 18 (London: Macmillan, 1978), pp. 392-3
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adulthood this person will either exhibit defensive traits such as stinginess (‘not letting 
go’) - the anal personality - or aggressively seek out the pleasures that were once 
thwarted - the anal-sadist and entrepreneur.267
It was not that Keynes approved of capitalist entrepreneur!alism. However, even his 
antipathy towards it strengthens Winslow’s argument that he was drawing upon the 
psychoanalytic notion of anal-sadism. In his ‘Economic Possibilities for Our 
Grandchildren’, Keynes hoped that;
...we shall be able to afford to assess the money-motive at its true value.
The love of money as a possession -  as distinguished from the love of 
money as a means to the enjoyments and realities of life -  will be 
recognised for what it is, a somewhat disgusting morbidity, one of those 
semi-criminal, semi-pathological propensities which one hands over 
with a shudder to the specialists in mental disease.268
Keynes’ debt to Freud is all the more striking given the propensity of respected 
contemporary psychologists who all proposed a discreet acquisitive instinct, rather 
than the complicated Freudian notion of an unconscious anal fixation. William 
McDougall, W.H.R. Rivers, and the American, James Drever, had all postulated an 
acquisitive instinct of some form.269 This is not the place to offer a history o f the
267 S. Freud, ‘Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality’, in J. Strachey ed., The Standard Edition o f  the 
Complete Psychological Works o f  Sigmund Freud: Vol. VII (London: Hogarth, 1953); and ‘Character 
and Anal Erocticism’, Strachey ed., The Standard Edition: Vol. IX  (London: Hogarth, 1959)
268 Keynes, Essays in Persuasion, in D. Moggridge ed., The Collected Writings o f  John Maynard 
Keynes, vol.9  (London: Macmillan, 1972), pp. 307-9
269 W. McDougall, An Introduction to Social Psychology (London: Methuen, 1908), p. 88 & 322; 
W.H.R. Rivers, Instinct and the Unconscious: A Contribution to a Biological Theory o f  Psycho- 
Neuroses (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1922), first published 1920, pp. 260-73; and J.
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interiorisation of acquisitiveness, although I see no reason why this could not be 
accomplished along the lines of the discussion of altruism in chapter 1. Instead, I wish 
to focus upon how acquisitiveness featured in the debates on the rationalisation of 
love.
Where Keynes had reluctantly accepted entrepreneurialism as a necessary stimulant for 
economic growth (underpinned by an unconscious, irrational anal-sadistic impulse) 
Durbin drew upon psychologies of love. In contrast to Keynes’ reluctant acceptance of 
sadistic impulses as necessary for economic stimulation, Durbin held to a belief in the 
cultural enabling of an altruistic personality within childhood development. This 
allowed him to formulate a theory of ‘mixed economy’ in which the emotional 
education of children could allow for sustainable wealth creation. Durbin’s use of a 
rationalised understanding of love to underpin his ideas was part of a wider movement 
that essentially depoliticized economics and placed it within the realm of the 
psychoanalyst. This can be explored by looking at similar psychologically informed 
economic thought in the period.
3: Wealth Creation and Emotional Education
In 1935 Ian Suttie, Susan Isaacs and the sociologists Morris Ginsburg and T.H. 
Marshall convened for a symposium on property and possessiveness. Their 
conclusions were published in the British Journal o f Medical Psychology. It will be 
recalled that Bowlby took his theoretical lead from Suttie and Isaacs and that the
Drever, Instinct in Man: A Contribution to the Psychology o f  Education (Cambridge: The University 
Press, 1921), first published 1917, pp. 187-190
270 1.D. Suttie, S. Isaacs, M. Ginsberg, and T.H. Marshall, ‘A Symposium on Property and 
Possessiveness’, British Journal o f  Medical Psychology, vol. 15, (1935-6), pp. 51-83
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British Journal o f Medical Psychology had been the principle forum in which 
psychological ideas of love were discussed in the interwar period. The discussion did 
not focus on the psycho-sexual origins of possessiveness, but rather examined how the 
mother-child bond had impacted upon economic behaviour.271 After surveying some of 
the historical evidence Suttie stated that:
iliave endeavoured to show reason for believing that possessiveness 
has not the close relationship to reality-thinking and to self-interest that 
is usually supposed, but has been so institutionalised in our culture that 
we take it for granted and even mistake it for a criterion of rational 
behaviour or for the inevitable expression of an inborn impulse. I 
suggest that the original utility-function of property has become 
completely overlaid by an abstract and largely unconscious social aim 
and ‘value’ so that economic behaviour and institutions have become 
divorced in many cases from economic ‘interest’ and practical needs, 
and show all the excesses and conflicts which characterise psychopathic 
thought and behaviour.272
The divorce o f the economic utility of property was, for Suttie, the product of the 
abstraction and corruption of the mother-child bond. Unlike the Freudian/Keynesian 
view, in which the desire for material gain was a semi-pathological state, 
acquisitiveness for Suttie was not in itself irrational but was mediated by feelings of 
greed or altruism.
271 Isaacs’ interest in economics was probably formed through her long time friendship with the LSE 
economist Lionel Robbins, D. Gardner, Susan Isaacs (London: Methuen Educational Ltd, 1969), pp. 50- 
1
272 1. Suttie, ‘A Symposium’, p. 61
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Suttie went on to propose that rectifying the mother-child bond could provide a 
solution to economic problems by reinstating the reality of acquisitiveness as a 
biological utility:
The variability of the sentiment of personal property as between one 
culture and another, and between individuals of the same culture, also 
points to a complex origin of this sentiment and to its intimate relation 
with social development. Mythology, psychopathology and the study of 
young children tend towards the same conclusion; that acquisitiveness 
is developed, not mainly from motives of organic need and 
satisfactions, or other material utilities, but as a special technique for 
the maintenance and development of social rapport. If this process is to 
be the case we can infer a strict relationship between the development 
of man’s economic disposition and the particular manner in which the 
emotional bond with the mother is replaced by others, and with the 
degree of social anxiety and antagonism occasioned by this substitution. 
The control of this process of ‘psychic weaning’ would then appear 
theoretically to offer a means of moulding economic motive (and 
ultimately economic system) far safer, pleasanter and more effective 
than the legal control of adult behaviour.273
Without this intervention, Suttie warned, greed was inevitable:
273 ibid., pp. 61-2
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...unless there were a concomitant change (to a better understanding of 
economic systems) in our mode of rearing young children, the social 
anxiety and competitiveness generated at this period of life must seek 
an outlet in possessiveness or in some other form of social competition.
Until such a change in rearing customs is brought about, the economic 
motive will continue to aim not ‘to be well o ff, but ‘to be better off 
tft&n other people’.
After eliciting agreement from Isaacs and Ginsberg the published report of the 
symposium concluded with the words of the sociologist T.H. Marshall:
My difficulty is .. .in understanding why the anxiety-security complex of 
the mother-need situation should necessarily lead to irrational 
competitive acquisitiveness.... I have tried to show that the property 
situation is highly adaptable to real social ends. I believe that the 
anxiety-security complex is inescapable. I see no reason to weaken it. I 
suggest that it is by no means impossible to educate it.274
The conclusion of this conference thus took rationalised altruistic love, in the form of 
the mother-child/anxiety-security complex, as the means to solve economic problems. 
It was this view that was to be reiterated by Bowlby and Durbin in Personal 
Aggressiveness and War and then, more robustly, in Durbin’s The Politics o f  
Democratic Socialism.
274 T.H. Marshall, ‘A Symposium’, p. 83. On Marshall see A.M. Rees, T.H. M arshall’s Social Policy in 
the Twentieth Century (London: Hutchinson, 1985)
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One of Durbin’s principal justifications for his work on aggressiveness was its 
potential economic benefit. He argued that peace lead to the active co-operation with 
others that enabled the division of labour and the creation of an affluent society, 
‘[extending] enormously the opportunities for life and satisfaction...’.275 And Bowlby 
concluded Personal Aggressiveness by asserting that acquisitiveness was rational, but 
that attempts to frustrate the pursuit of material gain were psychopathological.276 
Echoing the views of Suttie and Marshall, Durbin called for an emotional education of 
children that would engender love and guarantee peaceful and constructive 
contributions to society.277
This call was repeated by Durbin in his The Politics o f Democratic Socialism which 
was a thorough-going exposition of his democratic socialist politics, economics and 
social philosophy. As Brooke has argued, this work is redolent of the socialist, R.H.
' j no
Tawney. As well as receiving a dedication in The Politics o f  Democratic Socialism, 
Tawney was also acknowledged by Durbin as an advisor who read drafts and made
77Qrecommendations for revisions to the book. And there is indeed evidence for 
Tawney’s influence in Durbin’s conviction that economic issues were important but 
‘transitory’ in creating a better society. In The Acquisitive Society (1921) Tawney had 
offered a defence of the pursuit of material gain by contending that it was quite 
reasonable if each and every person were allowed the same opportunity:
275 J. Bowlby and E.F.M. Durbin, Personal Aggressiveness and War (London: Kegan Paul, Trench, 
Trubner and Co. Ltd., 1939), p. 5
276 Bowlby, Personal Aggressiveness, p. 150
277 Durbin, Personal Aggressiveness, pp. 41-45
278 Brooke, ‘Evan Durbin’, p. 42
279 acknowledgements in E. Durbin, Politics o f  Democratic Socialism (London: George Routledge and 
Sons Ltd., 1940)
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In the modem revulsion against economic tyranny, there is a disposition 
to represent writers who stand on the threshold of the age of capitalist 
industry as the prophets of a vulgar materialism, which would sacrifice 
every human aspiration to the pursuit of riches. No interpretation could 
be more misleading.... The grand enemy of the age was monopoly; the 
battle cry with which enlightenment marched against it was the 
abolition of privilege; its ideal was a society where each man had free 
access to the economic opportunities which he could use and enjoy the 
wealth which by his efforts he had created. That school of thought 
represented all, or nearly all, that was humane and intelligent in the 
mind of the age. It was individualistic, not because it valued riches as 
the main end of man, but because it had a high sense of human dignity, 
and desired that men should be free to become themselves.280
But Brooke is wrong in supposing that this belief in the cultivation of personality 
through material gain was transposed into Durbin’s use of psychology. As we have 
seen, Durbin evidenced a commitment to changing human character, enabling the 
biological potential of people to act altruistically, to resolve economic issues. This was 
not the enlightenment vision of Tawney but, to use the concept of Ullica SegerstrMe 
(discussed in the introduction), this was a ‘hyper-enlightenment’ belief, whereby 
knowledge of human psychology, i.e. altruism, was necessary for improving society.282 
As Durbin wrote:
280 R.H. Tawney, The Acquisitive Society, (London: Bell, 1921), pp. 19-20
281 Brooke, ‘Evan Durbin’, p.42
282 Segerstrale, ‘Chapter 18: Interpreting the Enlightenment Quest’, in her Defenders o f  the Truth: The 
Battle fo r  Science in the Sociobiology Debate and Beyond (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), pp. 
349-371
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The greatest single achievement of science in the twentieth century 
consists, or so it seems to me, in the light that has been thrown upon the 
formation of personal character. As a result of the observations and 
reflections of the analytical psychologists, we are now in a position to 
understand in a way that was quite impossible before this work had 
been done the nature of the causes that determine the behaviour of 
individual human beings.... I think it is obvious that psychological and 
anthropological studies contribute enormously to our understanding of 
every important social institution: the family, property, law, the 
distribution of authority and power in society, loyalty to the state, 
religion, co-operation, political conflict and war.
To describe Durbin’s work as ‘hyper-enlightenment’ is not to lavish it with Whiggish 
praise. Durbin depoliticized economics, divorcing it from wider social evaluation, and 
used instead personality as the means to ground a stable economy. This viewpoint was 
fundamentally different from the previous generation of economists. The likes of 
Tawney and Alfred Marshall had seen a close relationship between character formation 
and economics -  Marshall believed that ‘the progress in man’s nature’, embodied in 
the English character, had arisen from his exhibiting ‘more self-reliant habits, more 
forethought, more deliberateness and more free choice’.284 In Durbin’s work 
economics did not reflect any human values, but was viewed as part of a technocratic 
state supported by a psychoanalytically informed notion of altruism. These issues are 
further explored in subsequent chapters.
283 E.F.M. Durbin, The Politics o f  Democratic Socialism  (London: George Routledge and Son Ltd., 
1940), p. 37
284 Alfred Marshall quoted in Collini, ‘The Idea o f Character’, p. 92. For further discussion o f Marshall 
see S. Collini, D. Winch and J. Barrow, That Noble Science o f  Politics: A Study in Nineteenth Century 
Intellectual History (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983), pp. 309-337
107
There is little direct evidence of Bowlby’s political views in this period, although his 
membership of the NFRB and his collaboration with Durbin strongly suggests that he 
shared many of his friend’s beliefs. It was not until 1945 that Bowlby would write of 
how psychology could and should be used to stabilise society. But the idea of social 
behaviour as the basis for a progressive society is crucial to understanding the 
importance of his and Durbin’s ideas in the interwar period and afterwards. The final 
two chapters of this thesis offer an understanding of their work in the context of the 
prospect of World War II and the rise of fascism, and then their place in the post-war 
Labour government of Clement Attlee.
285 J. Bowlby, ‘Psychology and Democracy’, Political Quarterly, vol. 17, (1946), pp. 61-77
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Chapter 4: Security
The immediate context for the writing of Personal Aggressiveness and War (1939) 
was, of course, the rise of fascism and the imminent prospect of a second world war. 
But, as we have seen, predisposing the writing of this work were crucial interwar shifts 
in moral, socio-economic, political, and, not least, psychological thinking.
Altruism, Bowlby and Durbin argued, was a natural human capacity, residing in the 
unconscious, and Durbin had elaborated a political philosophy on this basis. This was 
a radical reworking of older socio-political ideas that had been based on an 
uncontested individual altruism. In response to the rise of fascism, this reworking was 
extended to, and consolidated, in terms of international relations. The violence that 
erupted in Europe was seen by some thinkers as the antithesis of psychologies of love 
and this shaped a specific reaction to debates over the justification of taking military 
action.
With the fragmentation of the pacifist movement in the middle of the 1930s and the 
failure of the political mechanisms for peace, pacifist sympathisers began to look to 
understand the psychological roots of nationalism and warfare to prevent an 
increasingly likely World War II. While Bowlby and Durbin were part of this 
movement that stressed the psychological basis of aggression and warfare, they also 
had a political and economic philosophy grounded in the enhancement of the 
evolutionary basis of altruism. As was argued in chapter 3, Durbin’s economics were 
based on the premise that people needed to co-operate for sustainable wealth creation. 
The mother-child bond was seen as a possible point for intervention in order to ensure
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this stability. When surveying the international scene Bowlby and Durbin not only 
sought to capture the psychological roots of aggression in Germany and Spain, but also 
to castigate governments for allowing this to happen to the detriment of international 
trade relations.
Economic internationalism had been a common justification for opposing fascism, but 
until the work of Bowlby and Durbin the collectivised use of force had not been 
explained in psychological theory. Economic internationalism had mainly been based 
on the Covenant of the League of Nations and the ultimately unsuccessful pledge of 
collective security. Bowlby and Durbin, however, saw the necessity of psychological 
intervention for the creation of stability, co-operation and wealth. Thus, in their work 
the notion of security shifted from an anchoring in international alliance, to one based 
on psychology.286
1: The Fragmentation of Pacifism and the Psvchologisation of War
Personal Aggressiveness and War (1939) was an extended version of an article for a 
conference on ‘War and Democracy’ (1938), and it was principally about the coming
987 •war. Durbin wrote that the empirical evidence on personal aggressiveness, which 
was supplied by Bowlby, was necessary to understand the causes of war between
286 In this regard Bowlby and Durbin’s legacy is evident in The Seville Declaration on Violence (1986). 
Adopted by UNESCO and endorsed by a number o f scientific organisations, the declaration was partly 
the work o f  another o f Bowlby’s collaborators, the ethologist Robert Hinde, and was intended to counter 
claims o f the genetic inevitability o f war; D. Adams, ed., The Seville Statement on Violence: Preparing 
the Ground fo r  the Construction o f  Peace (Geneva: UNESCO, 1991)
287 See G. Catlin and E.F.M. Durbin eds., War and Democracy ((London: Kegan Paul, 1938)
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human societies, concepts such as capitalism and nationalism were insufficient - they
288were only descriptive and not explanatory.
Durbin and Bowlby were not alone in advocating this view. As Martin Ceadel outlines 
in his Pacifism in Britain, 1914-1945, The Defining o f  a Faith (1980), their perspective 
on warfare can be traced back to debates in the middle of the 1930s and the formation 
of a psychological strand of pacificism. Discussing the various strands of pacifism and 
pacificism in the interwar years, Ceadel notes the distinction between those who 
absolutely rejected the war, and those who opposed it but believed that the use of 
controlled force might be necessary to achieve sustainable peace.289 Bowlby and 
Durbin were in this latter camp. Moreover, they were among a group that can be 
termed ‘psychological pacificists’.
Ceadel proposes that pacificists could be categorised as either ‘world socialists’ - those 
who saw warfare as the product of class relations; conspiracy theorists - those that 
attributed warfare to the actions of specific interested parties, e.g. arms manufacturers 
or international financiers; or ‘internationalists’ -  those who believed that international 
harmony was in the interest of every state. For the internationalist it was acceptable to 
use force to transfer the power of a noncompliant head of state if cultural or economic 
influence proved insufficient to dispel irrational nationalism.290 The issue of 
international cooperation and the internationalists’ justification for fighting a war, were 
hugely controversial in the 1930s. It was in these controversies that the idea of a 
‘psychological pacifism’ was constructed.
288 E.F.M. Durbin and J. Bowlby, Personal Aggressiveness and War, (London: Kegan Paul, Trench and 
Trubner and Co. Ltd, 1939), p. 3
289 M. Ceadel, Pacifism in Britain, 1914-1945, The Defining o f  a Faith (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1980),
p. 5
90 Ceadel, Pacifism, p. 5
111
As Ceadel notes, the interwar years saw international pacificism flourish as the 
nineteenth-century liberal belief in progress was tempered by the experience of World 
War I.291 This mixture of optimism and pessimism had been institutionalised at the 
Peace Conference of 1919. Here the 58 governments that comprised the League of 
Nations agreed to condemn as ‘illegal’ any war that had begun without first exhausting 
the machinery of the Covenant of the League. The formation of the League of Nations, 
therefore, legitimised the collectivised use of force in order to preserve peace. This 
legal transformation of warfare framed many of the anti-fascist debates in Britain. 
Opposition to the rise of Hitler led to considerable support for this notion and, by 
1935, the Labour Party had committed itself to what had become know as ‘collective 
security’.292
The failure to honour the pledge for collective security is now well documented. Less 
historical discussion has been given to the alternative strands of international 
pacificism that arose in the middle of the 1930s. Ceadel attributes this historical blind- 
spot to the conventional belief that 1935 saw clarification of the task of the League of 
Nations and that this clarification marked a split between pacifists and those who
J Q ' l
advocated a military deterrent. However, as Ceadel notes, this split cannot be clearly 
observed in the pacifists and pacificists who, from 1933, argued that warfare was the 
result of patriotism, and that patriotism was a culturally or psychologically conditioned 
‘war convention’.294 It is in the discussion of the war convention that it possible to
292 ibid., p. 147 For a contemporary account o f the legal transformation o f warfare and the construction 
o f collective security see A. D. McNair, Collective Security: An Inaugural Lecture (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1936)
293 Ceadel, Pacifism , p. 147
294 ibid., p. 148
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discern the psychological theories of warfare with which Bowlby and Durbin 
concerned themselves.295
The most famous critique of war that employed the notion of a war convention came 
from A.A. Milne’s Peace With Honour (1934):
When a nation talks of its honour it means its prestige. National prestige 
is a reputation for the will to war. A nation’s honour, then, is measured 
by the nation’s willingness to maintain its reputation as a user of 
force.296
Milne held out-and-out pacifist views, opposed to any idea of a national identity and 
war-mongering. However, this was not true of all those who critically assessed the war 
convention. In a series of essays entitled Challenge to Death, edited by Storm Jameson 
and published in 1934, the psychological rather than the cultural basis of patriotism,
907nationalism and warfare were discussed by a variety of authors.
Ceadel is probably correct to see these essays as reflecting the fragmentation of the 
pacifist movement. However, it is possible to discern some continuity between the 
views expressed in Challenge to Death and the post-World War I formation of 
rationalised views of altruism. As was stressed, it was in the work of Wilfred Trotter
295 Alternative psychological accounts o f  warfare can be found in E. Glover, War, Sadism and Pacifism 
(London: George Allen and Unwin, 1946), first published 1933; and later in W. Brown, War and the 
Psychological Conditions o f  Peace (London: Adam and Charles Black, 1942). Both works drew on 
Freud’s notion o f  the destructive instinct and saw war as the release o f mankind’s primitive impulses.
296 A.A. Milne, Peace With Honour: An Inquiry into the War Convention (London: Methuen, 1934), pp. 
27-8
297 S. Jameson ed. Challenge to Death (London: Constable and Co. ltd., 1934); On Jameson see her 
autobiography, Autobiography o f  Storm Jameson: Journey from the North: vol. I (London: Virago, 
1984), first published 1969. Jameson was a well connected novelist and Challenge to Death began when 
she organised a diner party for potential writers against the war; Jameson, Autobiography, pp. 327-330
113
and his The Instincts o f the Herd in War and Peace (1914), that we are first able to 
discern a psychological and non-volitional theory of altruism. Significantly Challenge 
to Death opened with an extensive quote from Trotter on the necessity of a 
psychological understanding of love and his belief that;
... .the progressive evolution of society has reached a point where the 
construction and use of a scientific statecraft will become an 
indispensable factor in further development and the only means of 
arresting the dreary oscillations between progress and relapse which 
have been so ominous a feature of human history.. ..The only way in 
which society can be made safe from disruption or decay is by the 
intervention of the conscious and instructed intellect as a factor among 
the forces ruling its development....298
The contributors to Challenge to Death heeded Trotter’s words and, following on from 
Jameson’s introductory essay on ‘The Twilight of Reason’, looked for a scientific 
explanation for the causes of war.299 Among the contributors were respected writers 
and thinkers, such as Julian Huxley, the novelist Vera Brittain and her husband, 
George Catlin.300 Brittain wrote of how, ‘...we have become masters of matter, but 
have not learnt to use, control and understand our own minds’.301 Catlin, who would
298 Trotter quoted in Jameson ed. Challenge to Death, p. xv
299 As with the post-World War I debates on the evolutionary basis o f altruism, the discussion of the 
psychological basis o f  patriotism and war in the nineteen thirties was also closely linked to unorthodox 
Christian theology. For example see L. Richards, The Christian’s Contribution to Peace: A Constructive 
Approach to International Relationships (London: Student Christian Movement Press, 1935), especially, 
pp. 29 and 48
00 The contributors uniformly viewed warfare as the result o f patriotism although differed in the degree 
to which they accounted for it psychologically. Along with Jameson, Huxley, Brittain and Catlin, other 
contributors included Gerald Heard, Vemon Bartlett, J.B. Priestley, Rebecca West, Winifred Holtby, 
Mary Agnes Hamilton, Ivor Brown and Phillip Noel Baker.
301 V. Brittain, ‘Peace and the Public Mind’, in Jameson ed., Challenge to Death, p. 41
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later go onto organise with Durbin the 1938 conference on ‘War and Democracy’, 
looked to the psychology and anthropology of groups to explain nationalism and 
war.302 It was, however, Huxley’s essay on ‘Peace through Science’ that discussed at 
the greatest depth the potential of psychology. He began his essay by stating his 
philosophy of science:
Science is organised and tested knowledge; and in that knowledge lies 
the potential control of phenomena. In regards to war, science can have 
two functions, the one promoting and the other impeding war. It can 
amass knowledge about the methods of prosecuting war so as it make it 
more efficient; or it can amass knowledge about the nature, causes and 
activities of war with a view to checking or preventing it.303
This was in keeping with Huxley’s ‘trustee’ model of evolution and, when applied to 
the psychology of warfare, this philosophy replicated Trotter’s belief in the necessity 
o f becoming consciously aware of the unconscious processes that enabled aggression 
or co-operation. Trotter’s views had been expressed in terms of Freudian psychology, 
and it was to Freud that Huxley turned:
The most fundamental cause of war, if one can speak of one among 
several contributing and necessary causes as being more fundamental 
than the others, is, I take it, the psychological. You could have no war 
unless human beings had certain capacities for anger, for mass emotion, 
and grim determination in the course of action.... Granted these are
302 G. Catlin, ‘The Roots o f War’, in Jameson ed., Challenge to Death, pp. 20-39
303 J. Huxley, ‘Peace through Science’, in Jameson ed., Challenge to Death, p. 287
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obvious but often neglected facts, from which there is no escape short 
of millennial selective breeding, there remain others more equally basic 
and of more immediate import. I mean those revealed by the study of 
the human subconscious-work first begun by Freud.. ,.304
We have seen how this work on the human unconscious had been constructed in 
Britain within the evolutionary tradition. By the middle of the 1930s some 
psychologists were beginning to bring psychoanalytic ideas to bear upon the biological 
basis of love and offer a formal developmental theory. Huxley’s solution to warfare 
was in keeping with this trend. After summarising the impulses that made up the 
unconscious he proposed the possible eradication of aggressive tendencies through 
emotional education:
If we could bring our children up so that their impulses for violence- 
which are perfectly natural and normal biological properties, and not 
the stigmata of original sin-were not crudely repressed, but given 
reasonable outlets and rational direction, so that they could be 
harnessed with the rest of the team of human driving forces instead of 
being inhibited and forced into unwilling opposition, intense war-fever 
could not occur, the danger of the outbreak of war would be lessened, 
and its violence and horror diminished.
But though we know enough psychology to be sure that this could be 
done, we do not yet know enough to say just how it could be done. It is
304 Huxley, ‘Peace through’, p. 297. Huxley should have used ‘unconscious’ when referring to Freud’s 
work. Indeed, it has been pointed out that Huxley was generally inconsistent in his terminology 
regarding consciousness, M. Swetlitz, ‘Julian Huxley and the End o f  Evolution’, Journal o f  the History 
o f  Biology, vol. 28, (1995), p. 185
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in this field of applied psychology and scientific education that an 
enormous amount of research is needed.305
This is precisely the line Bowlby and Durbin would take in Personal Aggressiveness 
and War. While Huxley had only hoped that psychology might be used to redirect 
aggression, Bowlby and Durbin offered an entire political philosophy underpinned by 
developmental psychology. This led them to take a more definite line than the 
contributors to Challenge to Death on the question of the collectivised use of force.
2: Personal Aggressiveness, War and Collective Security
Bowlby and Durbin’s commitment to emotional education has already been noted. 
Through the mother-child bond they believed it possible to create a harmonious and 
prosperous society. When set in an international context these views led them to deride 
alternative forms of government that were based upon extreme nationalism and 
hatred.306
The evidence drawn from the behaviour of baboons and children and from primitive 
societies had led Bowlby to conclude that: ‘The evidence in fact supports Hobbes’
305 Huxley, ‘Peace through Science’, p. 301
306 Personal Aggressiveness and War came out o f a research project, instigated by Durbin and funded by 
the Rockefeller foundation, investigating the psychology o f  international relations; ‘Psychological 
Research’, Durbin Papers, BLPES, 4/4. This project was to have continued and to have looked at 
comparisons in how the war was financed but it appears this proposal was rejected; ‘Rockefeller 
Research Project’, Durbin Papers, 4/5, BLPES. In Britain, however, there were moves to launch a full 
scale investigation into the causes o f warfare based on Bowlby and Durbin’s approach; ‘Chatham 
House’, Bowlby Papers, (CMAC), WL, PP/BOW/K.1/9. It has been argued that the Rockefeller 
Foundation’s patronage o f  social sciences in England was intended to bolster the social order o f  
capitalist democracy see D. Fisher, ‘The Rockefeller Foundation and the Development o f  Scientific 
Medicine in Great Britain’, Minerva, vol. 16, (1979), pp. 20-41; and Fisher, ‘American Philanthropy and 
the Social Sciences in Britain, 1919-1939: The Reproduction o f a Conservative Ideology’, The 
Sociological Review, vol. 28, (1980), pp. 277-315. That the Foundation backed Durbin is probably 
explained by the compatibility o f his ideas with big business, capitalist interests. I do no think it 
suggests a radical rethinking o f Rockefeller motivation is required.
117
view that without government and in a state of nature, man’s life, thanks to his animal
307passions and rivalries, tends to be ‘solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short.’ It was 
the state that raised man up above the level of animals and enabled the stability 
necessary for peace and prosperity. It was, therefore, at the level of government that 
responsibility had to placed. Fascism was a retrograde form of government which 
appealed to the baser, more destructive instincts of man:
Working hand in glove with rational acquisitiveness (the economic 
motive) are the forces of irrational acquisitiveness....The need for a 
scapegoat is believed to play as large a part in civilised communities as 
it does in primitive. The causes of the persecution of German Jews are 
shown to be a similar nature to the causes of the expulsion of devils by 
primitives. The differences lie not so much in origin of hatred as in the 
victims selected. Exactly the same motives are held to be at the root of 
certain international hatreds. The hatred of Nazi Germany for Bolshevik 
Russia is instanced and analysed. Propaganda is successful only in so 
far as there is a potential need for a scapegoat in the populace...it is 
impossible to account for the hatred which can so easily be stimulated 
in ordinary citizens in certain circumstances without supposing that 
there is this need latent in everyone.308
Bowlby and Durbin speculatively argued that this operated through the transposition of 
feelings in individual development to the political arena:
307 Bowlby, Personal Aggressiveness, p. 62
308 ibid., p. 150
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The transference of the predominant feelings of childhood from parents 
to the organs of political life -  to the State and the parties in it -  is 
almost universal. Hence the importance of symbolic figureheads and 
governors, Kings and Fiihrers. Hence the fanaticism and violence of 
political life.309
Although Bowlby and Durbin advocated the emotional education of children as the 
panacea for these social ills, they thought adult aggression too deeply entrenched in the 
psyche to be displaced by any moral or rational interjection. The collectivised use of 
force was, therefore, necessary and justifiable. Durbin would later write that:
I find no warrant in the evidence of psychology, or in history, for 
believing that aggressive groups of adult human beings can be 
restrained by kindness, or cured of aggression by submission to their 
will. On the contrary, I believe that social justice and international 
justice can be founded only upon peace and law; and that peace and 
law, in their turn, can be based only in the last resort, upon the use o f 
force. Aggressive individuals and minorities within the state and within 
the growing community of nations must be restrained by force, if they 
cannot be persuaded by reason. We cannot hand over the world to the 
law breaker, simply because he is armed with machine-guns and 
bombing aeroplanes. Nor would ordinary men and women permit it to
309 Bowlby and Durbin, Personal Aggressiveness, p. 20
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be done. They are prepared to pay the heavy price that is necessary to 
prevent it.310
Thus, Bowlby and Durbin’s psychological conception of the roots of warfare, coupled 
to their belief that it was a problem of national government, rather than an international 
phenomenon, justified the use of force for the international good. This strengthened 
Durbin’s conviction that a state should be judged by how it enhanced the natural 
capacity of man for altruism. Whereas prior to World War II Durbin’s thinking had 
been concerned with using psychology for the economic benefit of society, during the 
war it became integral to the national and international democratic project. In a sense 
collective security became transformed from an international pact into an emotional 
condition.
In The Politics o f  Democratic Socialism, published in 1940 but written on the eve of 
war, Durbin reflected on the development of his political thought:
... .to those of us who were brought up in the liberal and democratic 
traditions of British political life a certain form of utilitarianism is bred 
in our bones, and will not pass from us until we are dead. It is not the 
utilitarianism that degenerated into the personal hedonism of the 1920s.
We do not believe that personal pleasure, narrowly defined, is the 
object o f life. We respect the importance of the common good, and we 
recognise the obvious biological and psychological fact that ‘we are
310 E.F.M. Durbin, The Politics o f  Democratic Socialism  (London: George Routledge and Son Ltd., 
1940), pp. 328-9
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members of one of another’, and that the good of those for whom we
311care is essential to our happiness...
In contrast to nineteenth century utilitarianism, Durbin’s politics were justified in 
psychological terms. But this was not simply the naturalisation of a political 
philosophy. Durbin’s debt to psychology had far deeper and wider ranging 
implications. Durbin elaborated this theme in an essay of 1942: ‘What have we to 
defend? A Brief Critical Examination of the British Socialist Tradition’. In this 
revision of the principles of British politics, he argued that evolutionary and historical 
progress was rooted in social co-operation:
One of the most powerful forces in human life is the loyalty that the 
individual feels towards various social groups: families, churches, 
tribes, nations. We often under-estimate the power of these feelings and 
speak and think as though the pursuit of private gain and personal ends 
was the mainspring of all action. But the reflection of a moment will 
show that throughout recorded history, men and women have combined 
for common purposes: the preservation of the race, the production of 
physical necessities and the enjoyment of each others’ company. They 
have always prepared to lay down their lives in order to preserve the
'X 1 9social groups that served these purposes.
311 Durbin, The Politics, p. 329
312 E.F.M. Durbin, ‘What have we to defend? A Brief Critical Examination o f the British Socialist 
Tradition’, in N. Deakin ed. Origins o f  the Welfare State, vol. 2 (London: Routledge, 2000), pp. 5-6, first 
published 1942
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This passage permits us to see how Durbin psychologised collective security, 
identifying British society with a long evolutionary history of social groups. The 
British political system became an exemplar of the type of social co-operation:
The parallel between the team games of which we are so fond and the 
conduct of our own political life is as profound as it is familiar.. ..When 
the game is over and the battle is lost or won, the opponents shake 
hands and arrange a return match.
It is this form of our political life that infuriates the extremist in our 
midst and puzzles the foreign visitor -  the communist and the ‘near 
communist’, the Fascist and the ‘crypto-Fascist’, cannot understand the 
light-hearted good fellowship with which we engage upon our political 
warfare.313
Even the allied forces were cast in this mould; Durbin describing their relationship as 
based on ‘the sentiment of love, the mixture of impatience and affection that unites a 
family of vigorous and tolerant brothers.’314 Such a simplification of politics and 
society was and is unsustainable and this can be seen in the problems of evacuation, 
World War II’s very own test of Durbin’s belief in the British government as the 
apotheosis of the loving social group. Bowlby would be heavily involved in the 
evacuation o f children from British cities, a scheme that encompassed all the
313 Durbin, ‘What have we to Defend?’, p. 38
314 ibid., p. 65. Durbin was by no means alone in justifying the war in terms o f the loving social group.
In America Frank Buchman, he o f  the Oxford Group Movement, was spreading the message o f his 
recently formed campaign for Moral Re-Armament (MRA). In 1939 he gave a radio broadcast ‘One 
Hundred Million Listening’ with the then senator Harry Truman and argued that the war was just if  the 
allied forces had love on their side. Senator Harry S. Truman, Rear-Admiral Richard Byrd and Dr. Frank 
N.D. Buchman, ‘One Hundred Million Listening: A World Broadcast on Moral Re-armament From 
Station WRUL Boston October 29th 1939 (London: Hazell, Watson and Vilney Ltd., 1939). It is unclear 
how important the MRA was in ensuring American intervention after Pearl Harbour or, for that matter, 
the dropping o f  the first atomic bomb.
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psychological and political issues that have been discussed above. And, after the war, 
Durbin would become an important figure in the Labour government of Clement 
Attlee. An examination of the evacuation debates and Durbin’s political manoeuvrings 
allows for a deeper historical understanding of the scope of Bowlby and Durbin’s 
work.
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Chapter 5: Security and the State
Bowlby’s involvement in the evacuation of children from British cities during World 
War II provided him with the opportunity to apply and extend his psychological ideas. 
Here he employed his evolutionary theorising to address children’s anxiety at being 
away from their families. It also marked an important shift in the intellectual basis for 
conceiving social policy. Whereas, prior to 1940, British social policy had been 
formulated in terms of social and political a priori ideals and individual altruism, 
thereafter, partly as a result of Bowlby’s involvement, it became rooted in a 
technological framework. It was to remain so for the next twenty years.
The second part of this chapter explores the impact of Bowlby and Durbin’s thinking 
on the post-war Attlee government. Although it is difficult to gauge its precise impact, 
some important lines of research are identified that potentially afford a history of 
psychology more closely aligned to more conventional political and social British 
history.
1: Evacuation
In the summer o f 1938 a government committee laid out plans for an anticipated mass 
exodus of Britain’s cities if  and when war was declared on Germany.315 Believing that, 
in the event of war, panic would inevitably lead people to flee to the country, the 
committee sought to impose some order. It, therefore, divided Britain into three areas:
315 Discussion had begun as early as 1924 and had led to the formation o f the Evacuation Sub- 
Committee o f  Imperial Defence on 16th Feb. 1931, see R. Titmuss, Problems o f  Social Policy, 1950 
(New York: Pelgrave Macmillan, 2002), p. 23
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‘evacuation’, ‘neutral’ and ‘reception’ areas.316 Certain groups would be allowed to 
leave evacuation areas, those in which heavy bombing was expected, to safe reception 
areas where the government would ensure suitable accommodation. Millions of people 
were affected by this policy, even when it was limited to ‘priority cases’. Of particular 
concern was the separation of families with children of school age. The scale of the 
scheme and the co-operation required has attracted considerable historical comment. 
Richard Titmuss, in his The Problems o f Social Policy (1950), offered a rigorous 
analysis of the logistical difficulties faced by the various government departments 
involved and this was readdressed in Angus Calder’s widely read The People’s War 
(1969).317 Both Calder and Titmuss generally accepted the state’s approach and played 
down the fact that when war broke out the government had to persuade reluctant 
parents to send their children away. The figures for different regions varied widely. In 
London under half of its school children left the city, while in Rotherham only eight 
per cent moved. Even in Lancashire, where the percentage was highest, the proportion 
was only two-thirds.318 Calder puts this down to the ‘flair’ or otherwise with which 
local authorities had publicised the scheme, and the ‘greater courage or greater apathy’
' i  1 q
of people during wartime.
The absence of detailed historical discussion of the wider political significance of the 
evacuation scheme is surprising. This is all the more so given that this was at the 
forefront of the minds of those charged with delivering it. In an introduction to a
316 A. Calder, The P eop le’s War: Britain 1939-1945 (London: Granada Publishing, 1971), first 
published 1969, p. 42
17 R. Titmuss, Problems o f  Social Policy; and A. Calder, ‘Chapter 2: “This Strangest o f Wars”: 
September 1939 to April 1940’, in his The P eople’s War, pp. 40-88
318 Titmuss, Problems o f  Social Policy, pp. 103-4
319 Calder, The P eo p le ’s War, p. 43
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general survey into the success and failures of the scheme, written in 1940, the Fabian 
Margaret Cole wrote that:
...this evacuation was both an effort of national government and an 
operation which gravely affected social institutions as well as the lives 
of individuals; it sought to combine the compulsion of national need 
with as much as could be retained in emergency of the ‘voluntary 
principle’ on which so much of English public service has been built.
As such, it seems to provide, bottled neatly, as it were, by the 
unforeseen cause of the war, a laboratory experiment in State control 
upon which the student of politics can ponder and ratiocinate.320
The scheme gave rise to many tensions between those acting on behalf of the state and 
those it sought to help. For example, the billeting of suitable accommodation in 
reception areas was a constant source of aggravation. It was, however, the issue of 
parental non-compliance that was the most worrying, and it was for this that the 
expertise of Bowlby and Susan Isaacs was recruited.321
With the outbreak of World War II, and before joining the Emergency Medical Service 
and then the army, Bowlby was involved in the evacuation of children from London to 
Cambridge.322 The reasons for Bowlby’s involvement were multiple. He had been
320 M. Cole, ‘Introduction’ in R. Padley and M. Cole eds. Evacuation Survey: A Report to the Fabian 
Society (London: Routledge, 1940), p. 3
321 for a recent factual study o f evacuation o f London school children see R. Samways, We Think You 
Ought to Go: An Account o f  the Evacuation o f  Children From London Based on the Original Records o f  
the London County Council (London: Greater London Records Office, 1995)
322 Bowlby joined the Emergency Medical Service in 1940. However, he soon left after objecting to 
patients from Dunkirk being referred to as cowards by the Consultant Neurologist, Dr. Gordon Holmes: 
B. Shephard, A War o f  Nerves: Soldiers and Psychiatrists 1914-1994 (London: Jonathan Cape, 2000), 
pp. 171-2. After this he joined a group o f  army psychiatrists who worked to standardise officer
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working for the London County Council on the problem of juvenile delinquency and 
there were fears that this would increase with evacuation. There was also an 
influential call for the inclusion of applied psychology in government campaigns, such 
as evacuation. This emanated from the ‘Tots and Quots’ Club, a club made up of 
prominent scientists that included Durbin and Bowlby’s friend, Hugh Gaitskell. The 
views of this group were made widely known with the publication of Science in War in 
1940.324 Bowlby’s own views on the evacuation scheme became known through a 
report by the Fabian society to which he contributed. In this he stressed the necessity 
of creating homely environments for evacuees in order to minimise children’s anxiety:
Those whose normal peacetime work takes them into daily contact with 
the psychological problems of family life, difficult children and foster 
homes are surprised not by the breakdown of evacuation but at it partial 
success.
The truth is that every human being from birth to old age draws 
emotional sustenance and strength from those few people who 
constitute his home. Love and friendship are as vital to man, especially 
the child, as bread and coal.
These simple human needs need reinstating in a world preoccupied 
by economic stress and political strife. They need reinstating also
selection, see M. Pines, ‘A History o f Psychodynamic Psychiatry in Britain’, J. Holmes ed. A Textbook 
History o f  Psychotherapy in Psychiatric Practice (Edinburgh: Churchill Livingstone, 1991). This group 
of psychiatrists would later form the core o f the Tavistock Clinic as it was reorganised after the war. For 
critical discussion o f  the reorganised Tavistock, N. Rose and P. Miller, ‘The Tavistock Programme: The 
Government o f  Subjectivity and Social Life’, Sociology, vol. 22, (1988), pp. 171-192
323 Bowlby, along with Donald Winnicott, a paediatrician and psychoanalyst, and Emanual Miller, a 
child psychiatrist, wrote a letter on this subject to the British M edical Journal, ‘Evacuation o f Small 
Children: Letter to the Editor’, British Medical Journal, (1939), p. 1202-3. This concern would 
eventually lead to a joint memorandum from the Home Office and Board o f Education in 1941 insisting 
preventive measures were taken: Samways, We think you ought to go, p. 44
324 Science in War (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1940)
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because they are the essential background against which the emotional 
problems of the evacuation must be seen. For evacuation has broken up
99  Sfamily life all over the country.
This view is unsurprising given what is known of Bowlby’s psychological theorising at 
this time. One can also see in it the same slippage of the use of security that was 
evident in his psychologising of warfare. The evacuation scheme should not only be 
based on the removal of children from threatened cites, but, in Bowlby’s opinion, 
should have attended to the emotional need for security. Furthermore, he argued the 
emotional needs of children should be addressed by trained professionals:
...it should be realised that the successful placement of children in 
foster-homes requires skill, training and expertise.... For this reason it 
is a very serious criticism of the Government’s evacuation scheme that 
no attempt has ever been made to enlist the services of social workers 
whose peacetime profession it is to handle problems of this kind.326
Here Bowlby’s framework clearly anticipated the later movement toward a 
technological social policy. The role of government and the ends towards which it was 
working were not questioned. He advocated the employment of trained experts to cater 
for a need that he had understood from his theorising to be unquestionably innate and 
ubiquitous. Bowlby did not stop here; he went on to offer a psychological account of 
why many parents had been uncooperative with the scheme. He attributed many of the
325 J. Bowlby, ‘Psychological Aspects’, in R. Padley and M. Cole eds. Evacuation Survey, p. 186
326 Bowlby, ‘Psychological Aspects’, p. 193
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problems of evacuation to parental anxiety. A better psychological understanding of 
parenthood was needed to overcome this:
Very little consideration has been given to the parents of the little 
children who have been evacuated. What reference there have been 
have been almost universally disparaging. They have not kept the 
children clean or trained them properly, they upset the children by their 
visits, they evade the foster-homes on Sunday, above all they are 
wicked and selfish either not to send the children away or else to bring 
them home again.
But let us consider the question from the parents’ point of view. The 
life of most married women centres round the looking after their 
husband, children and home. To many it is the purpose and end of their 
life, the object of all their hopes and ambitions, the vehicle for their 
energies and enthusiasm. Suddenly, to ask these women to give up their 
children is like asking a physician to give up his practice or a naval 
captain his ship. They will feel bored and miserable....
And fathers must not be forgotten. One man of 40 went completely 
off his food when his little girl was sent away. He ate nothing and got 
more and more depressed. After 2 or 3 weeks of this it was hardly
'i'yn
surprising that his wife brought the child back again.
327 ibid., p. 191
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Bowlby did offer sensitive, sympathetic and respectful solutions to the problems faced 
by parents and the unavoidable distress caused by the scheme. However, there were 
wider political ramifications in his stance. Bowlby psychologised parents, and they 
were cast as objects of empirical study, rather than citizens who shaped their 
circumstances. It was a psychologisation that was neither confined to the war, nor to 
Bowlby alone. Isaacs, introducing a later survey of the Cambridge evacuation 
experience, shared Bowlby’s views and looked to their post-war applicability:
The sharp lesson in the ineffectiveness and waste of a partial approach 
to a great human issue, applies by no means only to the temporary crisis 
of dispersing urban populations during a war. It has an equally direct 
and urgent bearing upon the whole field of education and of social 
reconstruction during and after the war.
This is not the place to enter into such larger questions. We feel 
justified, however, in stressing our conclusion that a true understanding 
of the feelings and aims of ordinary human beings is an essential 
condition of success, whether we are concerned with the replacing and 
rebuilding of our great cities, the renewal of life in the countryside, the 
humanizing of our town schools, the training and teaching of youth, the 
education of adult citizens, the revision of economic structure.
Everyone of these purposes not only requires a co-operative effort 
from departments and sectional authorities now so often working
328 ibid., p. 192-3
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isolatedly; it demands also the full knowledge and understanding of 
human nature as a whole.
Such a perspective can be understood as part of an incipient political and social policy 
framework. Analysing the period from 1940 to 1960 Jose Harris has observed how the 
former ethical basis of politics and social policy completely disappeared. She reports 
on ‘the widespread silence on the theme of the underlying nature, powers, and 
purposes of the state’, and demonstrates how the states’ idealistic framework became 
replaced by a more technological conception of politics. Now social policy came to
be derived from supposedly neutral social sciences. Likewise, the historian Dorothy 
Porter notices a similar trend in changes to social medicine.331 Porter argues that, by 
the interwar years, social medicine had assumed an explicit political role as reformers, 
such as the Webbs and Newsholme, attempted to make advanced industrial society an 
egalitarian and healthy utopia. Opening up health care to everybody became 
fundamental to the creation of a fair and democratic society.333 But with World War II 
this egalitarian underpinning disappeared and was replaced by a social medicine 
grounded in social behaviour. Porter argues that this change in emphasis can be seen
329 S. Isaacs, ‘Introduction’, in S. Isaacs ed., The Cambridge Evacuation Survey (London: Methuen and 
Co., 1941), pp. 1-11
330 J. Harris, ‘Political Thought and the State’, in R. Whiting and S. Green eds. The Boundaries o f  the 
State in Modern Britain (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), p. 15
331 D. Porter, ‘From Social Structure to Social Behaviour in Britain after the Second World War’, 
Contemporary British History, vol. 16(3), (2002), pp. 58-80
332 S. Webb and B. Webb, Soviet Communism: Dictatorship or Democracy? (London: Left Review, 
1936) and A. Newsholme, ‘Some Conditions o f Social Efficiency in Relation to Local Public 
Administration’, Public Health, vol. 22, (1908-9), pp. 403-415
333 For discussion also see D. Porter, ‘Changing Disciplines: John Ryle and the Making o f Social 
Medicine in Twentieth Century Britain’, History o f  Science, vol. 30, (1992), pp. 119-47; D. Porter, 
‘John Ryle: Doctor o f  Revolution?’, in D. Porter and R. Porter eds., Doctors, Politics and Society: 
Historical Essays (Amsterdam and Atlanta: Rodopi, 1993), pp. 229-47; and D. Porter, ‘Social Medicine 
and Scientific Humanism in mid-Twentieth Century Britain’, Journal o f  Historical Sociology, vol. 9, 
(1996), pp. 168-87
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reflected in other sociological work of the period. For example, it is evident in Michael 
Young and Peter Wilmott’s Family and Kinship in East London (195 7).334
Harris and Porter’s work provides a useful means to assess Bowlby’s ideas. This 
assessment can, in turn, fill gaps in their accounts. Harris and Porter are unclear as to 
how the transformation they record took place. Harris sees the displacement of 
political by technological goals merely as the result of the rise of Keynesian economics 
and disintegration in the quality of political debate.335 The evacuation debates, 
however, go some way to explaining the rise of the technological basis for conceiving 
of social policy, and consideration of Bowlby and Durbin’s work in the context of the 
post-war Attlee government can further illuminate this.
2: Psychology and the State in Post-World War II Britain
In 1945 the Labour party won a landslide victory and formed the first ever majority 
Labour government with Clement Attlee as Prime Minister. The government has been 
seen as one of the great reforming ministries with the nationalisation of the Bank of 
England, coal, civil aviation, cable and wireless, gas, inland transport, and iron and 
steel, and the creation of National Insurance, National Assistance, and the National 
Health Service.336 While these reforms are well documented, little has been written of 
the more problematic question of the place of psychology in this new welfare 
provision. The belief in the necessity of psychologically informed social policy was by
334 M. Young and P. Wilmott, Family and Kinship in East London (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 
1957); Porter, ‘From Social Structure’, p. 70
335 Harris, ‘Political Thought and the State’, p. 27
336 There is a vast literature on the Attlee government. For surveys see K. Morgan, Labour in Power, 
1945-51 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984); H. Pelling, The Labour Governments 1945-51 (London: 
Macmillan, 1984); and P. Hennessy, Never Again: Britain 1945-51 (London: Cape, 1992)
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no means held across the government. It was, however, a prerogative for Bowlby and 
Durbin, and looking at their advocacy of a psychologically informed state we can 
begin to get a historical understanding of an issue that is still of importance today. It 
suggests that the inclusion of psychology was not driven by a concern for welfare 
provision but by a desire for ontological security that we have seen formulated in the 
pre-war and evacuation debates.
From around the middle of the 1930s Durbin had steadily increased his influence and 
standing within the Labour movement. During the war his theories of a mixed 
economy would have appealed to the coalition government and he secured a temporary 
appointment on the economic section of the War Cabinet Secretariat in 1940. This was 
followed by a position as personal assistant to Clement Attlee who was then Deputy 
Prime Minister. After the war Durbin would go on to become Parliamentary Secretary 
at the Ministry of Works before his death in 1948, and he was a key figure in 
establishing the party’s economic outlook.337 As has been argued, the use of 
psychology for creating a harmonious society was central to Durbin’s economics and 
he worked hard to get the subject on the government’s agenda.338
In 1945 Durbin organised a conference with G.D.H. Cole. The conference addressed 
‘Psychological and Sociological Problems of Modem Socialism’, and was well 
attended by some of the most prominent left-wing thinkers, including Karl Mannheim,
337 S. Brooke, ‘Problems o f  ‘Socialist Planning’: Evan Durbin and the Labour Government o f 1945’,
The H istorical Journal, vol. 34(3), (1991), pp. 687-702
338 It has been argued that psychology played an important part in establishing Attlee’s ministry as truly 
modern; M. Francis, ‘The Labour Party: Modernisation and the Politics o f Self-Restraint’, in B. 
Conekin, F. Mort, and C. Waters eds., Moments in Modernity (London: Rivers Oram Press, 1999), pp. 
152-170. Francis records how a Parliamentary Private Secretary, Christopher Mayhew, felt so 
inadequate in the presence o f ministers such as Gaitskell and Harold Wilson and their ‘unpretentious 
youth, well-trained efficiency and modernity’ that he took the advice o f Durbin and sought out a 
psychotherapist to recover his mental balance.
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T.H. Marshall, W.A. Robson, R.H. Tawney, Harold Wilson, Michael Young and 
Bowlby.339 Its purpose was to look at how experts from the social sciences could help 
inform a deeper understanding of socialism, democracy and liberty.340 Bowlby’s 
contribution to the conference was published the following year in the Political 
Quarterly.
Entitled ‘Psychology and Democracy’, it was a clear statement of Bowlby’s belief in 
the necessity of a psychological understanding of the roots of love for the constitution 
of democracy, not simply its maintenance:
...a co-operative, peaceful and non-persecutory society demands that 
personal and social relations within it be based on the principles of 
freedom and democracy. Since the valuation of a society of this kind is 
clearly a moral judgement, if it can be demonstrated that liberty and 
democracy are necessary for its existence, they cease to be merely 
desirable in themselves but are seen to be social and psychological 
techniques having as their purpose the creation of a society with certain 
particular valued attributes.341
After summarising his work on personal aggressiveness, Bowlby speculatively set out 
the environmental or ‘field’ conditions that would allow for democracy to flourish.
The idea of the ‘field’ was taken from the Polish psychologist and philosopher Kurt 
Lewin who advocated a constructive experimentalism whereby the experimenter was
339 Plans for this conference can be found in ‘Notes on Social Psychology’, Durbin Papers, BLPES, 4/8
340see S. Brooke, ‘Evan Durbin: Reassessing a Labour ‘Revisionist” , Twentieth Century British History, 
vol. 7, (1996), p. 40
341 J. Bowlby, ‘Psychology and Democracy’, Political Quarterly, vol. 17, (1946), p. 61
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forced to continually re-evaluate his or her conceptual schema to deal with 
complicated social relations.342 Although purporting to be an advocate of Lewin’s 
‘field theory’, Bowlby in fact collapsed complex social relations into his own 
developmental theory, eschewing the social ‘field’ and replacing this with an 
individualistic social ontology, namely the need for security.343 For example, he 
equated the democratic process with the early development of children’s personalities:
By and large the same factors which promote libidinization and co­
operation in childhood, proximity of authorities, a sense of being 
valued, tolerance for private interests and so on, are those which also 
evoke co-operative attitudes in grown-ups.344
Bowlby believed the exercise of government or management should have been the 
actualisation of this innately grounded co-operation. In effect he naturalised through 
psychology the political or managerial process in the light of his observations of 
childhood development, exactly as Durbin had done in his essay on ‘What have we to 
defend?’.345 This can be objected to on philosophical grounds as an example of the 
naturalistic fallacy. There are also objections that can be levelled at it from a social and 
historical perspective and these can be examined through some of the political debates 
of the period.
342 Bowlby, ‘Psychology and Democracy’, p. 73; on Lewin see A. Metraux, ‘Kurt Lewin: Philosopher- 
Psychologist’, Science in Context, vol. 5, (1992), pp. 373-84
343 On how Lewin’s theory was taken up in this way in America and the conceptual issues involved see 
K. Danziger, ‘The Project o f an Experimental Social Psychology: Historical Perspectives’, Science in 
Context, vol. 5, (1992), pp. 309-28
344 Bowlby, ‘Psychology and Democracy’, p. 67
345 E.F.M. Durbin, ‘What have we to defend? A Brief Critical Examination of the British Socialist 
Tradition’, in N. Deakin ed. Origins o f  the Welfare State, vol. 2 (London: Routledge, 2000), pp. 5-6, first 
published 1942
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Bowlby’s principle incentive for the development of a psychological view of 
democracy was its potential to accommodate a Labour government as much as to deter 
the threat of a further war, all the more horrific in view of the new nuclear weapons. 
He concluded:
The return to power of a Labour Government pledged to promote a high 
degree of internal and external co-operation would be an excellent 
reason for fostering research along these lines. Such considerations 
attain even more urgent significance with the advent of the atomic 
bomb. All our previous experience points inescapably to the conclusion 
that neither moral exhortation nor fear of punishment will succeed in 
controlling the use of this weapon. Persons bent on suicide and nations 
bent on war, even suicidal war, are deterred by neither. The hope for the 
future lies in a far more profound understanding of the nature of the 
emotional forces involved and the development of scientific social 
techniques for modifying them.346
Bowlby would go on to pursue this research at the Tavistock Clinic and work for the 
inclusion of psychoanalysis within the NHS.347 It remains for further research to show 
how significant this technological framework for social policy was for the labour 
movement, given that it was rooted in the notion of security and social behaviour 
rather than welfare. One potentially fruitful line of research might be the later 
development o f T.H. Marshall’s notion of citizenship in which he attempted to
346 Bowlby, ‘Psychology and Democracy’, p. 76
347 On Bowlby’s post-war work at the Tavistock see Rose and Miller, ‘The Tavistock Programme: The 
Government o f  Subjectivity and Social Life’, pp. 171-192
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constitute society in terms of social production.348 It remains here, however, to offer a 
historical assessment of Bowlby views, to judge the extent that they constitute a 
coherent ideological package.
3: Conclusion: The Limits of Bowlbv’s Ideology
I have argued that Bowlby’s theory of attachment needs to be understood as 
embedded in wider socio-economic and political debates. His developmental theory 
was constructed in the context of post-World War I thinking on altruism, the post-war 
crisis of national identity, and the debates surrounding democratic socialism. This 
model of development acted, in turn, as the basis for Bowlby and Durbin’s emergent 
political and socio-economic beliefs. It is thus impossible to separate Bowlby’s 
psychology from the social-economic and political interests within which it was 
forged. They mutually reinforced one another and constituted a coherent plan for 
social action, or ideology.
This ideology can be summarised as the state-led application of a universalistic 
psychology to intervene primarily in familial relations and aid in the development of 
children to become altruistic (but otherwise autonomous) members of society. This 
intervention was justified by reference to the ability of peaceful societies to create 
wealth for the benefit of everyone. Any act of aggression worked against wealth 
creation and was, therefore, irrational and a psychological problem. The great absence
348 On Marshall’s conception o f  citizenship see B. Turner, ‘The Erosion o f Citizenship’, British Journal 
o f  Sociology, vol. 52(2), (2001), pp. 189-209; and M. Freeden, ‘Civil Society and the Good Citizen: 
Competing Conceptions o f Citizenship in Twentieth-century Britain’, J. Harris ed., Civil Society in 
British History (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), pp. 275-292
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in Bowlby and Durbin’s thinking is an explanatory account of how people are 
supposed to connect with the many institutions of industrial society.
This absence is unsurprising given their model of psychological development and its 
emphasis on universal and primitive human instincts, and their commitment to a form 
of government that could regulate these instincts. Rather than offering an explanation 
or understanding of the institutions that comprise civilisation, Bowlby and Durbin 
merely advocated that forms of government that accentuated people’s aggressive 
tendencies be replaced by those that enabled loving ones. This form of dualism cannot 
account for Bowlby and Durbin’s own value system, shown to be rooted in interwar 
British society. Moreover, it is problematic in other ways.
Bowlby and Durbin believed that early psychological intervention would tackle the 
root cause of social problems, namely aggressiveness. If this could be achieved then 
people would be free to follow their desires in a caring society and an economy 
maintained by lasting peace. With their model of development, Bowlby and Durbin 
had little conception of the role commerce and consumerism in shaping people’s 
desires. It would, of course, be anachronistic to criticize them for it. Nevertheless, they 
can hardly be excused for granting no space for the competitive nature of private 
enterprise given that this was a subject widely debated during the post-war period of 
nationalisation.
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Writing in 1952, after his resignation from the Labour government, Aneurin Bevan 
lamented the prominence accorded to economic considerations with Keynesian 
economics and wrote of its detrimental effect on socialism:349
What I wish to emphasise here is that Parliamentary action was still to 
be the handmaid of private economic activity; was still to be after the 
fact. Private enterprise was still regarded in that policy, as the dominant 
consideration, and the role of Parliamentary action was to provide a 
stimulant when it looked like flagging. This is wholly opposed to 
Socialism, for to the Socialist, Parliamentary power is to be used 
progressively until the main strands of economic activity are brought 
under public direction.350
And here lies the central problem with Bowlby and Durbin’s perspective. Their 
solution to social problems was wholly psychological and could not conceptually deal 
with the fact that private enterprise was and is inherently self-interested and 
competitive. It is all very well to take the Keynesian line and argue that 
entrepreneurialism ultimately serves wider social needs through driving an otherwise 
stagnant economy. But, it is impossible to maintain that this is compatible with the 
creation of a caring and harmonious society.
Bevan, rather than offer to correct individual behaviour to serve an economic end, 
outlined an alternative democratic vision, arguing that social harmony could be 
achieved by the proper regulation of economic activity:
349 A former Minister o f Health, and o f Labour and National Service under Attlee, Bevan resigned after 
new NHS charges were introduced.
350 A. Bevan, In Place o f  Fear (London: Heinemann, 1952), p. 31
139
If individual man is to make a home for himself in the Great Society, he 
must also seek to make the behaviour of social forces reasonably 
predictable. The assertion of anti-socialists that private economic 
adventure is a desirable condition stumps him as profoundly 
unscientific.351
This was the inverse of Bowlby and Durbin’s interpretation of democratic socialism, 
and Bevan came close to making explicit reference to their views:
Rational thought fights in vain against the irrational mood which is 
produced by the endemic war in industry, commerce and finance. The 
psychology of competition, and love of peace, are uneasy bed-fellows.
The love of peace is certainly there, but it is overwhelmed time and 
again by waves of mass emotion from the countless millions of little 
and great frustrations experienced in the competitive struggle for 
existence.352
It appears that little has changed. We still need to ask to questions about what role 
psychology can play in a truly progressive society. Indeed, this goes to the heart of the 
evolutionary psychology debates. The model of human nature advocated by 
evolutionary psychologists like Bowlby, perpetuates the view that social organisation 
is at best a secondary consideration in understanding peoples’ needs, at worst it is
351 Bevan, In Place o f  Fear, p. 36
352 ibid., pp. 49-50. In 1955 Bevan fought an unsuccessful leadership challenge against Hugh Gaitskell, 
opposing plans to introduce National Health Service charges: see R.J. Godfrey, ‘The Bevan-Gaitskell 
Rivalry: Leadership, Conflict and Division within the British Labour Party’, DPhil thesis, University o f  
Sussex, (1986)
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irrelevant. This is not a sustainable position; my hope is that I have provided some 
indication that its existence is not based on any ‘scientific’ considerations, but rather, a 
set of socio-cultural beliefs that are historically contingent, and can and should be 
reconsidered.
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